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ABSTRACT 
 
In 2014, the Chilean government promulgated the Law 20,571. This law gives to regulated 
clients, mainly residential electricity customers, the right to produce energy/electricity for 
self-consumption and sell any surplus to the grid. After five years of implementation, 
including an update in 2018, the installed capacity of these projects is still very low. In 
contrast, in Scotland it is possible to find a much higher citizen participation in energy 
production through more collective initiatives, specifically community energy projects. 
This situation begs important questions about the effectiveness of net billing schemes in 
promoting citizen participation in energy production. In this doctoral thesis, a variety of 
tools inspired by game theory, social science, and mathematical programming are used 
and adapted to answer these questions. This leads to the following findings. Firstly, the 
current Chilean net billing scheme may not be the best support mechanism for citizen-led 
energy production developments. Secondly, some residential electricity customers would 
be willing to participate in local energy initiatives by devoting money and/or time, even 
when their main concern is the lack of financial resources necessary to fund such projects, 
and project ownership can influence this willingness. Thirdly, community energy projects 
can be the best strategy to follow for residential electricity customers in Scotland and 
Chile, although cost subsidisation can further improve community energy incentives. 
Even when the incumbents do not know their share of the benefits at the time of choosing 
a particular energy production scheme or mechanism, community energy projects present 
more opportunities to be implemented in comparison with net billing schemes in both 
countries. Finally, under specific circumstances, community energy deployment can have 
positive effects on variables like social welfare, consumer surplus, nodal prices, and 
carbon dioxide emissions. Based on these findings, we then draw conclusions and 
recommendations, which can help further development in the community energy sector, 
particularly in Chile.  
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RESUMEN 
 
En el año 2014, el gobierno chileno promulgó la Ley 20.571. Esta ley da a los clientes 
regulados de electricidad, mayoritariamente clientes residenciales, el derecho de producir 
energía/electricidad para autoconsumo y de vender cualquier excedente disponible a la 
red. Después de cinco años de implementación, incluyendo una actualización a dicha ley 
en el año 2018, la mayoría de los proyectos representan una baja capacidad instalada. Por 
el contrario, en Escocia es posible encontrar una capacidad instalada mucho más alta 
asociada a participación ciudadana en generación de energía, a través de iniciativas más 
colectivas, particularmente proyectos comunitarios de energía. Esta situación motiva el 
establecer algunas preguntas sobre la efectividad de los esquemas net billing para 
promover la participación ciudadana en generación de energía. A través de esta tesis 
doctoral, usamos y adaptamos una serie de herramientas inspiradas en los campos de la 
teoría de juegos, ciencias sociales y programación matemática. Después de usar tales 
herramientas y, por lo tanto, responder las preguntas anteriormente mencionadas, 
podemos destacar los siguientes hallazgos: primero, el actual esquema chileno de net 
billing no sería el mejor para apoyar desarrollos de producción de energía ciudadanos; 
segundo, algunos consumidores residenciales de electricidad tendrían la voluntad de 
participar en iniciativas locales de producción de energía vía donando dinero y/o tiempo, 
aun cuando su mayor preocupación es el financiamiento de dichos proyectos, y la 
propiedad de los proyectos influiría en tal voluntad; tercero, los proyectos comunitarios 
de energía pueden ser la mejor estrategia a seguir por los consumidores residenciales de 
electricidad en Escocia y Chile, los costos subsidiados pueden mejorar los incentivos para 
el despliegue de dichos proyectos, y aun cuando los incumbentes no saben cuan bien 
podrían estar al momento de elegir un esquema de producción de energía u otro, los 
proyectos comunitarios de energía presentan mayores oportunidades para ser 
implementados en comparación con proyectos net billing en ambos países; finalmente, 
habrían efectos positivos en variables como beneficio social, excedente del consumidor, 
precios nodales y emisiones de dióxido de carbono, derivado del despliegue de proyectos 
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comunitarios de energía bajo circunstancias específicas. En consecuencia, establecemos 
conclusiones y recomendaciones que pueden ayudar a un desarrollo más profundo de los 
proyectos comunitarios de energía, particularmente en Chile. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Climate change is probably the most worrying threat mankind has faced in recent times. 
It is worrying because it involves not only climatic or meteorological aspects but also 
derived implications with unsuspected consequences. These consequences are strongly 
linked to social, economic, and environmental matters that model, define, and guide the 
daily life of people around the world. In the late eighties, a pioneering call for action was 
made by the Brundtland Commission (World Commission on Environment and 
Development - WCED) to make significant efforts to assure economic growth, 
environmental protection, and social equality [1]. After twenty years or so from that call, 
things seem to have improved in several aspects, but there are still many challenges ahead, 
particularly, in terms of guaranteeing economic growth, environmental protection, and 
social equality; in other words, an efficient and equitable sustainable development.  
 
Regarding the above, the worldwide electricity and heat sector plays a key role in the three 
above-mentioned pillars of sustainable development, as it is one of the fundamental 
drivers of economic growth and social equality. It provides access to basic services for 
industries (and people), which allow and facilitate the provision of other more complex 
services and goods that improve people’s quality of life every single day such as, health, 
safety and security, food, leisure, and so on. At the same time, these contributions to 
economic growth and social equality often come at a cost to the environment. In 2016, the 
sector accounted for 42% of the total global carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions in the world 
[2]. These CO2 emissions are very important considering the current CO2 concentration 
in the atmosphere, which has already exceeded the 400 ppm, magnitude that is over the 
highest historical CO2 level of 300 ppm (as quantified by data reconstruction from ice 
cores) [3]. As generally known, CO2 traps the heat that is released through human 
activities (anthropogenic emissions), which implies a variety of negative consequences to 
the biosphere, including permafrost melting and the corresponding retained methane 
release, slower forestation, decreasing solar radiation reflection and the corresponding rise 
2 
     
of sea water levels and temperatures, thermohaline currents weakening and the 
corresponding changes on the natural continental temperature regulation, among others. 
Although the installed capacity of renewable energy has grown from approximately 995 
GW in 2007 to more than 2,179 GW in 2017 [4], we still need to enact effective measures 
to reduce pollutant emissions, as fossil fuels currently constitute about two thirds of the 
global power installed capacity [5]. 
 
All the aforementioned consequences derived from CO2 emissions and the resulting 
climate change would imply a variety of impacts that may damage economic growth as 
well as social equality, recalling the sustainable development concept. Several estimations 
highlight that impacts in developed countries might imply, for example, welfare loss 
(especially in poorer countries) [6], damage to critical crops for world food security, such 
as corn and soybeans crops in the United States [7], severe loss in the economic value of 
European forest land [8], specific impacts on agriculture, river floods, coastal areas, 
tourism, and human health with potential significant reductions in household welfare and 
annual welfare growth in the European Union [9], a reshaping of the global economy with 
a drop on the average global income and a rise in global income inequality derived from 
unmitigated warming [10], negative impacts on gross domestic product per +1°C on 
average and a larger economic inequality in the United States [11], significant land losses 
in Europe derived from a sea-level rise [12], water availability stress and river flooding 
[13], among others. Of course, developing counties like Chile are no exception and also 
face challenges related to climate change. According to the Climate Change National 
Action Plan 2017-2022 established by the Chilean government, Chile is highly vulnerable 
to climate change due to the existence of a low lying coastal area, arid and semiarid zones, 
forests, land exposed to natural catastrophes, areas that are prone to drought and 
desertification, urban zones with atmospheric pollution, and mountainous ecosystems. 
This implies many consequences such as a rise on temperatures across the country [14], 
changes to precipitation patterns with a significant drop on rainfall [15-17], an increase in 
the frequency of extreme climatic events [18], biodiversity damage, water availability 
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stress and drought, illnesses proliferation, impacts on public infrastructure, lower installed 
capacity based on hydro energy, agricultural land displacement across the country [14], 
harmful effects on fisheries [19-22], pressures on the tourism sector and public services 
[14], etc. 
 
Based on the evidence shown above, climate change would clearly impact most of the 
countries around the world, including Chile, in different areas, which would mean a 
significant damage to economic, social, and environmental aspects of human life. It is 
therefore clear that CO2 emissions reduction is imperative and mandatory, so the best 
options to achieve this need to be properly explored and evaluated by policy-makers and 
implemented by governments, ideally in the short-term. However, even though some basic 
solutions to this problem have been relatively well-known for years (for instance, limit 
fossil fuels consumption, upgrade public and private infrastructure, reduce commuters and 
travellers’ journeys, decrease goods and services consumption, be more efficient in terms 
of the use of energy, eat vegetarian food, avoid deforestation, constrain birth rates, replace 
fuels, among others [23]), the reality is more complex, so the effectiveness of dealing with 
this global issue might not be as high as expected years ago, especially considering the 
consumer-side of the problem and its solutions. The key numbers on CO2 concentrations 
(400 ppm) and annual emissions (from 33.42 GtCO2 in 2010 to 36.18 GtCO2 in 2016) 
[24,25] only confirm this statement, even though the renewable energy participation in the 
world generation mix more than doubled in ten years, as noted above.  
 
In this context, some authors have argued that the current growth rate of renewable energy 
installed capacity is not enough to tackle climate change even when wind and solar costs 
have dropped significantly [26]. Other authors have recently said that even a scenario with 
100% renewable energy would not be sufficient [27]. Moreover, some estimations 
highlight that coal-fired power plants could keep their relevance in the world generation 
mix until 2040, due to the useful life of such plants in Asia where they are 11 years old on 
average, indicating several operational decades ahead [28]. Hence, an effective, sufficient, 
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and timely transition towards a carbon-free electricity and heat sector could be at risk. 
These facts (and many others) illustrate that the challenge that is being faced is huge and 
therefore the relevance of transforming the power sector into a zero-carbon industry, as 
soon as we possibly can, cannot be denied. Currently, this energy transition is dependent 
on (quite few) large companies or generators. For example, in the United Kingdom (UK) 
the electricity generation sector is led by a small number of large power companies, which 
represent almost 50% of the wholesale electricity market1 [29]. In Chile, a similar situation 
can be observed as the electricity market is led by five large generation firms2, if a total 
installed capacity greater than 1,000 MW [30] is considered. Thus, it seems that new ways 
of thinking and conceiving the energy and electricity markets need to be taken into 
account, apart from widely-known specific activities based on the customer-side or 
producer-side of the solution, namely, reduce fossil fuels consumption, shorten 
commuters and travellers’ journeys, limit goods and services consumption, etc. 
 
Other ways of thinking and conceiving the energy and electricity markets have started to 
be explored in the literature. In particular, a new way of making the demand-side involved 
in energy production, not as a mere spectator or influencer but as true participant and 
decision-maker, is being considered. Ackermann et al. [31] propose one of the most 
relevant definitions in this sense: the concept of distributed generation. This concept can 
be simply defined as “an electric power source connected directly to the distribution 
network or on the customer site of the meter”. Of course, the precise definition may vary 
in each country around the world given the specific legal, regulatory, technical, and 
economic context. This concept has recently attracted a lot of attention, even though a 
more decentralised way of producing energy is not an entirely new paradigm, as in the 
beginning of the electricity markets the first power plants only supplied customers near 
their location, due to an DC-based transmission system, which implied a constrained 
voltage and a shorter delivery distance [32]. There are some drivers that play a key role in 
                                                 
1 EDF (29.1 GW), RWE (14.0 GW), and SSE (9.7 GW). 
2 ENDESA (ENEL) (3.8 GW), Colbún (3.3 GW), AES Gener (2.4 GW), ENGIE (1.6 GW), and CELTA (1.0 GW). 
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the emergence of more decentralised energy systems, such as technological developments, 
more limitations to the construction of long transmission lines, a larger demand for reliable 
energy services, liberalised electricity markets, climate change and other environmental 
concerns [33]. Pepermans et al. [32] notice that two drivers chiefly contribute to an 
increasing interest in distributed generation: liberalised electricity markets and 
environmental concerns. Alanne & Saari [34] highlight that such distributed generation 
systems may contribute to an effective peak load management, capacity reliability and 
quality, local network use and expansion, combined heat and power deployment, more 
affordable energy sources, among others. The same authors also note that these elements 
would justify a deeper connection or alignment to the concept of sustainable development. 
However, there are disadvantages and challenges to face as well, including significant 
implementation costs, misaligned market incumbents’ incentives, unbalanced energy 
supply and demand, impacts on grid frequency and voltage, and other technical issues 
mainly due to power flow variations, AC-DC interfaces, and a lack of synchronous 
generation [32].  
 
It should be noted that the concept of distributed generation, as it was conceived and 
defined, seems to imply a more individualistic concept of decentralised energy production 
and does not explicitly take into account social aspects, which are very important at the 
time of developing and implementing any project that may impact people’s life and the 
environment. Social aspects imply a diversity of factors, for example, how harmful or 
beneficial an energy production project could be, what specific benefits such a project will 
provide to people, how project costs and risks are accounted and managed by project 
developers, how people can participate in the decision-making processes, etc. 
 
Here, another concept emerges as an option, which explicitly considers social aspects in 
energy production: community energy. Walker and Devine-Wright [35] identify two 
underlying dimensions of this concept: process and outcome. The former relates to who 
develops and runs the project, and who is involved and has influence. The latter relates to 
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how the outcome is spatially and socially distributed. They also establish that an ideal 
community energy project would be a renewable energy project that is entirely driven and 
carried out by a group of people and also benefits the local community. This is because 
such project becomes less controversial and divisive among the community members, as 
there is a direct and more profound involvement and the benefits are shared among people 
[35]. Given that the term community energy explicitly involves a more social perspective 
about energy generation, there are more concepts related to the social sciences that explain 
and play a key role in the emergence of such projects, including interpersonal and social 
trust [36], structural and symbolic resources [37], community ownership [38], among 
others. Of course, the relevance of more technical concerns related to the area of electric 
power studies cannot be denied and deserves to be taken into account, but that is beyond 
the scope of this thesis. Despite the complexity of such terms, it is possible to find many 
community energy projects that are currently generating energy and benefitting people in 
a more sustainable way, particularly in European countries like Germany, Denmark, 
Spain, England, Scotland, Wales, the Netherlands, Sweden, Italy, etc. As in a distributed 
generation paradigm, community energy can also take many specific legal forms and/or 
organisations depending upon their specific legal, regulatory, technical, and economic 
context, but the essence or nature of a community energy project does not vary: an energy 
production project made by and for people. 
 
Both aforementioned terms come under the umbrella of a wider notion: citizen 
participation in energy production. As a consequence, policy-makers, local authorities, 
and governments, should decide in which way citizen participation in energy production 
should be promoted and deployed in a particular place, which can be incentivised through 
net billing schemes, net metering schemes, community energy projects, locally-owned 
energy initiatives, and many other concepts or definitions that can be found in the 
specialised literature today. 
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Chile decided not to be left behind, and its government in 2014 promulgated the Law 
20,571, commonly called “distributed generation or net billing law” [39]. This law gives 
to regulated clients the right to produce energy/electricity for self-consumption and sell 
any surplus to the grid. In the same vein, the Chilean government also launched Chile’s 
Energy Policy 2050, in which it explicitly sets out some goals related to the associativity 
between communities and private organisations/companies for promoting local 
developments, deployment of community-led or joint-led energy projects, distributed 
generation and electricity demand management mechanisms [40]. However, although this 
law was promulgated and the government explicitly established a positive attitude to 
citizen participation in energy production initiatives, the Chilean net billing scheme as 
defined in Law 20,571 did not seem to yield as much result as expected. Some incumbents 
in the electricity market claimed that the law was not entirely aligned with customers’ 
needs and companies’ incentives, citing economic, technical, and legal reasons3 4. In fact, 
at the end of 2016, there was less than 2 MW of installed capacity derived from net billing 
scheme projects in Chile. Considering this situation, the government began negotiations 
to modify the net billing law. This update came in 2018, with modifications to the 
maximum generation, the possibility of implementing joint ownership projects, payments 
for energy injections made by residential customers with up to 20 kW of installed capacity 
(when their electricity consumption expenses are exceeded), among others5 6 [41]. Yet, 
although the total installed capacity derived from net billing projects increased remarkably 
during the last few years, the projects (in terms of quantity) still represent a low installed 
capacity. This implies that most of the net billing capacity is not justified by a real 
inclusion of residential electricity customers in energy production. In this sense, the 
Chilean government recently stated that the net billing law is to promote self-consumption 
[41], which would contradict what has been written in Chile’s Energy Policy 2050. 
                                                 
3 See https://www.nuevamineria.com/revista/generacion-distribuida-una-ley-en-deuda/ 
4 See http://www.revistaei.cl/entrevistas/cara-a-cara-se-debe-reformular-la-ley-de-generacion-distribuida/# 
5 See http://www.revistaei.cl/2018/08/03/estos-los-principales-cambios-del-proyecto-ley-modifica-la-generacion-distribuida/ 
6 See http://www.revistaei.cl/reportajes/la-apuesta-la-generacion-distribuida/ 
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In contrast, in the UK, citizen participation in energy production began to be promoted 
much earlier, through official statements as a way to strengthen communities and the 
energy/electricity market in a more sustainable way [42,43]. This boost supported the 
creation of several public, private, and third-sector organisations with the objective of 
encouraging and helping communities that wanted to participate in energy production. At 
the same time, the British and devolved governments started to create financial and 
technical aid schemes that provided (and still provide) key support to facilitate the 
deployment and implementation of the concept of citizen participation in energy 
production. Within the UK, one of the most remarkable examples is Scotland, where the 
community and locally-owned energy sector began with an installed capacity of 1.2 MW 
in 2011, based mostly on wind energy technologies and helped by the British feed in tariff 
scheme [44], to migrate towards an installed capacity of 697 MW in 2018, which is not 
only based on wind energy but also on other renewable energy sources [45]. Behind this 
apparent success was an ambitious goal set by the Scottish government in 2011, which 
established a target of 500 MW of installed capacity based on community and locally-
owned energy by 2020 [46-48]. However, given the current situation the Scottish 
government now set a new target of 1 GW by 2020 [45]. Concerning the above, the 
community-owned energy sector alone currently represents nearly 80 MW of installed 
capacity, a magnitude that demonstrates a remarkable evolution especially during the last 
6 years. This is very important, not only because of the installed capacity, but also because 
of the potential benefits that communities can derive from such projects. Those benefits 
may consist of direct profits that can be used for improving local economy (via 
employment, for example) or carrying out other social activities (local refurbishments, for 
instance). This is a huge difference in comparison with schemes like net billing, where the 
benefits are primarily allocated to just one individual, which might even be a private 
company and not a residential electricity customer.  
 
Making simple comparisons between both countries, it seems that the Scottish experience 
in citizen participation in energy production deployment, principally through the 
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emergence of a community energy sector, may provide useful lessons to other countries, 
especially emerging ones like Chile, that want to develop and deploy their own. The 
contrasts between Chile and Scotland could indicate that a deeper involvement of 
communities in energy production might imply a higher citizen participation and then a 
more successful outcome; in terms of new citizen-based renewable energy installed 
capacity, at least. Alternatively, more collective energy production schemes (community 
energy) might imply better results than more individual energy generation schemes (net 
billing). Of course, this begs several more specific questions: Is the Chilean net billing 
scheme appropriate to foster citizen participation in energy production? Do people 
(alternatively: residential electricity customers) really want to participate in energy 
production? What social factors influence citizen participation in energy production? Is 
community energy more attractive than net billing schemes to promote citizen 
participation in energy production? What impacts could the deployment of community 
energy projects have on electricity markets? The answers to these questions could, of 
course, relate to complex factors such as historical, sociological, psychological, and 
cultural factors that are beyond the scope of this work. Nevertheless, there are some more 
practical tools that can help to better understand this phenomenon.  
 
The methodology followed in this work, in order to answer the aforementioned questions, 
considers the use of game-theoretical tools (i.e. biform games and linear production 
games), which can help to deal with questions related to the economic-strategic viability 
or convenience of a particular initiative. Moreover, some social science techniques like 
Likert scale-based surveys and regression analysis are also considered in this doctoral 
thesis, which can help find clues about people’s feelings, desires, or preferences about a 
particular initiative. Furthermore, mathematical programming or optimisation modelling 
is also taken into account in this work, which addresses questions about the impacts of 
community energy initiatives on key economic variables such as prices, production 
quantities, profits or social welfare, etc.  
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Hence, this research takes the Scottish and Chilean experiences in citizen participation in 
energy production into account, and develops simple and pioneering cases and examples 
focused on solar PV technologies, in order to answer the aforementioned questions. To do 
so, we consider real-world data chiefly taken from Chilean and Scottish/British sources 
and use all the above-mentioned tools, in order to contribute to the state-of-art by 
providing valuable evidence that might help policy-makers, governments, and other 
stakeholders to design and implement proper public policies that increase the penetration 
of renewable energy through citizen participation. This may contribute to CO2 emissions 
reductions, provide customers a real and effective involvement in the energy/electricity 
markets, democratise and strengthen such markets, increase the customers’ wealth and 
social welfare, have positive effects on retail prices, and so on. In this sense, this work 
addresses and examines these elements, which implies the following main 
results/findings: 
 
Firstly, the net billing scheme currently in force in Chile may not be the best support 
mechanism for citizen-led energy generation initiatives. Secondly, some residential 
electricity consumers would be willing to participate, by investing money and/or devoting 
time, in local energy initiatives, even when the lack of financial resources necessary to 
fund such initiatives is their main worry, and project ownership can influence this 
willingness. Thirdly, community energy projects can be the best strategy for residential 
electricity consumers in Scotland and Chile, although cost subsidisation can further 
improve the incentives for community energy developments. Community energy projects 
show more opportunities to be implemented in both countries, even when the incumbents 
do not know their share of benefits at the time of choosing a particular energy generation 
scheme. Finally, under particular circumstances, community energy initiatives can have 





     
Based on these findings, we draw conclusions and recommendations shown later in this 
doctoral thesis, which can help further development in the community energy sector, 




This research mainly addresses two hypotheses, which can be presented as follows: 
 
1. The current Chilean net billing scheme is not the most effective scheme to promote 
and deploy citizen participation in energy production in Chile, especially with regard 
to community energy projects. 
2. The implementation and deployment of community energy projects in Chile may lead, 
at least under certain circumstances, to positive economic and environmental impacts 
on the whole power system. 
 
General and specific objectives 
 
The general objective of this thesis is verifying the aforementioned hypotheses and 
providing a more effective market mechanism or scheme to promote and deploy citizen 
participation in energy production in Chile. 
 
The specific objectives are shown as follows: 
 
1. Survey the current literature about the Scottish experience in community energy 
emergence, and analyse the Chilean current situation to determine the key differences 
between these two countries. 
2. Investigate the appropriateness of the current Chilean net billing scheme, one of these 
key differences, using game theoretical tools. 
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3. Examine residential electricity customers’ willingness to participate in energy 
production and especially the relationship between customers’ sense of ownership of 
energy projects and their willingness to devote time and money to these projects, by 
using social science tools like Likert scale-based surveys and regression analysis. 
4. Determine the economic-strategic incentives for implementing and deploying 
community energy projects by using novel hybrid game theoretical tools. 
5. Examine the potential effects of community energy developments on electricity 
markets using advanced optimisation models. 
6. Contribute to the state-of-art literature and derive useful lessons and recommendations 
to help policy-makers, governments, and other stakeholders to design and implement 
proper public policies that increase the penetration of renewable energy through 
citizen participation, particularly community energy projects. 
 
Main contributions of the thesis 
 
The main contributions of this doctoral thesis can be summarised as follows: 
 
1. This thesis gathers evidence from different sources and disciplines, about the Scottish 
community energy sector development, which will be useful to many readers.  
2. This is a first systematic attempt to characterise the Chilean community energy sector 
and compare it with similar sectors elsewhere. 
3. This is the first attempt to analytically demonstrate the inconvenience of the current 
Chilean net billing scheme for residential electricity consumers, by using non-
cooperative game theory. 
4. This is the first systematic effort that explores and determines whether Chilean 
residential electricity customers are willing to participate in energy production 
initiatives, and what the key drivers of their willingness to devote time or money are. 
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5. This is a first attempt at explicitly including ownership matters in quantitative studies 
about citizen participation in energy production, and the first study to show that these 
ownership matters are a key explanatory variable of citizen participation. 
6. This is the first attempt to characterise the Scottish and Chilean community energy 
sectors by using novel hybrid games theoretical tools, particularly biform games.  
7. This is the first effort that formally characterises and includes community energy 
projects in generation and transmission expansion optimisation problems, by using 
biform games and linear production games. 
8. This is the first attempt to demonstrate the usefulness of using biform games to analyse 
increasingly complex electricity markets. 
9. This is the first work explicitly focused on community energy development in Chile, 
which presents valuable evidence and useful lessons and policy recommendations. 
 
Structure of the thesis 
 
The main body of this doctoral thesis has been organised in four chapters (plus the final 
remarks and general conclusions presented afterwards, at the end of this thesis), in which 
we attempt to address the aforementioned research hypotheses by answering the above-
mentioned questions. Accordingly, the corresponding structure of this thesis is shown as 
follows: 
 
In chapter I, we present an overview of the relevant evidence available regarding the 
Scottish experience in relation to the development of community energy projects. We also 
characterise the Chilean context and further analyse the current Chilean net billing scheme 
using concepts from non-cooperative game theory. We then derive lessons from the 
Scottish experience and define a list of policy recommendations for Chile, which can help 
further development in community energy. The text in this chapter is based on a 
manuscript that has been accepted for publication in Renewable and Sustainable Energy 
Reviews. 
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Chapter II presents an exploratory quantitative assessment of the preferences for local 
energy initiatives based on solar photovoltaics technologies, carried out through an online 
survey focused on residential electricity customers who live in Region Metropolitana, 
Chile. We explicitly include the concept of ‘sense of ownership’, for which we also 
propose a specific definition. We use the corresponding results to draw conclusions for 
strengthening citizen participation in energy production. 
 
Chapter III presents simple and novel three-player bi-form coalitional games, which 
analyse community energy projects in Chile and Scotland taking into account two methods 
based on biform games theory. These games are based on real-world data about 
community energy projects, net billing distributed generation schemes and ordinary utility 
contracts. We use these games to derive insights about the economic-strategic viability of 
community energy projects and draw conclusions for the community energy sector, 
simultaneously showing that biform games can be a valuable tool to analyse increasingly 
complex electricity markets. The text in this chapter is based on a manuscript that has been 
submitted for publication in Energy Economics. 
 
Finally, in chapter IV, we present a bi-level generation and transmission planning 
optimisation model, which combines biform games and linear production games, to 
analyse the impact of the community energy sector emergence on wider electricity 
markets. The model is formulated as a mathematical program with equilibrium constraints 
(MPEC) for which the corresponding Karush–Kuhn–Tucker (KKT) conditions are 
obtained, in order to integrate all the incumbents’ problems considered in the model. 
When solving this problem we examine the effects on social welfare, consumer surplus, 
nodal prices, demand and generation of electricity, transmission expansion, and CO2 
emissions. We then draw conclusions for the community energy sector and show that 
biform games and linear production games can be valuable tools to work on energy 
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markets complexities through optimisation models. The text in this chapter is basically 
based on a manuscript that has been submitted for publication in Applied Energy. 
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I. THE SCOTTISH EXPERIENCE IN COMMUNITY ENERGY 




In recent years, the idea of local and/or civic participation in energy generation has been 
part of renewable energy targets defined by governments in the UK and Europe, in order 
to implement energy production projects in a sustainable and decentralised way. 
 
In 2003 and 2005, the UK Government released two reports, which contained statements 
about encouraging actions performed by citizens aimed at implementing local/community 
renewable energy projects [42,43]. Those statements were not mere rhetoric. In fact, many 
organisations were, at that time, already operating in the community energy sector, 
including the Scottish Community and Households Renewables Initiative, and the Energy 
Saving Trust (EST), which provide advice, training and funding, among other services 
[36]. Since then, additional initiatives have been launched by the UK and devolved 
governments around the UK [49], such as the Welsh Assembly's Community Scale 
Renewable Energy Programme, the Community Renewable Energy Fund, etc. Generic 
support schemes for renewable energy have helped community energy developments as 
well. Apart from the Renewable Obligation System implemented in the UK, a Feed-In-
Tariff (FIT) scheme has been implemented since 2010 [50]. There are also other initiatives 
such as the Seed Enterprise Investment Scheme (SEIS), which offers a tax relief that could 
apply to some renewable energy projects [51-53]. These schemes help to increase the 
amount of renewable energy generating capacity, as well as support the deployment of 
citizen participation in energy generation projects. 
 
Despite this, some critical views have also been voiced. Some authors argue that current 
support schemes are useful but not sufficient, and that they need to be complemented with 
other policies. They also criticise the UK’s position as ambiguous, because community 
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energy is being promoted without significant changes in the large-scale generation mix, 
as a small number of companies dominate the British energy sector, and isolated policies, 
like the FIT scheme, are unlikely to change the prevailing policy framework, which is 
based on large-scale developments [52,54]. Bomberg & McEwen [37] show that 
uncertainties related to support schemes could inhibit the progress of community energy 
projects. Frantzeskaki et al. [55] argue that, despite a political desire for community 
energy, existing mechanisms and policies are inconsistent and incompliant. Underlining 
this perspective, Berka et al. [56] show that community energy projects face higher costs 
due to several factors, such as internal processes, diseconomies of scale, local opposition 
and acceptance, among others. Moreover, despite the existence of around 5,000 
community energy groups up to March 2015 in the UK7 [57,58], the electricity generation 
is led by few “major power producers” [59]. Thus, in the UK, the trend would imply a 
redistribution of just a small part of the whole generation mix towards communities, while 
other economic agents, such as some householders, farmers, and public bodies, would 
benefit more from this shift [60]. Nevertheless, the role of communities in energy 
production is recognised in the UK (and especially in Scotland) through the 
aforementioned elements by the incumbents of the British energy market. Even the small 
share of community energy projects in the UK’s generation mix is significantly larger than 
other countries, especially in Scotland. 
 
There may therefore be useful lessons to be learned from the UK, and particularly, the 
Scottish approach to community energy, which could help countries that want to develop 
their own community energy sector. This chapter focuses on Chile, which has an incipient 
but still weak community energy sector, despite some interest in further development from 
the government. In this chapter, we provide an analysis of the Scottish community energy 
sector and its development, compare this with other European countries and the current 
situation in Chile, and draw out conclusions for Chilean policy. 
 
                                                 
7 More recent studies indicate around 3,500 groups involved in community energy [58]. 
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The rest of this chapter has been organised as follows. In section I.2, we propose an 
updated definition of community energy based on the Scottish experience. In section I.3, 
we summarise and analyse the Scottish community energy sector, contrast it with some 
experience elsewhere in Europe, and include an overview of UK and Scottish government 
support mechanisms. Section I.4 gives an overview of the Chilean community energy 
sector, compares it to Scotland and uses concepts from game theory to analyse some of its 
main features. Based on this, section I.5 then presents some recommendations for Chile. 
Section I.6 concludes. 
 
I.2 Community energy: towards an updated definition based on the Scottish 
experience 
 
Before proceeding, it is useful to consider how community energy projects should be 
defined. The concept of community energy [35] has evolved through the years, reflecting 
a growth in terms of experience, knowledge and information, evidence, support from 
public and private entities, new and more transactions between communities and other 
stakeholders, newly available technologies, more regulations, and so on.  
 
Of particular relevance to this chapter is the Scottish Government’s definition, which 
defines community energy as “projects led by constituted non-profit-distributing 
community groups established and operating across a geographically defined community, 
including Bencoms”8. It then introduces another concept, “Locally-owned Energy”, which 
includes “projects led by regional organisations which are not profit-distributing and have 
charitable aims such as housing associations and educational institutions or local 
authorities, as well as commercial businesses including farmers, land managers, rural 
small and medium-sized enterprises and profit-distributing co-operatives” [46]. It is 
                                                 
8 Community Benefit Society, organisation created for serving the broader interests of a community. Members commonly have 




     
important to note that both definitions include an understanding in which community and 
locally-owned organisations carry out their mission and achieve objectives within a 
specific and well-defined geographic location, affecting a particular community or 
communities within a certain geographical range. 
 
In order to have more information about the nature and characteristics of such projects, 
Van Veelen [61] develops a typology of 367 community energy projects in Scotland based 
on several variables, such as legal body, purpose, ownership, size of installation, 
technology, among others, defining five categories of projects. Within those categories, 
the study identifies 211 initiatives (often) described as development trusts, which are 
legally formed as a company often with charitable status and full community ownership; 
63% of them (which had funding information available) had received economic/financial 
support from the government. On the other hand, only 20 projects are identified as energy 
cooperatives in which is possible to find projects from 1,000 kW of capacity. If 
development trusts are taken into account, it is possible to find projects only from 100 kW 
of capacity [61]. It is therefore clear that, in terms of the number of projects, development 
trusts are the dominant type of organisation considered by the Scottish people to be 
involved in energy production. Given that, one question emerges: what is a development 
trust? 
 
According to the Development Trusts Association Scotland’s (DTAS) definition, a 
development trust is an organisation that is [62]: 
 
1. Engaged in the economic, environmental, and social regeneration of a defined area. 
2. Independent, aiming for self-sufficiency and not for private profit.  
3. Community based, owned, and managed. 
4. Actively involved in partnerships and alliances between the community, voluntary, 
and private and public sectors. 
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DTAS [62] establishes that a development trust must meet all the four points mentioned 
before. Additionally, there is no specific legal/organisational structure for a development 
trust. However, most of the registered organisations in DTAS are companies limited by 
guarantee with charitable aims9 and many have trading subsidiaries as well. It is important 
to note that a development trust is not necessary a “trust” in a legal sense [63]. 
Nevertheless, under these criteria, could a cooperative be considered as a development 
trust?  
 
According to the International Co-operative Alliance’s definition and principles [64-67], 
a Cooperative is an autonomous association of persons united voluntarily to meet their 
common economic, social, and cultural needs and aspirations through a jointly owned and 
democratically-controlled enterprise. The members have an equal say in what the business 
does and a share in the profits. Comparing this concept with the DTAS’s definition of 
development trust, it is clear that the economic nature of a development trust and a 
cooperative are very similar, but there are some key differences. In a cooperative, the main 
goal is providing benefits to its members/owners [66,68,69], as result of the economic 
activity carried out by the cooperative entity, leaving to the community without a direct 
access to the profits or benefits. A cooperative is therefore not a charitable organisation 
[66,68]. Concerning this, SCENE [70] highlights that the primary motivation of 
community energy initiatives is “to generate local income and strengthen the local 
economy”, instead of providing benefits to the members of a particular project. Similarly, 
Van Veelen [61] notes that energy cooperatives in Scotland tend to be primarily motivated 
by the financial benefits their members might receive from participation in renewable 
energy, whereas development trusts’ primary motivation is generating local income. 
Another important difference is that a cooperative does not necessarily focus on a specific 
place because its members can belong to one or several communities within a small or big 
area, which is not necessarily well-defined. Hence, cooperatives do not meet at least two 
                                                 
9 See http://www.communitycompanies.co.uk/charitable-companies-limited-by-guarantee 
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elements listed by DTAS so should not be treated as development trusts, even when both 
entities could seem indistinguishable in practice.  
 
The information revealed above is useful to establish an updated definition of the concept 
of community energy based on the Scottish experience, due to the following reasons. 
Firstly, in the Scottish context, there are mainly two groups of initiatives, which people 
can use to participate in energy production, namely “non-profit-distributing community 
groups” or “community energy” per se, and “locally-owned energy”. The main difference 
between them is related to the legal and organisational structure of projects, where the 
latter group does not distinguish between pro-profit and non-profit organisations10. 
Secondly, the first group seems to lead the community energy sector in Scotland, mainly 
through development trusts. Thirdly, energy cooperatives in Scotland are not important in 
terms of citizen participation in energy production, considering the number of projects. 
This is a key point in comparison with other countries like England, Germany, Denmark, 
etc., where energy cooperatives have a prevailing role [61,71-75]. Fourthly, as was shown 
before, an energy cooperative should not be considered as development trust so they 
should not be considered under the first group. This is important from a legal and 
economic perspective11 [76]. 
 
Regarding the above, we propose the following updated definition of community energy, 
avoiding distinctions based on legal structures: 
 
A community energy project (or initiative) is a project conceived, carried out, and 
implemented by people who are: 
 
                                                 
10 It is important to note that, beyond the aforementioned classification, within the Scottish landscape of community energy projects 
it is possible to find different legal/organisational structures, such as companies with charitable status, transition towns, local 
environmental groups, community hall associations, among others. The above involve a variety of ownership models like, for 
instance, full community ownership, shared equity/joint venture, community shares, etc. [61].   
11 For instance, under the Scottish regulation, a community (group) can be eligible for all funding instruments, whereas other 
organisations, like bencoms and cooperatives, are eligible for all funding instruments unless they formally accept some rules, which 
shape the distribution of benefits. This would empirically demonstrate the different nature of cooperatives. 
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a) Interested in generating energy. We are not exclusively focused on renewable energy 
sources, as the current constraints on renewable energy use in terms of full availability 
of energy, capacity factors, utilization of storage devices, backup procedures in case 
of blackout, etc., still mean that fossil fuels have to play a role in some community 
energy projects. 
b) Located close to or in the exact place of the project. This may seem to be a bit vague 
or imprecise. However, we think that it is necessary to highlight the existence of a 
geographical scope, without too strictly defining it, as an exact definition could depend 
on different aspects such as the current legal or regulatory framework, nature of the 
project, surrounding environment, technology, and many other factors, considering a 
range from just a few metres to many kilometres. For now, we therefore just note the 
existence of a scope in terms of geographical distance or area/place, as noted in Van 
Veelen [61]. This is coherent with the Scottish Government’s definitions on these 
matters. 
c) Well-organised under any suitable legal and organisational structure. This includes 
a formal definition of the rules, roles, and responsibilities of the project within the 
community and about their relations with other stakeholders.  
d) The owner or have a high participation in the ownership of the project, as people 
should have the right to be involved in the project decision-making process, as well as 
obtain its benefits and assume its costs and risks. This point is directly related to the 
two underlying dimensions (process and outcome) of the concept of community 
energy stated by Walker & Devine-Wright [35]. 
e) The main (and/or the first) beneficiary of the project. This is related to the above-
mentioned point. As long as people are the owner or have a high participation in the 
ownership of the project, they will have the right to get the project benefits before 
other possible participants in it. The outcome will then focus on people first, which is 
the essence of a community energy project. 
f) Primarily interested in welfare maximisation and income generation, but in order to 
achieve other aims such as social and/or environmental goals, including an 
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improvement in terms of local economy and energy independence. Here, the focus is 
not only on providing benefits to some members, but also the community as a whole. 
 
Thus, at least from an economic perspective, a community energy project can be treated 
as an economic agent that receives assets from other economic agents, which must be 
managed appropriately, in order to obtain benefits to be invested in social initiatives or 
used to reach charitable aims. All of this is aimed at helping a community and gaining 
more (sustainable) independence. Considering this, in terms of energy production, this 
entity competes with other organisations, such as power generators and utilities. 
Therefore, more research is necessary in order to fully understand the community energy 
sector incumbents’ incentives, economic behaviours, key differences, etc. 
 
I.3 Community energy in Scotland 
 
I.3.1 Specifics of community energy development in Scotland 
 
Unsurprisingly, community energy and related concepts have been studied extensively. 
Some literature focuses on the organisational structure of community energy projects, 
trying to identify which conditions or elements are necessary for projects to be successful 
[35,36,77]. In addition, some literature focuses on remarkable cases, some of them based 
in Scotland. For instance, Warren & McFadyen [38] show that there was a kind of local 
‘affection’ towards a windfarm from people in the Isle of Gigha, and note that the project 
faced less public opposition compared to similar projects in Kintyre peninsula. Rae & 
Bradley [78] note the importance of energy autonomy for communities and the success of 
community ownership in wind energy installations, considering a remarkable example in 
the Scottish village of Fintry. Bomberg & McEwen [37] identify that political conditions, 
which allow or constrain community energy projects, and non-material resources, which 
facilitate the functioning of community energy groups, mobilise community energy 
initiatives. They also highlight that a critical element is taking advantage of government 
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resources and support, mainly through communities’ knowledge, expertise, and 
connections. Additionally, the idea of survival, empowerment and autonomy, and income 
generation in a sustainable way as a main priority, contributed to the mobilisation of 
communities in energy production. Frantzeskaki et al. [55] note that a common feature in 
Scottish communities is the willingness to struggle for self-sufficiency and independence, 
which also applies to the energy sector. They also establish several categories of tensions 
that are faced by community energy projects, such as incompliant funding mechanisms, 
time-management and project management risks, financial viability risks, etc. Haggett et 
al. [79] find, for different stages of a community energy project, that economic 
motivations are the primary driver followed by control/autonomy, and environmental 
issues. In a more quantitative study, Seyfang et al. [49] find that the highest proportion of 
community energy groups in the UK operating in 2012 were located in Scotland, South 
West England, and South East England. Moreover, the area covered by community-related 
networks and organisations was higher in Scotland than England. Further stressing the 
importance of income generation, Okkonen & Lehtonen [80] apply Leontief’s Input-
Output Model to projects located in three Scottish archipelagos (Orkney, Shetland and the 
Outer Hebrides) and find positive impacts on employment derived from re-investments of 
revenues of community onshore wind power. More recently, Haf et al. [81] show the 
importance of confidence in the Scottish Government and its vision about the community 
energy sector by performing semi-structured in-depth interviews for four energy groups, 
including two groups located in the Scottish isles of Lewis and Tiree. They also note the 
disparity with some Welsh energy groups on these issues. 
 
There is a significant amount of empirical evidence that would put the Scottish experience 
as a relevant and pertinent model to follow for other countries that may want to develop, 
deploy, and implement community energy projects, as can be seen above. Of course, that 
relevance is due to several factors, which include, among others, economic, 
environmental, historical, psychological and sociological aspects, such as desire for 
collective action, cultural milieu, and manifestations of community based actions in land 
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reform. However, given that this is a multi-factorial problem, focusing on some key legal, 
economical, and statistical elements might be pertinent, ignoring other elements that are 
beyond the scope of this work. Some questions therefore emerge: how has the Scottish 
community energy sector evolved in recent years? Could the Scottish experience in 
community energy be comparable, in some aspects, with other countries’ experiences? Is 
it possible to derive useful lessons from this evolution? 
 
I.3.2 The evolution and some contrasts of the Scottish community energy sector 
 
In 2011, official statistics show about 1.2 MW of installed capacity, mainly based on wind 
energy, from projects registered under the FIT scheme [44]. Similarly, since 2011, the 
EST has been working on reports related to the community energy sector in Scotland on 
behalf of the Scottish Government [45,82-87]. Regarding this, Fig. I.1. shows that projects 
labelled as “Community” reached 26 MW of installed capacity (366 installations) in June 
2012 [82], whereas in June 2016, there were 510 installations adding up to 67 MW of 
capacity [86]. More recently, in 2018, 540 installations implied an installed capacity of 80 
MW [45]. This therefore means an increase both in number and installed capacity during 
the last few years.  
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We note that the installed capacity of these projects almost doubled during five years while 
the number of installations increased from approximately 400 to 540, implying that 
installations are, on average, larger than before. This evidence reveals a high level of 
growth in projects strictly led by communities. Based on the current data, in the next ten 
years, Scotland could see another 100 MW of installed capacity from this kind of 
initiatives, if the trend continues. This is a stark contrast with other countries where the 
participation of communities in energy production is still very weak, including, for 
example, Chile. In terms of energy sources, Fig. I.2. indicates that wind energy has been 
the preferred technology during the last years, followed by biomass, hydro, and waste-to-
energy. The participation of solar PV technologies is relatively small in terms of capacity. 
 
 
Fig. I.2. Installed capacity by technology of projects labelled as “Community” 
Sources: [45,82-87] 
 
If we also consider “local-owned energy” projects, the situation is even better. Table I.1. 
shows the minimum estimated installed capacity of this kind of projects, jointly with 
“community energy” projects. In 2016, the total capacity was 595 MW with an annual 
production of 1,479 GWh. This was a key milestone from a policy-making perspective, 
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capacity by 2020, derived from these two types of projects [46-48]. In 2018, the total 
capacity reached 697 MW. Regarding this, the Scottish Government has set a new target 
of 1 GW derived from community and locally owned energy by 2020 [45]. 
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CHP and waste 
(GWh) 
2012 204 88 117 489 233 256 
2013 285 168 114 740 390 330 
2014 361 202 159 895 470 425 
2015 508 301 207 1,281 720 561 
2016 595 354 241 1,479 840 639 
2017 666 403 263 1,664 958 706 
2018 697 432 265 1,755 1,051 704 
Source: [45,82-87] 
 
In order to achieve this target, the Scottish government has spent a significant amount of 
resources for implementing a variety of initiatives, mainly related to setting up a suitable 
legislation/regulation and proper incentives [46,88]. One of the most important initiatives 
is the CARES12 [44,46,89,90] but there are also other relevant initiatives [90-92]. It is 
important to note that every single project has to demonstrate its economic and financial 
feasibility, and also show how the resources will be managed to benefit the wider 
community. Other aspects that are taken into account include management, impacts and 
costs, grid constraints, agreements between community and people involved in the project, 
etc. An expert panel decides about the resources that will be provided. Another feature of 
the community energy sector in Scotland is the participation of several organisations that 
provide useful support to communities, such as Community Energy Scotland13, EST14, 
Changeworks15, SCENE16, Local Energy Scotland17, among others. However, not all is 
                                                 
12 Community and Renewable Energy Scheme. 
13 See http://www.communityenergyscotland.org.uk/about-us.asp 
14 See https://www.energysavingtrust.org.uk/about-us 
15 See https://www.changeworks.org.uk/what-we-do 
16 See https://scene.community/our-work-overview 
17 Consortium made up of several organisations: EST, Changeworks, The Energy Agency, SCARF, and The Wise Group. This 
consortium manages the CARES. 
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perfect and some schemes complicate community energy projects. On this topic, Creamer 
[93], based on two-in-depth cases, notes that an incoherence between the length of the 
funding and the desired or expected outcomes in terms of CO2 reductions and other 
positive lasting consequences, demanding administrative processes, and 
competition/rivalry for resources, might affect the development of such initiatives. Due to 
some changes in the CARES scheme in 2011, a key element has been the applicability 
and eligibility for the FIT scheme and the Renewable Heat Incentive, both introduced by 
the UK Government [46,94-96]. Under the FIT scheme, which was closed to new 
applications on the 31st of March 201918, there are some additional benefits for community 
energy initiatives and school installations, in terms of a relaxation of the minimum energy 
efficiency requirements and validity certification. These benefits also included the 
possibility of sharing a single grid connection and a tariff guarantee19 [97]. Nevertheless, 
the aforementioned closure of this scheme might affect the development and deployment 
of community energy initiatives. Scotland has also developed a new Energy Strategy20, 
which establishes a vision for the entire Scottish energy system up to 2050, taking into 
account three main themes: a whole-system view, a stable managed energy transition, and 
a smarter model of local energy provision [92]. 
 
Thus, it is clear that the incumbents of the Scottish community energy sector have been 
working in a suitable way, encouraging citizen participation in energy production by 
fostering and implementing projects that belong to either “non-profit-distributing 
community groups” or “locally-owned energy” categories. However, including recent 
evidence based on other experiences in Europe, in order to have a wider justification over 
the Scottish contribution to the community energy sector, seems appropriate. 
 
Heras-Saizarbitoria et al. [74] note that approximately 3,000 energy cooperatives were 
already operating in Europe in 2014. However, almost 80% of these are located in 
                                                 
18 See https://www.energysavingtrust.org.uk/scotland/grants-loans/renewables/feed-tariffs 
19 Available up to October 2015. 
20 It was available for public consultation. 
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Germany and Denmark. The cooperative sector involvement in energy production has 
been well described by Yildiz et al. [75] in the former country, where is possible to see 
classifications by value chain approach and technology, historical development, and 
regional development. Even when it is also possible to find other models of ownership, 
such as limited partnerships and civil partnerships, cooperatives are the most relevant 
organisational form regarding active participation in local energy policy [75]. 
Nevertheless, other European countries like the Netherlands and Sweden currently present 
a promising perspective. In the Netherlands, 500 initiatives were started by citizens and 
social groups during the last years, most of them related to the cooperative model [74]. In 
Sweden, there are currently 81 wind cooperatives, 6 solar PV cooperatives, 10 small-scale 
district heating producers, 25 eco-villages, and 9 rural communities owning renewable 
technologies. Additionally, in 2012, around 25,000 householders owned shares in energy 
cooperatives [73]. This suggests that energy cooperatives are the prevailing type of 
organisation for citizen participation in energy generation in Europe. Some evidence also 
shows the existence of other models, which allow involvement and/or ownership by public 
entities such as municipalities, private organisations including commercial developers or 
larger generators, and/or local citizens. Furthermore, state subsidies and tax reductions for 
micro-producers, net metering schemes, project shares sales, limitations on members’ 
ownership, among others, have been deployed in order to boost citizen participation in 
energy production [73-75].  
 
However, some of these policies could have adverse effects. For instance, Tews [98] 
notices that the auction scheme in Germany is a failure in terms of controlled renewable 
energy expansion, actor plurality, and cost efficiency, highlighting several issues: awards 
without construction permits, longer implementation deadlines, control exerted by a small 
number of professional project developers, and variation in prices. 
 
Based on this evidence, we can highlight that Scotland has been strongly pushing energy 
generation projects led by citizens that aim to directly benefit communities as a whole, 
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rather than only a certain number of people within a community. This might be crucial as 
investments in entities like energy cooperatives, made by people with sufficient savings 
to invest, might undermine social cohesion as some people miss out on project benefits 
[71]. In addition, from an economic perspective, if there is discrimination among the 
members of a cooperative, its viability might be affected, decreasing social efficiency and 
making the cooperative a weaker competitor [99]. However, as long as an energy 
cooperative benefits a community as a whole (or is incentivised to do so), the difference 
between these entities and community-led projects (such as development trusts) will be 
indistinguishable in practice. Further research is needed in order to empirically 
corroborate whether energy cooperatives are only providing benefits to their members 
and/or communities.  
 
Nevertheless, the Scottish experience in community energy also has some negative or 
questionable aspects. For instance, it is true that the installed capacity of “non-profit-
distributing community groups” (or community energy projects) is lower than the capacity 
of locally-owned energy projects. However, this difference may or may not be relevant, 
depending on the number of people who benefit from the project and whether the project 
benefits the community as a whole or not. This is important given that providing benefits 
for communities in a sustainable way is the main purpose of community energy projects. 
Therefore, some metrics might need to be developed in the near future, in order to 
determine the real contribution to the community energy sector and society from different 
types of organisations or structures. Additionally, there is such variety of specific legal 
and organisational structures available in Scotland (and, more widely, in Europe) that may 
or may not be considered part of the community energy sector. From a public policy 
perspective, this might be confusing, time-consuming, and demanding in terms of 
resources, especially for people who want to set up a community energy project. Hence, 
having fewer specific legal and organisational vehicles may be more convenient for all 
community energy incumbents. In fact, defining a kind of “Community-Special-Purpose 
Entity”, following our proposed updated definition of community energy and unifying 
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criteria derived from non-profit-distributing community groups and locally-owned energy 
projects, may be useful to reduce, among others, transactions costs. 
 
In summary, weighing positive and negative features, we consider that the Scottish 
community energy sector might be considered as leader in citizen participation in energy 
production. Thus, countries with an underdeveloped community energy sector, including 
developing countries like Chile, should consider the Scottish experience as a relevant 
model when developing, deploying, and implementing policies aiming for a robust 
community energy sector. 
 
I.4 Community energy in Chile 
 
I.4.1 Chilean resource availability and electricity industry 
 
The main feature that Chile and Scotland have in common is the high availability of 
renewable resources, which makes renewable community energy projects feasible. 
 
For Chile, Santana et al. [100] show that the potential installed capacity of wind, from 
Arica to Chiloé Island, was 37 GW. In terms of solar PV energy, they show that the 
potential installed capacity for projects without a tracker21 reached 1,238 GW, whereas 
for projects with a tracker22, this reached 1,640 GW. In addition, the potential installed 
capacity of solar CSP23 could be as high as 552 GW. The potential hydro energy capacity, 
considering some territorial constraints, was estimated at 12.5 GW with an average power 
of 7.8 GW. A 2009 Garrad Hassan study determined the potential capacity of marine 
energy24, including wave and tidal. This study shows that the potential for raw offshore 
wave energy could reach 164.9 GW. For tidal energy, the estimated potential, in terms of 
                                                 
21 Considering a capacity factor greater than 0.24. 
22 Considering a capacity factor greater than 0.3. 
23 Considering a capacity factor of 0.5 and 200 ha as minimum. 
24 Considering a single Pelamis wave farm of 30 MW of installed capacity in six locations (180 MW) between the fifth and tenth 
regions of Chile. 
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raw kinetic energy flux, was estimated between 0.6 and 0.8 GW [101]. However, only an 
area from Chiloé Island up to the Magallanes Strait would be interesting in terms of taking 
advantage of this energy source [102]. Chile also has biomass potential. In 2013, the 
Universidad Austral de Chile carried out a study25, which found that biomass has a 
technically useful potential of up to 60,000 GWh/year, which implies an installed capacity 
of 2.1 GWe, based on the current consumption of native biomass [103]. 
 
These numbers are comparable to Scotland. In 2005, the Scottish Government published 
a study, which highlighted the potential of several renewable energy sources. An installed 
capacity of 16 GW, 1 GW, and 200 MW was estimated in this study for onshore wind, 
offshore wind, and hydro, respectively26. For biomass, a potential of 450 MW was 
estimated, mainly based on wood fuel resource and some energy crops. Marine energy 
(wave and tidal) was proposed as having significant potential with an installed capacity of 
1,300 MW, considering suitable places located in the northern and western seaboards of 
the country [104]. Other investigations have been carried out and other similar estimations 
have been found in, among others, Andersen et al. [105], Allan et al. [106], and Neill et 
al. [107]. 
 
Table I.2. Estimated potentials of renewable energy per capita (kW/cap)27 28  
 Biomass Wind Solar Hydro Marine 
Chile 0.12 2.05 121.73 0.69 9.2 
Scotland 0.08 3.15 1.32 0.04 0.24 
Sources: [100-104,108-110] 
 
Hence, the availability of renewable resources in both countries is significant, as can be 
seen in Table I.2. Chile has huge potential in terms of solar, wind, and marine energy per 
capita. Likewise, Scotland also has enormous potential in terms of wind energy per capita, 
                                                 
25 Between the regions of Coquimbo and Magallanes y la Antártica Chilena. 
26 This report emphasised the importance of small-scale projects and new improvements in current plants. 
27 Due to a scarcity of specific information related to the potential of solar energy in Scotland, an estimation very simple was made 
which considers the data revealed in Burnett et al. (p.341, 2014) about a baseline average resource of solar energy (W/m2) and the 
Scotland’s surface (km2) available in the following website: 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20160106191622/http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/regional-trends/region-and-country-
profiles/key-statistics-and-profiles---august-2012/key-statistics---scotland--august-2012.html 
28 The population considered for Chile is 18,006,407 inh. and for Scotland is 5,400,000 inh. Both estimations are up to 2015. 
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although it is less well endowed with solar resources. This is one obvious reason that 
explains the current installed capacity of Scottish community energy projects, which is 
mostly dominated by wind projects. From this point of view, Chile could take advantage 
of its potential not only through projects carried out by large generators, but also, like 
Scotland, by encouraging community energy projects around the country, based on the 
variety of renewable sources that Chile has, and not solely on solar. This is relevant for 
Chile, considering that its current installed capacity is still mostly based on fossil fuels, as 
shown in Fig. I.3.  
 
 
Fig. I.3. Scottish and Chilean installed capacity (of power plants) by technology currently in operation 
Sources: [111,112] 
 
On the contrary, Scotland’s electricity mix is mainly based on renewable energy sources 
such as wind and hydro; still, it is currently encouraging community energy projects 
around the country, as discussed above. 
 
I.4.2 Community energy in Chile: current status 
 
Given that the Chilean renewable resources are at least comparable, and in some ways 
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significant potential of solar and marine energy, it is necessary to further study the Chilean 
state of the art in terms of community energy initiatives in Chile. This may be useful to 
explore what has to be done to foster and deploy decentralised energy projects through 
community or citizen initiatives, which has been defined in the Chilean Energy Policy as 
one of the goals to be reached by 2050. 
 
In short, this policy specifies in several ways that Chile needs a more intelligent electricity 
system, including a higher participation of citizens as producers/managers/consumers. All 
of this is aimed at having a more secure system that can face unexpected circumstances 
without major problems, and manages the energy required for users of the electricity 
system in a decentralized manner [40]. Apart from the resource availability and state of 
the art, we will analyse if Chile has similar definitions, views, and other elements as 
Scotland, or whether there are barriers related to resources availability.  
 
In Chile, the concept of community energy is very new. In fact, citizen participation in 
energy generation has been deployed using a different approach. Instead of focusing on 
community energy, Chilean policy has focused on distributed generation. Considering 
Ackermann et al.’s [31] definition of distributed generation as “an electric power source 
connected directly to the distribution network or on the customer site of the meter”, and 
our definition of community energy shown above, it is clear that both concepts are related. 
Distributed generation can be seen as a subset of the concept of community energy, 
because the former limits the scope to a distribution network and one single customer, and 
seems to be primarily based on technical aspects, whereas the latter is primarily based on 
economic and social aspects. Nevertheless, it is important to note that both concepts 
consider consumers as producers (prosumers), who need a network to inject the energy.  
 
Following this idea, the Chilean government gave the right to individually generate 
energy/electricity for self-consumption through renewable energy or combined heat and 
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power (CHP) sources to regulated customers (mostly residential clients)29, through the 
Law 20,571 “Distributed Generation Law” [39], which includes the right to sell their 
surplus of energy to the grid [113]. In this sense, there were 24.41 MW of installed 
capacity operating under this law at December 2018 [114]. However, it is important to 
highlight that this amount includes not only residential installations, but also installations 
that might belong to small and/or medium businesses. In fact, if we only consider small 
systems (up to 10 kW or 0.01 MW), which represent almost 91% of the total installations 
that operate under this law, it is possible to see that these projects have only succeeded in 
installing 6.3 MW of installed capacity [114]. In addition, such projects are mostly based 
on rooftop solar energy and concentrated in the capital city and its immediate surroundings 
(Region Metropolitana), as noted in Fig. I.4. and Table I.3., and focused on individual 
generation and self-consumption rather than providing benefits to communities. 
 
 







                                                 
29 According to the Chilean legal framework, defined as those clients who have a connected power below 0.5 MW or those clients that 
have asked for an authorization to be in this category (of regulated customers) having a connected power between 0.5 MW and 5 MW. 
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Table I.3. Installed capacity in MW of distributed generation projects by 
region and technology in Chile 
Region Biomass CHP Hydro Solar Total 
Arica y Parinacota    0.42 0.42 
Tarapaca    0.31 0.31 
Antofagasta    0.66 0.66 
Atacama    1.69 1.69 
Coquimbo    1.05 1.05 
Valparaíso    2.94 2.94 
Metropolitana  0.05 0.09 7.61 7.75 
O'Higgins    2.78 2.78 
Maule   0.00 4.04 4.05 
Ñuble    0.13 0.13 
Bíobío    1.50 1.50 
La Araucanía    0.54 0.54 
Los Ríos    0.20 0.20 
Los Lagos    0.28 0.28 
Aysén 0.03   0.05 0.08 
Magallanes    0.03 0.03 
Total 0.03 0.05 0.09 24.24 24.41 
Source: [114] 
 
Hence, some questions remain. For instance, why do other regions with more potential for 
solar or wind energy have a lower implemented installed capacity? Is support from the 
government universally available and, most important, delivered properly? Is a shift in 
focus from distributed generation to community energy necessary in order to increase the 
number and capacity of projects conceived by citizens? 
 
One important feature of the Chilean electricity market, as noted above and in [115], is 
that Chile has a net billing scheme, instead of a net metering scheme like other countries. 
Under the Chilean context, the concept of net billing means that the energy injected into 
the grid is calculated and valued at an injection rate (which is different from the 
consumption rate), and then the resulting value is subtracted from the cost of energy 
consumption (calculated as the energy consumption multiplied by the consumption rate). 
In the same vein, net metering means the energy injected into the grid is directly subtracted 
from the energy consumption, in kWh [116]. The main retail rate applied to most Chilean 
residential customers is the BT1 rate30, which combines energy and capacity in a single 
rate, and consequently there is a difference between the rate of the energy injected into the 
grid and energy consumption. The rationale of this is that the injected energy has less 
                                                 
30 Low Voltage 1, in Spanish. 
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value due to the utilisation of distribution infrastructure [115-117]. Conversely, under a 
net metering scheme the injected energy is valued at the same rate as energy consumption. 
Another important feature is that there is important divergence among cities in investment, 
tariffs or rates, capacity, and integration intervals, which means that payback periods for 
solar PV projects may vary from 6 years up to almost 17 years, depending on the location 
of the project [115]. In this sense, Becerra et al. [118] assess a wind farm in two different 
locations in Chile and note that it is possible to generate value from a regulation change. 
They also highlight that tax expenditures on support mechanisms could be better than a 
net metering scheme. Varas et al. [119] show that a net billing scheme in the northern part 
of the country could be profitable, if the investment cost is lower than 2,000 USD/kW31. 
Ramírez-Sagner et al. [120] highlight the fact that residential PV systems are more 
profitable under larger self-consumption rates. 
 
As can be seen above, the net billing scheme is now an important element of the Chilean 
electricity market, so providing more insights by developing a simple example using game 
theory seems appropriate. We will do this in the next subsection. 
 
I.4.3 The best strategies for Chilean residential customers under a net billing 
scheme 
 
In order to provide a deeper and useful discussion about the convenience of implementing 
a net billing scheme, taking into account the Chilean experience, we develop a simple 
sequential non-cooperative game to demonstrate the effects of that scheme on Chilean 
residential customers, by determining Subgame-perfect Nash equilibria (SPNE). In this 
game, a consumer can decide whether to generate energy under the Chilean net billing 
scheme or not. If the consumer decides to do so, we then assume that the consumer buys 
a solar PV panel from the distributor, in agreement with the Chilean regulation. We 
                                                 
31 According to the authors, this cost implies a solar PV plant size around 1 kW. If a net metering scheme was desired, the plant size 
has to be around 2 kW. 
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consider a solar PV technology useful life of 25 years [121] and representative investment 
costs for panels of 1 kWp, 2 kWp, and 3 kWp of capacity, which are USD 3,086.72, USD 
4,948.06, and USD 6,188.95, respectively [122]. We then calculate representative annual 
amortizations of the investment costs for those panels, by using the following formulas 
[123]: 
 














       (I.2) 
 
Here, 𝑉𝑃 is the present value of the solar PV panel, 𝐶 is the amount to pay under an annual 
basis during the useful life of the solar PV panel, 𝑟 is the discount rate, and 𝑡 is the solar 
PV technology useful life. We assume that a customer can amortize the whole investment 
during the PV technology useful life period. The resulting annual amortizations of the 
installed capacity (investment costs of solar PV panels) are shown in Table I.4. 
 
Table I.4. Annual amortizations in USD of the investment costs 
of solar PV panels for residential consumers considering 
different discount rates and installed capacities 
Discount Rate / Capacity 1 kWp 2 kWp 3 kWp 
5% 219.01 351.08 439.12 
7% 264.87 424.60 531.08 
10% 340.06 545.12 681.82 
 
The estimations for annual generation are 1,500 kWh, 3,000 kWh, and 4,500 kWh 
respectively, for the three aforementioned capacities [122]. The estimated annual 
generation can be valued using an electricity injection rate of 0.10 USD/kWh (valid in 
August 2017) and multiplying that injection rate by the production of each panel. The 
consumption rate, which is different from the injection rate, is 0.14 USD/kWh [124]. If 
we take the average consumption of a residential low-medium income consumer (LMIC), 
which is 1,800 kWh/year [115], and the same for a residential high income consumer 
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(HIC), which is 7,865 kWh/year [115], we can multiply the consumption rate by those 
average consumption levels to get gross costs.  
 
The consumer therefore has to pay for its consumption and also for the investment cost of 
a solar PV panel, which will be annually amortized during the useful life mentioned above, 
minus the payment derived from the injection into the grid32. Thus, in this game, 
consumers and distributors can choose between to generate under a distributed generation 
scheme (G) or not to generate under distributed generation scheme (NG), and between to 
sell a solar PV panel (SP) or not to sell a solar PV panel (NSP)33, respectively. An example 
is given in Fig. I.5. 
 
 
Fig. I.5. Sequential non-cooperative game solved by backward induction procedure for LMIC, considering 1 kWp of installed 
capacity and 5% as discount rate. 
 
It is important to notice that every outcome revealed above is shown in USD per year and 
reflects the sum of the consumption per year, the investment for the solar PV panel 
amortized under an annual basis, and the annual payment for injecting energy into the 
grid. 
 
In Table I.5., the SPNE for LMIC, HIC, and the distributor, considering different discount 
rates and installed capacities, are shown. 
 
                                                 
32 Every value has been obtained considering an exchange rate of CLP 644.697649 / USD available in 
https://www.oanda.com/lang/es/fx-for-business/historical-rates. 
33 Under this strategy, consumers can buy solar PV panels from other sellers at a 30% cheaper rate. 
1 kWp - LMIC
SP -329.49 329.49
G Distributor
Consumer NSP -263.78 110.48
NG -258.22 258.22
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Table I.5. SPNE for LMIC, HIC, and the distributor, considering different discount rates and installed capacities 
Discount Rate / Capacity 1 kWp 2 kWp 3 kWp 
10% NG ; (SP, NG) NG ; (SP, NG) NG ; (SP, NG) 
7% NG ; (SP, NG) NG ; (SP, NG) NG ; (SP, NG) 
5% NG ; (SP, NG) NG ; (SP, NG) G ; (SP, NG) 
 
Considering the assumptions listed above, the resulting strategies for LMIC and HIC 
(without brackets), and for the distributor (within brackets), which are also SPNE, 
producing energy under the current distributed generation scheme in Chile is not 
economical for consumers in most of the cases, due to the costs and potential benefits. 
Producing energy would only be an efficient strategy34 for consumers if they amortize the 
initial investment during the whole useful life of the solar PV panel, if they can buy a 
device with a higher installed capacity (which is more expensive), and if they have low 
discount rates through those years, which are strong assumptions. If a consumer decides 
to generate energy in any other situation, that consumer would be harmed because its 
selected action would not be optimal given the choice made by the distributor35. 
 
Even if the investment costs are substantially lower, the conclusions are similar. Table I.6. 
shows a case where investments costs are reduced by 30% relatively to current rates. 
 
Table I.6. SPNE for LMIC, HIC, and the distributor, considering different discount rates and installed capacities, and an 
investment cost 30% lower 
Discount Rate / Capacity 1 kWp 2 kWp 3 kWp 
10% NG ; (SP, NG) NG ; (SP, NG) NG ; (SP, NG) 
7% NG ; (SP, NG) NG ; (SP, NG) G ; (SP, NG) 
5% NG ; (SP, NG) G ; (SP, NG) G ; (SP, NG) 
 
Hence, these results might explain, at least in some sense, why residential consumers and 
distributors are not very interested in distributed generation schemes in Chile – the 
economics are just not favourable. A review of the incentives and how the current Chilean 
policies are addressing them is therefore necessary. 
 
                                                 
34 It is important to note that payments for consumers are negative but less economically “harmful”. 
35 This is because the consumer will lose more, as can be seen in Fig. 5. 
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I.4.4 Other specific initiatives 
 
In 2014, the Chilean Government began a discussion about the associativity between 
communities and large generators, based on the following pillars: paying taxes where the 
power plant is located, price equality, and sharing benefits36 37. However, the Chilean 
Government decided to push just the first two38 [125,126]. The Chilean Government has 
also carried out other initiatives related to the concept of community energy. In particular, 
the programme named “Comuna Energética” seeks to increase citizen participation in the 
energy sector in every municipality. The programme focuses on renewable energy and 
energy efficiency projects, and comprises two main stages: the first one is a local energy 
strategy, and the second one is a certification process [127]. 
 
Some featured projects are related to energy efficiency, energy generation through solar 
PV panels, and energy usage/production awareness [128]. There is another initiative 
called “Fondo de Acceso a la Energía” which provides funding for small-scale solar PV 
projects in rural and isolated locations [129].  
 
Taking the private sector into account, there are currently more than 20 cooperatives that 
are involved in the electricity market. Many of them are providing distribution services in 
rural zones. There is also an incipient initiative currently carried out by Fundación 
Proyecto Propio and Rubik Sustentabilidad39; private entities which seek to help 
communities conceive renewable energy projects with an installed capacity between 1 and 
3 MW, contributing to the development of social projects in those communities. This 
initiative highlights the importance of establishing Power Purchase Agreements (PPA), to 
have a more sustainable source of benefits and carry out social projects in the community 
[130].  
                                                 
36 See http://www.nuevamineria.com/revista/proyecto-de-asociatividad-la-palabra-en-juego/ 
37 See http://www.latercera.com/noticia/asociatividad-de-proyectos-de-energia-con-comunidades/ 
38 See http://www.pulso.cl/empresas-mercados/gobierno-zanja-la-discusion-por-ley-de-asociatividad-y-divide-proyecto-en-tres-
partes/ 
39 See https://www.proyectopropio.cl/generacion-comunitaria/ 
42 
     
 
The community energy sector in Chile is still incipient, as was shown before, but there are 
upcoming opportunities to improve this situation through proper policies that move the 
sector in the right direction, giving correct incentives to the economic agents. The Chilean 
renewable energy potential also offers a huge possibility to develop community energy 
projects. Thus, considering international experience, such as the Scottish experience in 
community energy, seems appropriate. 
 
I.5 Discussion and recommendations 
 
In the UK, and especially in Scotland, the community energy concept has been promoted 
explicitly and defined in a better way compared to several countries, including Chile. The 
definition and promotion of community energy sector in Scotland has been a catalyst in 
the deployment and implementation of a range of initiatives, including private and public 
supporting entities/organisations, grants and loans schemes, and so on. It is true that the 
community energy sector in Scotland is still a small part of the whole electricity sector in 
terms of installed capacity. But, at the same time, the growth that the community energy 
sector has undergone in recent years is remarkable. Moreover, the range of projects has 
been wide; although the main energy source has been wind, there are also significant levels 
of other renewable sources. In addition, energy cooperatives (private profit organisations) 
do not have such significant role, and more social organisations like development trusts, 
seem to be leading the community energy sector in Scotland, considering the number of 
projects. Conversely, in mainland Europe, energy cooperatives seem to lead the 
community energy sector, but it is not clear if these entities are providing benefits to some 
members or communities. This is a key element, because the essence of a community 
energy project is providing benefits to communities and not only to some members. 




     
On the contrary, despite the fact that Chile has more potential in terms of renewable 
energy, Chilean public policies on this matter seem weak and contradictory, especially, if 
we consider that the scope up to now seems focused on the promotion of distributed 
generation projects. Distributed generation is a more specific concept, related to the 
concept of community energy, but not always convenient for residential consumers and 
distributors. This has resulted in several deficiencies, such as a geographical concentration 
of projects, a small installed capacity derived from those initiatives, and a mix based 
exclusively on just one renewable energy source. One critical aspect has been the 
difference in tariffs between the injection and consumption of energy by residential 
consumers, even when there might have been technical reasons for this. This is a challenge 
for Chilean policymakers. In this sense, a change in tariffs could be one of the main 
opportunities for Chile to help the community energy sector.  
 
Beyond this, considering the specific legal/organisational structures available in Chile 
seems crucial. In this sense, it seems that in Chile more existing social and collaborative 
organisations, like neighbour committees and indigenous communities, could take an 
important role to push citizen participation in energy production [131], particularly 
community energy rather than distributed generation projects.  
 
Still, how could these projects face potential asymmetries in terms of treatment in 
comparison with other incumbents of the Chilean electricity market? We theorise that 
generation as a PMG40 could be a path forward. A PMG is a project connected to the 
network, which has less than 9 MW of excess capacity, has the right to be exempt from 
transmission costs, and is subject to the electric system operator [132]. It can avoid the 
gap between injection and consumption tariffs. If the PMG is connected to the distribution 
network, that project is catalogued as a PMGD41. If these projects have an installed 
capacity up to 3 MW, they are not subject to an environmental assessment42, which could 
                                                 
40 Small Generation Source, in Spanish. 
41 Small Distributed-Generation Source, in Spanish. 
42 See https://www.sea.gob.cl/sea/proyectos-actividades-sometidos-eia 
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help to push these initiatives in a faster way. This is relevant considering that most of them 
are focused on generating energy on the basis of renewable energy sources. 
 
Additionally, considering the evidence presented above, a community engaged with a 
certain type of generation project is a minimum requirement in order to carry out projects 
successfully. Support from the government, as well as other entities would enable an 
increase in people’s involvement and knowledge, in terms of management and other skills 
necessary to deal with community energy projects. This is critical due to the size of these 
projects, the variety of disciplines involved, the diversity of backgrounds and skills, etc.  
 
Even though community energy organisations have more social objectives than many 
firms, a primary motivation is still profit maximization, which then helps to achieve other 
objectives that benefit the community’s development. This profit maximization is 
demanding, but it is what helps to communities gain more economical (understood as a 
variety of resources including energy) independence in a sustainable way. In the long-
term, this also helps governments to save and manage resources in a better way. To 
achieve profits, the specific legal or organisational structure does not matter significantly, 
but skills do, and it is very important that organisations remain focused on profit 
maximization, in order to help the whole community.  
 
Altogether, the establishment of a thriving community energy sector in Chile requires 
rethinking the electricity market with a major component of decentralised generation, 
through community energy instead of distributed generation. We therefore make the 
following recommendations: 
 
1. Review the current narrative around distributed generation and its promotion, 
considering current (and future) incentives and gaps, in order to improve uptake, or 
(preferentially) change the focus towards a broader concept such as community 
energy. 
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2. Explicitly define long-term objectives in relation to community energy projects. 
3. Review tariff structures and prepare a pathway to adapting a legal and regulatory 
framework to support community energy projects, avoiding negative impacts on 
electricity markets. 
4. Consider giving priority to the development of community energy projects as a PMG 
or PMGD with an installed capacity up to 3 MW, given that most of them will be 
based on renewable energy sources. This might avoid extra costs and delays due to 
bureaucratic procedures and potential conflicts like public opposition, for instance. 
5. Analyse the current electricity network and design a long-term roadmap, in order to 
incentivise the reinforcement of the grid to support the connection of these projects, if 
necessary. 
6. Carry out more research, especially addressing sociological issues, in order to know 
more about Chilean communities and discover who would like to be involved in 
community energy initiatives. 
7. Foster the independence of communities, developing and delivering skills and tools in 
order to properly manage community energy projects in the future, through new 




This chapter has discussed the Scottish experience in community energy development, 
considering the main evidence available up to now. The Scottish experience should be 
recognised as a worldwide example of how communities are trying to deal with several 
issues, including increasing economic independence through renewable energy projects. 
Obviously, it has faced and still faces important challenges, but also opportunities. With 
the support of a range of private and public entities, communities are currently taking 
advantage of these opportunities.  
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In comparison, the Chilean community energy sector is weak and incipient. This is mainly 
due to the Chilean government’s support towards distributed generation schemes instead 
of community initiatives in energy production, even when that would not be convenient 
for consumers under the current net billing scheme. However, given the potential in terms 
of renewable resources, geographical conditions, communities, etc., a wider community 
energy deployment is possible in the medium or long term, if this is supported with explicit 
government policies. This will present an enormous challenge, because it challenges the 
way electricity markets are currently operating. Nevertheless, based on their nature, 
community energy projects could be an effective tool to tackle climate change, increase 
the renewable energy participation in the electricity mix, and improve the economy and 
quality life of communities. This chapter aims to be a first step in getting a deeper 
understanding of this phenomenon, building on the Scottish experience to derive useful 
recommendations. More research will be necessary in the near future to help Chile and 




     
II. AN EXPLORATORY ASSESSMENT OF PREFERENCES FOR 
LOCAL SOLAR PHOTOVOLTAIC ENERGY INITIATIVES AND 




During the last few years, Chile has been pushing many renewable energy initiatives 
across the country, based on its significant potential of renewable resources. Several 
authors through different studies have explored Chile’s potential availability of renewable 
energy sources. For instance, Santana et al. [100] highlight the significant wind, solar 
photovoltaic (PV), concentrated solar power (CSP), and hydro energy potential. 
Furthermore, Garrad Hassan estimates significant potential for marine energy, including 
wave and tidal energy [101], which could be used along the Chilean coast. In the same 
vein, the Universidad Austral de Chile notices the potential for biomass that could be part 
of the renewable energy mix [103]. Although the Chilean generation mix is still strongly 
influenced by fossil fuels, their participation is steadily decreasing. One example of this 
transition is the rise of solar PV initiatives in Chile, which grew from nearly zero to over 
2 GW between 2012 and 2018, considering only large-scale installed capacity43. In reality, 
the installed solar capacity is larger, as small and medium scale solar PV initiatives have 
also been set up throughout the country. For example, in December 2018, the capacity of 
solar PV-based installations with an installed capacity up to 10 kW or 0.01 MW, reached 
6.3 MW [114]. Most of these projects consist of rooftop solar PV panels on residential 
houses and small and/or medium businesses. Moreover, these initiatives are focused on 
individual generation and self-consumption and very concentrated in the capital city and 
its immediate surroundings [114]. Despite this, the increase of small and medium scale 
solar PV initiatives cannot be denied. In fact, one key factor behind this growth is the 
promulgation of Law 20,571 named the “Distributed Generation Law” or “Net Billing 
Law” [39], which gives regulated consumers the right to individually generate 
                                                 
43 See https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/explaining-latin-americas-impending-solar-boom1 
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energy/electricity for self-consumption through renewable energy or combined heat and 
power (CHP) sources. This includes the right to inject any surplus of energy to the grid 
[113]. However, as noted in Fuentes González et al. [133], this scheme might not be 
convenient for residential electricity customers, and other forms of citizen participation in 
energy generation schemes may be more effective options.  
 
Beyond the dilemma about which scheme could be the best one for residential electricity 
customers, the Chilean government has already set out clear objectives. A document called 
“Ruta Energética 2018-2022” specifies one key goal in relation to this matter: the 
achievement of four times the current installed capacity of distributed small-scale 
renewable generation (with a size less than 300 kW) by 2022 [134]. This reflects ongoing 
calls for a more profound citizen participation in energy production. However, one 
question arises: even when there is an increasing level of commitment from different 
stakeholders for promoting citizen participation in energy production, do people really 
want to participate in such initiatives? 
 
This chapter attempts to provide answers to the aforementioned question by gathering 
information, through a web-based survey that considers a Likert scale, and using data 
analysis techniques to better understand the implications of this question. We analyse 
whether people are willing to devote money and/or time to solar PV-based citizen energy 
projects, and investigate which specific variables influence such willingness. For 
respondents’ simplicity, we do not make specific comparisons between different types of 
citizen participation in energy production schemes such as net billing schemes or 
community energy projects; rather we use the wider concept of local solar energy 
initiatives based on solar PV (LSIPV). LSIPV might provide a means for inclusive and 
sustainable decentralised energy production growth for a wider number of people. It 
encompasses a wide range of projects that vary in, for example, project developer, 
ownership model, level of community engagement, etc. Thus, LSIPV include community 
energy projects, net billing or net metering schemes, energy cooperatives, and other 
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initiatives. This wider definition therefore facilitates the information collection process, 
as well as the respondents’ tasks. Focusing on Region Metropolitana, Chile, where 40% 
of the Chilean population resides [135], we collected attitudinal and stated preference data 
to assess willingness to devote money and/or time to LSIPV and the main variables 
influencing such willingness. Our main goal is to provide an enhanced understanding of 
customers’ interest in and perceptions of LSIPV, which can then in turn facilitate the 
implementation of public policies that enable markets to align with these preferences, 
business models that are more likely to be accepted, and educational strategies pertaining 
to local solar PV. 
 
Although, as outlined below, there is existing literature on this topic, one particularly 
novel contribution of this study is the inclusion of ‘sense of ownership’, i.e. the degree to 
which citizens perceive to be owners of the project. As we show, this is an important 
variable that helps explain attitudes towards LSIPV, which has now been included in 
previous studies. 
 
The remainder of this chapter has been organized as follows. In section II.2, we present 
the theoretical background behind this study. Section II.3 outlines the methodology used 
to carry out this study. Section II.4 shows the results. In section II.5, a discussion and 
some recommendations that follow from the results are given. Finally, section II.6 
concludes. 
 
II.2 Theoretical background 
 
As mentioned above, the concept of LSIPV involves a variety of initiatives related to 
citizen participation in energy production, and hence, the relevance of the determinants, 
barriers, and boosters of people’s willingness to participate in, by devoting time and/or 
money, goes beyond the current European and Chilean context. For example, in the United 
States, carrying out a survey considering fuzzy logic inference model, Zhai & Williams 
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[136] find that the perceived cost is a main factor influencing customers’ decision to 
purchase solar panels, but also show that perceived maintenance and environmental 
concerns have significant impact. Rai & Beck [137], using survey data, note that perceived 
affordability is the strongest predictor of consideration of solar PV and intention to call a 
solar provider. On the other hand, solar technology was perceived (even by those with 
higher than average educational attainment) to be more costly than it was in reality. 
Similarly, Farhar & Coburn [138] reveal that financial gain, along with environmental 
benefits, was one of the highest-scoring perceived benefits of grid-tied PV in a survey of 
Colorado homeowners. In the same vein, community solar program administrators 
identified the main challenges to implementing their projects, as determining a 
subscription model that would meet potential participants’ needs, finding subscribers 
willing to put money into purchasing shares and members to participate, selecting and 
securing a site, among others [139]. Of course, the European experience also offers many 
studies that deserve to be mentioned here. For instance, Seyfang et al. [49], through a web-
based survey, find that 71% of the respondents (community energy groups) develop solar 
PV-based generation activities and that the main objectives for such groups are saving 
money on energy bills, reducing CO2 emissions, improving energy independence, 
community empowerment, and generating income for community. Hicks & Ison [140] 
model the motivations driving community energy projects considering several cases in 
different continents, including some solar PV-based projects in Scotland and Germany. 
Broughel & Hampl [141], based on a two large-scale representative surveys and focused 
on Austrian and Swiss community energy projects, model the profile of potential investors 
noting that respondents are willing to invest from 1,000 to 10,000 CHF/EUR in such 
projects, and one of the most promising technologies in this sense is solar PV. Bauwens 
[142] establishes the determinants of the members’ investment size for two energy 
cooperatives, of which one of them develops solar-based projects. Dóci & Vasileiadou 
[143] study projects in Germany and the Netherlands and find that aspects such as 
decreasing energy costs, addressing climate change, and some hedonic motivations, 
influence investments in renewable energy projects at community level, including 
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initiatives based on solar PV. Salm et al. [144] segments two groups of community energy 
investors showing their preferences and expectations, and find that solar PV is the most 
popular technology among them. At a broader level, in relation to the variables that may 
influence people’s willingness and interest in citizen-led energy production initiatives, 
Kalkbrenner & Roosen [145] notice that social norms, trust, environmental concern, and 
community identity are influential in determining willingness to participate in community 
energy projects. Bauwens [146] reveals that the activation of social norms might foster 
investment decisions in community renewable energy initiatives, based on data from 
cooperatives in Belgium. Koirala et al. [147] show, using a survey carried out in the 
Netherlands, that environmental concern, renewables acceptance, energy independence, 
community trust, community resistance, education, energy related education, and 
awareness about local energy initiatives are the most important factors in determining the 
citizens’ willingness to participate in community energy systems. In a more qualitative 
study, Koch & Christ [148] establish that the main drivers for participation in an urban 
solar PV project in Switzerland are the desire to support local renewable energy and feel 
a sense of project ownership at little effort or expense. They also highlight that the initial 
financial investment is a barrier for half of the interviewees who chose not to participate 
in. 
 
As can be seen above, although there is substantial evidence that financial incentives are 
a key determinant of willingness to engage with LSIPV, there are also many social 
determinants and variables. There is a clear need to understand these better, particularly 
in the Chilean context which is likely to differ from Europe and the US. Based on the 
literature discussed above, we hypothesize that there is a set of variables that influence 
residential customers’ willingness to participate in LSIPV by devoting time (WTDT) 
and/or money (WTDM). This includes, firstly, social variables that may play a key role in 
establishing the necessary relationships among the members of a community that facilitate 
people’s participation in LSIPV. Secondly, given that our focus is on renewable energy, 
specifically solar PV energy, we expect that people’s environmental concerns may 
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influence their participation in LSIPV. Thirdly, we expect that people with a more 
technical awareness, even when this feature is based on perceptions rather than facts, may 
influence their WTDT and WTDM to LSIPV. Lastly, some economic and demographic 
features may also influence people’s participation in these kinds of initiatives.  
 
In addition, we notice that there is no explicit reference or consideration to ownership 
matters in most of the evidence shown above. Ownership matters are very important as 
they might define which particular scheme a person would like to be involved with. For 
example, a high/strong sense of ownership could indicate that citizens would like to be 
involved in a more individual citizen participation in energy production scheme like a net 
billing project, whereas a low/weak sense of ownership would mean the opposite, which 
would lead the choice of a community energy project. To investigate this, for the purposes 
of this work, we include a specific variable called “sense of ownership” in order to 
corroborate its significance and influence on WTDT and WTDM to LSIPV. This variable 
is an attempt to capture the level to which people feel that they own a project, which, we 
hypothesize, implies a willingness or desire for making decisions about that project, 
assuming the benefits, costs, and risks derived from owning it. In summary, the variables 
that we expect to affect electricity residential customers’ WTDT and WTDM to LSIPV 
are shown in Table II.1. 
 
Table II.1. Variables that hypothetically would affect electricity residential 
customers’ WTDT and WTDM to LSIPV in Region Metropolitana, Chile. 




Willingness to collaborate with community 
in a LSIPV  
Perceived community interest in solar energy 
Environmental Environmental concern 
Socio-technical 
Desire for energy independence 
Sense of ownership 
Perceived usefulness of solar PV technology 
Perceived solar energy profitability 










     
 
Taking into account these variables, we perform an online survey, followed by a 
regression analysis of the resulting data to better understand which variables influence 
respondents’ WTDT and WTDM, as well as the main barriers to participate in LSIPV. 




This study uses an online survey to collect data and analyse electricity residential 
customers’ perceptions of solar energy and their willingness to participate in LSIPV by 
devoting time and/or money (WTDT and WTDM). The target respondents for this online 
survey were electricity residential customers who are 18 years old or older and live in 
Region Metropolitana, Chile. Respondents were recruited through collaboration with local 
organizations, which disseminated the online survey link via their websites or social media 
platforms. This means that we use accidental sampling; the implications of this are 
discussed at the end of this chapter. Random sampling, which would have been preferred, 
is not possible here. However, the 99 valid responses we received do include respondents 
from a wide range of backgrounds. In Table II.2., the main respondents’ demographic and 












     
 
 






Gender   
Male 49 49% 
Female 49 50% 
Other 1 1% 
Age   
18–24 years 3 3% 
25–29 years 5 5% 
30–39 years 32 32% 
40–49 years 24 24% 
50–64 years 22 22% 
65 years and older 13 13% 
Highest education level 
Secondary school or below 6 6% 
Technical schooling centre 6 6% 
Professional institute  6 6% 
Undergraduate degree 32 32% 
Postgraduate degree (Master's or PhD) 49 50% 
Average monthly net household income (amounts in USD) 44 
Less than 415 3 3% 
415 – 720 2 2% 
721 – 1,257 5 5% 
1,258 – 2,194 14 14% 
2,195 – 3,825 25 25% 
3,826 – 6,674 22 22% 
More than 6,674 19 19% 
I don't know/prefer not to say 9 9% 
Rent vs Own (self or family) 
Owner 80 81% 
Renter 19 19% 
Type of dwelling  
Stand-alone house 32 32% 
Semi-detached home 27 27% 
Flat 38 38% 
Other 2 2% 
Who is paying electricity bill?  
Respondent 73 74% 
Someone else 26 26% 
 
The online survey was designed considering the existing literature on solar energy 
adoption and community energy experiences, as discussed above. It consisted of several 
sections. First, we provided a brief description of solar PV panels’ features and various 
ways in which individuals may participate in LSIPV. Respondents were then asked for 
information on the variables listed in Table II.1, which we hypothesised to influence an 
individual’s WTDT and WTDM to LSIPV. The respondents were then asked a number of 
                                                 
44 The exchange rates considered for all calculations are USD/CLP 619.6 and USD/GBP 0.758 according to OANDA.com. 
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questions with seven-point Likert scales that aimed to capture the different determinants 
of the WTDT and WTDM discussed above. These questions, as well as their summary 
statistics and measurements of internal consistency within these determinants are listed in 
Tables II.3. and II.4. References to previous studies using the same or adapted questions 
are listed in the final columns of these tables, where appropriate. 
 
Table II.3. Two-items-based and three-items-based variables, their corresponding sources and measurements of internal 
consistency. 




Perceived usefulness of solar PV technology  
[136, 149] 
 I consider solar PV panels to be a reliable technology 0.751 
 I think using solar PV panels to produce electricity is beneficial for the 
environment 
0.751 
Cronbach’s Alpha 0.857 
Spearman-Brown Coefficient 0.858 
Buying solar technology expertise  
- 
 I feel that I know enough about solar energy technology to make an informed 
purchase decision 
0.791 
 I feel that I know enough about solar energy technology market (suppliers) to 
make an informed purchase decision 
0.791 
Cronbach’s Alpha 0.880 
Spearman-Brown Coefficient 0.883 
Community identity  
[145,150] 
 I consider my community to be a good place to live 0.561 
 There are many people in my community whom I think of as good friends 0.809 
 I feel attached to my local community 0.821 
Cronbach’s Alpha 0.848 
Spearman-Brown Coefficient - 
Sense of ownership  
- 
 If I were to participate in a local solar PV initiative, it would be important to me 
to directly influence decisions related to the project 
0.710 
 If I were to participate in a local solar PV initiative, it would be important to me 
to directly assume the benefits, costs, and risks of the project 
0.710 
Cronbach’s Alpha 0.831 
Spearman-Brown Coefficient 0.831 
Environmental concern  
 
[137] 
 I am concerned about environmental issues (e.g. climate change, depletion of 
natural resources, water scarcity, etc.) 
0.794 
 I am concerned about the environmental impact of my home’s electricity 
consumption 
0.794 
Cronbach’s Alpha 0.881 
Spearman-Brown Coefficient 0.885 
Perceived solar energy profitability  
[149, 151] 
 I think using solar energy would save me money 0.673 
 I think using solar energy would help to protect my home from rising electricity 
prices in the future 
0.673 
Cronbach’s Alpha 0.804 




     
Table II.4. One-item-based variables and their corresponding sources. 
Question/Item & Variable Source 
Desire for energy independence 
[139]  It is important to me to be more energy independent at home and, at the same time, less reliant on 
my energy (utility) company 
Trust 
[152] 
 I assume that people in my community have only the best intentions 
Perceived community interest in solar energy 
[151] 
 Solar energy is a topic of interest in my neighbourhood 
Willingness to collaborate with community in a LSIPV 
-  I am willing to collaborate with others in my community to develop a local solar PV energy 
initiative 
Willingness to participate in LSIPV by devoting time (WTDT) 
[145,147] 
 How is your willingness to invest time in a local solar PV initiative? 
Willingness to participate in LSIPV by devoting money (WTDM) 
[145,147] 
 How is your willingness to invest money in a local solar PV initiative? 
 
As can be seen in Table II.3., all results for Cronbach’s Alpha present a value over 0.8, 
which denotes that our key variables are internally consistent. Nevertheless, among some 
researchers there is some controversy about the benefits of the Cronbach’s Alpha for 
variables or scales formed by two questions [153]. We therefore also include the 
Spearman-Brown formula for two-item-based variables. The resulting Spearman-Brown 
coefficients are greater than 0.8 in all two-items-based variables, so we can assume that 
the internal consistency of our variables is acceptable. Based on these results, we compute 
for all variables shown in Table II.3 an average score among questions that belong to a 
specific variable, in order to maintain the same scale. As already mentioned, most 
questions in Tables II.3. and II.4. are adapted from previous work. In most of the cases, 
the original scale was altered to a seven-point Likert scale and questions about “Perception 
of profitability” include an “I don’t know” response option. People were also specifically 
asked about their WTDT and their WTDM to LSIPV, considering only one seven-point 
Likert scale question for each one of these dependent variables. 
 
Regarding the ‘sense of ownership’ concept, our questions were based on existing 
literature on ownership issues. This includes Lachapelle & McCool [154], who refer to 
the concept of ownership as a shared sense of problem and process to address wicked 
situations. It also involves association of citizens and agencies to collectively define, 
share, and address problems with redistribution of power. More specifically, Lachapelle 
[155] defines sense of ownership considering three questions: 1) who has a voice and 
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whose voice is heard? 2) who has influence over decisions and what results from the 
effort? 3) who is affected by the process and outcome? Marks & Davis [156] establish, in 
a study about rural water systems in Kenya, a scale of sense of ownership based on several 
elements, such as feeling about being an owner, family involvement as owners, members’ 
involvement as owners, and a concern about the operation and maintenance of such 
systems. As noted before, Koch & Christ [148] find, for some interviewees, emotions 
related to the concept of sense of ownership, in a study where interviewees felt positive 
feelings about being like co-owners and energy producers rather than mere customers. 
Hence, the concept of sense of ownership involves several elements including the 
existence of an objective (problem) to be reached (solved) through a coordinated process 
with coordinated efforts (participants); also, an effective participation and recognition 
(voice); and decision-making processes with their results and/or consequences. Following 
this literature, we operationalise ‘sense of ownership’ through two questions: one about 
the perceived importance of having a direct influence over decisions and the second one 
about the perceived importance of facing/taking all consequences, i.e. all benefits, costs, 
and risks derived from LSIPV.  
 
In the next section of the survey, participants were asked to indicate the main barrier, from 
their perspective, to participate in a local solar energy initiative, choosing from several 
alternatives. Finally, participants were asked to provide information on their gender, 
education level, housing type, whether they own or rent a dwelling, whether they or 
someone else pays the electricity bill, and income. These factors will be explored for their 
potential influence on respondents’ WTDT and WTDM (or WTP) to LSIPV. Housing 
type and home rental vs. ownership are particularly relevant as individuals who are not 
homeowners would be generally unable to install solar PV devices. 
 
In terms of data analysis, we first analyse descriptive statistics for all independent and 
dependent variables considering the entire survey group. The scores from the respondents’ 
answers are then used to determine the most significant variables that might affect WTDT 
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and WTDM to LSIPV, by estimating a multi-variate linear regression model using IBM 
SPSS version 20®. This model is estimated considering all variables shown in Table II.1. 
Given that we do not have specific hypotheses about magnitude, order, and direction of 
the relation and significance of each independent variable (for these respondents), we then 
perform the backward selection method to select the significant variables and corroborate 




II.4.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
Descriptive statistics are listed in Table II.5. below. As can be seen in this table, 
respondents on average have a “high” environmental concern (with mean 6.06 and 
standard deviation 1.44), perceived usefulness of solar PV technology (with mean 6.08 
and standard deviation 1.49), and desire for energy independence (with mean 5.97 and 
standard deviation 1.65). Respondents’ sense of ownership reaches a mean 5.26 with 
standard deviation 1.58 and trust presents a mean 4.86 with standard deviation 1.49. 
Community identity has a mean 5.20 with standard deviation 1.46. It is interesting to note 
that the lowest score and highest dispersion is obtained by the “buying solar technology 
expertise” variable, which has a mean 3.29 and standard deviation 1.85. 
 
Table II.5. Descriptive statistics for variables that hypothetically would affect electricity residential 
customers’ WTDT and WTDM to LSIPV 
Type of variable Variable N Mean SD 
Social 
Community identity 98 5.20 1.46 
Trust 99 4.86 1.49 
Willingness to collaborate with community in 
a LSIPV 
99 5.61 1.71 
Perceived community interest in solar energy 99 3.76 1.77 
Environmental Environmental concern 99 6.06 1.44 
Socio-technical 
Desire for energy independence 99 5.97 1.65 
Sense of ownership 99 5.26 1.58 
Perceived usefulness of solar PV technology 98 6.08 1.49 
Perceived solar energy profitability 99 5.70 1.42 




     
In terms of respondents’ WTDT and WTDM to LSIPV, according to Table II.6., the first 
variable presents a mean of 5.41 with a standard deviation 1.53. The distribution of the 
respondents’ scores indicate that most of them are willing to devote time (76.8%) and the 
rest are neutral or more unwilling to do so. The second variable reaches a mean 4.78 with 
a standard deviation 1.52. The distribution of the respondents’ scores indicate that 61.6% 
of the respondents are willing to devote money to LSIPV but a considerable rise of 
indecisive people can be noted at the same time (24.2%). 
 
Table II.6. Respondents’ WTDT and WTDM to LSIPV 
N=99 Very Low Low Slightly low Neutral Slightly high High Very High Mean SD 
WTDT (%) 4.0 1.0 6.1 12.1 18.2 32.3 26.3 5.41 1.525 
WTDM (%) 6.1 2.0 6.1 24.2 30.3 18.2 13.1 4.78 1.522 
 
 
Fig. II.1. Main barriers for respondents to be willing to participate in a LSIPV. 
 
Fig. II.1. shows the main barriers for the respondents to be willing to participate in a 
LSIPV. As can be seen here, the most important perceived barrier is “lack of financial 
resources for funding the project” (more than 50% of the choices). It is followed by 
“inadequate or weak project participants’ experience, knowledge or skills” (about 20% of 
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II.4.2 Regression Analysis 
 
As shown below in Table II.7., the regression model explains a significant part of the 
variance (adjusted 𝑅2 = 0.287, 𝐹(4) = 10.759, 𝑝 < .001) in WTDM to LSIPV, 
confirming the validity of our model. The standardized coefficients show that the most 
important variable is willingness to collaborate with the community in a LSIPV (𝛽 =
0.461, 𝑝 < .001), followed by community identity (𝛽 = −0.301, 𝑝 < .05), sense of 
ownership (𝛽 = 0.266, 𝑝 < .05), and Education - Postgraduates v/s Secondary school or 
below (𝛽 = −0.256, 𝑝 < .01). The rest of the variables, namely trust, perceived 
community interest in solar energy, environmental concern, desire for energy 
independence, perceived usefulness of solar PV technology, perceived solar energy 
profitability, buying solar technology expertise, house ownership, electricity payer, 
education (other categories), income, age, and gender are not significant and, therefore, 
they are not included in Table II.7. After checking the case-wise diagnostics and residuals 
statistics, we find six potential cases to be catalogued as influential or outlier. 
Nevertheless, none of these six cases presented a Cook’s distance greater than one, so we 
conclude there is no outlier that justifies a removal. 
 






B Std. Error Beta 
Constant 2.884*** .545  
Community identity -.314* .125 -.301 
Sense of ownership .256* .107 .266 
Willingness to collaborate with community in a LSIPV .409*** .117 .461 
Education (Postgraduates v/s Secondary school or 
below) 
-1.626** .550 -.256 
Dependent Variable: WTDM 
*** p < .001 
  ** p < .01 
    * p < .05 
 
As can be seen in Table II.8., the regression model explains an even larger fraction of the 
variance (adjusted 𝑅2 = 0.506, 𝐹(6) = 17.541, 𝑝 < .001) in WTDT to LSIPV. The 
standardized coefficients show that the most important variable is willingness to 
collaborate with community in a LSIPV (𝛽 = 0.808, 𝑝 < .001), followed by sense of 
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ownership (𝛽 = −0.220, 𝑝 < .05), trust (𝛽 = −0.206, 𝑝 < .05), buying solar 
technology expertise (𝛽 = 0.180, 𝑝 < .05), house ownership (𝛽 = −0.167, 𝑝 < .05), 
and electricity payer (𝛽 = −0.167, 𝑝 < .05). The rest of the variables, namely 
community identity, perceived community interest in solar energy, environmental 
concern, desire for energy independence, perceived usefulness of solar PV technology, 
perceived solar energy profitability, education, income, age, gender are not significant 
and, therefore, they are not included in Table II.8. After checking the case-wise 
diagnostics and residuals statistics, we find six potential cases to be catalogued as 
influential or outlier. Nevertheless, again, none of these six cases presented a Cook’s 
distance greater than one, so we conclude there is no influential case or outlier that justifies 
a removal. 
 






B Std. Error Beta 
Constant 3.278*** .493   
Buying solar technology expertise .150* .063 .180 
Trust -.211* .084 -.206 
Sense of ownership -.213* .092 -.220 
Willingness to collaborate with community in a LSIPV .722*** .087 .808 
House Ownership (Owner = 0, Tenant = 1) -.658* .289 -.167 
Electricity payer (Respondent = 0, Someone else = 1) -.575* .248 -.167 
Dependent Variable: WTDT 
*** p < .001 
    * p < .05 
 
II.5 Discussion and recommendations 
 
As the results above show, on average, respondents have a high score for all variables, 
with the exception of two variables: perceived community interest in solar energy and 
buying solar technology expertise. This suggests that the respondents might not have 
enough knowledge about what their neighbours think about solar energy development, 
which would denote a need for improving the communication among neighbours, if an 
increased citizen participation in energy projects is desired. This may imply a cultural 
change that may take a huge effort, but should be possible. Moreover, respondents do not 
think or feel they know enough to buy solar energy technology. This means that the 
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government and/or private sector should strengthen the current communication channels 
and deploy an effective marketing strategy that targets potential customers of solar energy 
technologies, especially taking into account that there would be a potential market to 
explore, as respondents would be willing to participate in LSIPV. In terms of trust and 
community identity, both variables are closer to the “neutral” score. In this sense, the 
government should deal with this matter by encouraging and facilitating communication 
as well as deeper connections or relationships among the neighbours of a particular 
community. Of course, all of this does not exclusively depend on specific activities carried 
out by some public or private entity; rather, there are more profound cultural, 
psychological, historical, and sociological aspects that also need to be properly addressed 
in the context of LSIPV emergence. This might take longer, but it should be considered 
and promoted, especially in the context of community energy emergence in Chile. 
 
We can also highlight that respondents in this study on average have a high WTDT but a 
lower WTDM, in comparative terms, even though they are, on average, higher educated 
and have a higher salary than the average Chilean consumer. Interestingly, the most 
important perceived barrier to LSIPV is “lack of financial resources for funding the 
project”, which indicates either (real) financial constraints or just reluctance about 
spending money on LSIPV. Most people in our sample have undergraduate and/or 
postgraduate degrees (82%), which indicates reasonable access to financial resources and 
a better wage, so it appears that respondents are not necessarily credit-constrained but are 
reluctant to spend money on LSIPV, even though they realise that financial constrains are 
the most important barrier to these initiatives. This suggests that better knowledge of, and 
access to, schemes that provide funding and/or reduce risk would be beneficial. It also 
suggests that information about the potential returns to investment in LSIPV might be 
lacking. Another interesting result to note is that, even when people are willing to spend 
time on LSIPV, they are worried about the project participants’ time, so here the focus 
should be on promoting an equal participation of people in such initiatives. At the same 
time, improving and strengthening people’s expertise should be a priority, at least, at a 
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basic level that is enough for knowing the project management main aspects. It is not 
necessary for all participants to have comprehensive knowledge about all aspects of 
LSIPV project management, but a better distribution of tasks and knowledge of what goes 
on in the project may help address the perceived issue of lack of time put in by other 
project participants. 
 
Nevertheless, according to the aforementioned results, respondents are on average willing 
to participate in LSIPV. Of course, the next question is how (or alternatively, through 
which scheme) would people participate in LSIPV? We encourage further research in this 
sense for Chile, particularly addressing social elements like sense of ownership as 
mentioned beforehand. 
 
Concerning the regression analysis results, we can highlight that willingness to collaborate 
with the community in a LSIPV, community identity, sense of ownership, and education 
(postgraduates v/s secondary school or below) are significantly related to WTDM to 
LSIPV. Willingness to collaborate with community in a LSIPV offers the largest positive 
contribution to WTDM, which is expected. On the other hand, the largest negative 
contribution to WDTM is given by community identity. This might be explained by the 
fact that respondents in our area of study, which is mostly urban, do not have a strong 
identity or attachment with their closest community or group of neighbours. However, 
they might be willing to collaborate with others by devoting money only if they develop 
a specific initiative with others (community), such as a LSIPV. It is also possible that areas 
with a stronger community identity differ from the others in other ways (e.g., in disposable 
income) and are therefore less interested in LSIPV. In the same vein, when respondents 
report a lower education level, they are less willing to give money, which can be seen 
through the coefficient for education (postgraduates v/s secondary school or below) – this 
is likely to be a wage effect, as respondents with a lower education level are more likely 
to be credit-constrained. Finally, sense of ownership is positively related to WTDM, as 
we expected. As explained above, respondents that want to make decisions and assume 
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benefits, costs, and risks (derived from a LSIPV), are likely to be more engaged with the 
project, may get additional utility from playing their part in it, and may also perceive lower 
risks, as they have some measure of control over the project; all of these effects would 
lead to a higher WTDM. 
 
In terms of the second regression model, we notice that willingness to collaborate with 
community in a LSIPV, sense of ownership, trust, buying solar technology expertise, 
house ownership, and electricity payer are significantly related to WTDT to LSIPV. 
Willingness to collaborate with community in a LSIPV offers the largest positive 
contribution to WTDT, as it does for WTDM, which is expected. Buying solar technology 
expertise is the second positive contribution to WTDT in terms of magnitude. This might 
indicate that respondents with knowledge about what, how, and where to buy solar 
technologies, would be willing to contribute to LSIPV by spending time and delivering 
their knowledge. Respondents with a lower perceived level of knowledge may feel that 
they cannot usefully contribute to LSIPV. The coefficients for house ownership and 
electricity payer negatively contribute to WTDT indicating that when respondents are not 
the owners or are not paying the electricity bill, they are not willing to spend time in a 
LSIPV; this is straightforward. Trust is also negatively related to WTDT and this might 
be explained by the fact that respondents that trust others would rather spend time on other 
activities, leaving project management to others. In the same vein, sense of ownership 
negatively affects to WTDT – the opposite of its effect on WTDM. This is somewhat 
puzzling, but may be explained by the fact that respondents who want decision-making 
power and carry some of the project risks are less willing to, in addition, spend time 
managing the day-to-day running of the project. 
 
Based on the above, some recommendations can be derived that could help encourage the 
emergence of citizen participation in energy production initiatives: 
 
65 
     
1. Foster deeper communication and connections within the communities and inform 
people in these communities about the advantages of energy production initiatives. 
2. Give more information about solar energy technologies as well as the opportunities 
that energy/electricity markets could provide for people. 
3. Provide clarity on access to funding and encourage transparency within the project 
about the sharing of risk and effort. 
4. Delve into and analyse more social elements (especially taking the concept of sense 
of ownership into account) that may influence WTDT and WTDM, broadening the 
scope and collecting more representative data from Chilean residential customers. 
5. Design and implement specific tools based on social and/or economic variables, for 
example, that help people to decide which scheme would be the best for them. This 
can be seen as an analogy of the customers risk profiles for financial investments, 
made by some financial companies. 
6. Define specific and verifiable policies (and procedures) for promoting citizen 




In this chapter, the question about whether people would like to participate in energy 
production based on solar PV initiatives was addressed from a social science perspective. 
Most respondents are willing to participate in these projects by devoting time and/or 
money. We have identified social factors, recognised in the state-of-art literature, that 
influence this willingness, including trust, willingness to collaborate with the community, 
community identity, buying solar technology expertise, among others. We also include 
the concept of sense of ownership in an explicit way and show that this influences 
customers’ willingness, although not always in the expected way. Despite their 
willingness, respondents are worried about how such projects would be funded, how 
people can obtain and develop the necessary knowledge for managing the projects, and 
the effective time that people contribute to the project.  
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Our sample is small and not entirely representative for the entire Chilean population. For 
instance, in our sample respondents have a higher educational level, live in flats in a higher 
degree and in houses in a lower degree, and the female proportion is a bit lower45. This 
could lead to different results. People with a lower educational background might not 
know the main implications of (using) solar PV technologies and also present some 
complications at the time of devoting money, as they would perceive a lower income. On 
the other hand, in Chile most people live in houses so this could facilitate the installation 
of generation devices and then affects WTDT, WTDM, and the independent variables. 
Moreover, there could be other factors or variables that might influence or affect WTDM, 
WTDT, and other variables, which could have been omitted in this work. Of course, social 
science offers one perspective to deal with these matters, but there are other approaches 
like decision theory, choice theory, and game theory, for instance, that may also offer 
proper answers to such problems. 
 
Nevertheless, based on the exploratory nature of this study, we think these results should 
encourage further research in order to generalize the results to the Chilean population. 
Such research with a more profound analysis can provide better results and conclusions 
that can also be generalised to the population, which may strengthen the current public 
policies of citizen participation in energy production in Chile and then develop a thriving 
community-led energy production sector tackling climate change and improving local 
economies in a sustainable way. This could be possible via having community energy 
projects across the country. 
  
                                                 
45 See http://www.censo2017.cl/microdatos/ 
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III. THE PROMOTION OF COMMUNITY ENERGY PROJECTS IN 





Citizen participation in energy production is increasingly becoming an important matter 
in many countries around the world. This is evidenced by the fact that the number of news 
items, reports, scientific articles, dedicated public and private organisations, and projects 
that are related to or involved in this matter, is steadily increasing. Moreover, this concept 
is also progressively playing a major role in governments’ decisions, through a variety of 
public policies, laws and regulations that have been or are being implemented; an 
important example is article 16 on local energy communities in the European Union's 
electricity directive46. Unsurprisingly, the corresponding installed capacity of citizen-led 
electricity generation projects has increased remarkably during the last few years, 
especially in some European countries like Scotland [45,82-87]. There are other countries, 
like the Netherlands, Spain, and Sweden, which show similar trends. Additionally, 
Germany and Denmark deserve mention, as these countries represent a model to follow 
given the nature and number of projects and their contribution to the generation mix [73-
75]. These experiences can be used to encourage and help other less developed countries, 
like Chile, in promoting and implementing their own citizen-led projects in energy 
generation. In fact, the Chilean Government has explicitly declared its willingness to 
support a more decentralised system and a higher participation of citizens in energy 
markets as prosumers, rather than mere customers [40,133].  
 
Under the broad umbrella of citizen participation in energy production, it is possible to 
find a wide variety of initiatives, such as community energy projects [35,36], distributed 
generation projects [31], locally-owned energy projects [46], projects based on hybrid 
                                                 
46 See https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52016PC0864&from=EN 
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partnerships (with public, private, and/or civil involvement) [75], among others. Of 
course, the diversity of projects will depend upon the specific context in each country or 
energy market.  
 
For the purposes of this chapter, the focus will be on community energy projects. These 
initiatives are examined and contrasted, in the sense of economic-strategic viability, with 
other well-known schemes; specifically, distributed generation projects and regular utility 
contracts. Accordingly, in this work a regular utility contract is understood as an ordinary 
electricity provision contract between a customer and a distributor/supplier. A distributed 
generation project is defined as “an electric power source connected directly to the 
distribution network or on the customer site of the meter”, following the Ackermann et 
al.’s [31] definition. As noted in Fuentes González et al. [133], a community energy 
project is defined as a project conceived, carried out, and implemented by people who are: 
 
 Interested in generating energy 
 Located close to or in the exact place of the project 
 Well-organised under any suitable legal and organisational structure 
 The owner, or have a high participation in the ownership, of the project 
 The main (and/or the first) beneficiary of the project 
 Primarily interested in welfare maximisation and income generation. 
 
The same authors notice that community energy projects are more complex than 
distributed generation, in terms of their nature and characteristics, because the former do 
not need to be connected to distribution networks, can involve more than one customer at 
the same time, and imply not only technical aspects, but also social and economic ones 
[133]. As a consequence, community energy projects should guarantee to their members 
proper cooperation mechanisms and attractive incentives to join and remain a part of the 
project. Moreover, community energy projects should be competitive compared to other 
ways of energy production, which should imply higher benefits for their members, as well 
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as a long-term sustainability. These characteristics imply a dual behaviour of community 
energy projects because, on the one hand, these projects need cooperation and, on the 
other hand, these initiatives need to compete with others projects. As far as we are aware, 
there are no existing studies that model such dual behaviour from an economic-strategic 
perspective. 
 
Game theory appears as a suitable tool to analyse this setting. Game theory can be defined 
as a discipline that aims at determining the best possible outcome and the corresponding 
strategy (or set of actions) to get to this outcome, for a number of decision-makers 
(players) who interact in a particular situation or context (game). Game theory also allows 
finding out what the players’ incentives are and whether they are aligned and affected by 
any stimulus that might imply changes (instability). In principle, games can be 
cooperative, where players cooperate with each other, and non-cooperative, where players 
do not cooperate but make their decisions individually to maximise their own objectives. 
There are also hybrid games, which consider cooperative and non-cooperative behaviour 
at the same time. Although these have, to our knowledge, not been applied to energy 
markets, we suggest that they are especially appropriate to model the dual behaviour of 
community energy initiatives, and will apply them in what follows. 
 
There is a variety of hybrid games. This chapter is focused on a simple and intuitive 
approach called biform games theory [157,158], which, as we will show, can be applied 
to electricity markets and the community energy sector. Adapting the existing literature 
on biform games, we formulate simple and novel three-player games that model two 
residential electricity consumers with a high and low/medium average electricity 
consumption, respectively, and a distributor or supplier that provides electricity to both 
consumers. We apply these games to data from two countries, Scotland and Chile, as 
community energy projects have been significantly promoted in the former and distributed 
generation schemes in the latter. For each of these two countries, we therefore analyse 
three scenarios: a base scenario in which consumers buy electricity through regular utility 
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contracts, a scenario where community energy projects are pursued, and one where a net 
billing distributed generation scheme is in operation. In all of these, all players interact 
with each other.  
 
This chapter aims to make three specific contributions. First, by using biform games 
theory, we develop simple but pioneering examples taking into consideration real data 
from Chile and Scotland, in order to better understand the community energy sector, its 
economic-strategic viability and the interaction with other projects or schemes. The 
economic-strategic viability concept means that an initiative or project provides the best 
possible payoff or outcome for the incumbents, given a feasible and rational strategy (or 
set of actions). The best possible payoff or outcome can be seen as either monetary losses 
or monetary benefits, depending on the circumstances and results of the modelled 
situation. By addressing these metrics, we can derive insights about the stability inside the 
projects (or coalitions) and competitiveness with other schemes, which can help policy 
makers encourage a thriving community energy sector through proper long-term public 
policies that are compatible with the energy market incumbents’ incentives. Second, we 
derive some lessons that can help people distribute a payoff or outcome among the 
members of a community energy project. Third, this chapter aims to show another way of 
thinking about community energy projects, considering a methodology that is not 
currently widely used for the analysis of electricity markets and the community energy 
sector. This can contribute to a further dialogue between game theorists and energy 
modellers, which will help increase the deployment of community energy initiatives and 
a deeper penetration of renewable energy sources. 
 
Since we are mainly concerned with demonstrating a new method and deriving qualitative 
insights, our models are highly simplified and we make a number of restrictive 
assumptions. Most importantly, we focus exclusively on the economic-strategic side of 
community energy initiatives. We recognise that there are other elements that might affect 
people’s decisions and/or behaviour, which we do not include, such as psychological, 
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sociological, historical or environmental factors. These could be included in more realistic 
models, at a price of reducing model transparency and increasing computational cost. 
 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. In section III.2, we present the 
theoretical background necessary to build up the biform games. In section III.3, we reveal 
the main features and assumptions of our approach based on biform games. In section 
III.4, the results are shown. In section III.5, a discussion of those results is given. Finally, 
section III.6 concludes. 
 
III.2 Theoretical background 
 
III.2.1 State-of-the-art analysis of the community energy emergence 
 
A community energy project implies cooperation among the members, which is 
particularly crucial. People with different feelings, motivations, attitudes, judgement, 
professional background and experience, points of view, etc., need to agree with others in 
order to successfully carry out and implement the project. Many studies show the 
importance of the social-institutional elements in the emergence, constitution, and 
operation of community energy projects [36-38,52,55,79,81,145-147,159-161]. 
Additionally, because these initiatives are currently playing a role within liberalised 
electricity/energy markets, other studies characterise the (potential) incumbents of the 
community energy sector, as well as the market and its characteristics 
[49,54,60,71,72,74,141-144,162-164].  
 
Fewer studies focus specifically on economic-financial aspects. In one study, Leontief’s 
Input-Output Model is applied to Scottish community energy projects to evaluate their 
impacts on the local economy [80]. Lakshmi & Tilley [165] determine the Return on 
Stakeholders’ Capital (RoSC) and Cost of Stakeholders' capital (CoSC) for a particular 
community energy project in England, for the purpose of monitoring and improving its 
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functioning, regardless the scale. Berka et al. [56] calculate the expected Net Present 
Value (NPV) and Levelized Cost of Energy (LCOE) for community-owned projects at 
different development stages, and show the existence of higher costs, longer project 
development times, and higher risks, in comparison with commercial projects.  
 
In relation to the economic-strategic viability of projects, Abada et al. [166] analyse an 
energy community, understood as an initiative where several households in a given 
building decide to use a single meter and potentially cooperate and install solar 
photovoltaics (PV) panels. They point out that there is no assurance that coalitions of 
households will be viable, and that this is affected by the installation costs, coordination 
costs, and sharing rules. Lo Prete & Hobbs [167] show how microgrid development affects 
costs and benefits for network incumbents (a utility company, a private investor in 
microgrids, and residential customers), highlighting market failures, the importance of 
microgrid introduction timing, and effects on prices. Lee et al. [168] analyse the 
cooperation between small-scale electricity suppliers and end-users in direct trading, 
proposing a fair pricing and revenue division scheme for them. There are also other studies 
that propose resources allocation schemes in different contexts [169-172]. More recently, 
Abada et al. [173] highlight the interaction between energy communities and a distribution 
system operator and the effects derived from the grid tariff structure.  
 
Hence, it seems that the prevailing trend has been to analyse the social-institutional 
features of community energy projects, principally dealing with psychological, 
sociological, historical, institutional, and/or political factors, in order to find out which 
category or categories significantly affects the emergence and success of community 
energy projects. Consequently, we can find relevant information about people’s attitudes 
and willingness towards community energy projects, the impact derived from particular 
public policies, the features of such projects that might help to clearly define community 
energy, and so on. Most of the aforementioned studies use statistical and social sciences 
techniques. On the other hand, the economic-financial side of the community energy 
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emergence has received less attention, which indicates an opportunity to properly delve 
into this matter, for instance, by developing more advanced valuation models of such 
projects, new ways of funding, more knowledge about a suitable cash flow management, 
etc. Concerning the last group of studies related to the economic-strategic viability, it is 
important to highlight two elements of interest: firstly, most of these studies are based on 
cooperative game theory, where in essence players form coalitions to get the best possible 
payoff or outcome and distribute it among them, ensuring stability. The basic idea is to 
assure that the members will remain in the coalition. Competition between community 
energy projects and other existing schemes is not considered in these studies. Secondly, 
these investigations take into account projects that are closer to or under the above-
mentioned definition of distributed generation than that of community energy, mainly 
because the focus is on specific buildings and/or dwellings within these, rather than proper 
small or medium-scale power plants owned by communities. Also, the strategic 
interactions chiefly occur at the distribution level. This is not a sine qua non condition for 
community energy projects. 
 
Thus, from our perspective, there is a gap that deserves to be appropriately explored in 
terms of modelling community energy projects and their interactions with other schemes 
or projects, in order to find clues that may help to answer the following research questions: 
a) is it possible to assure stability within a coalition that allows its members to remain in 
and then contribute to the emergence of community energy projects?; and b) is it possible 
to know more about whether a community energy project is attractive for its members in 
comparison with other schemes or projects? 
 
III.2.2 Biform games fundamentals 
 
Community energy projects present a dual behaviour: cooperative on one side, where the 
members of a community energy project need to cooperate with each other in order to 
carry out the initiative; and non-cooperative on the other, where the project itself competes 
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with other projects or schemes of electricity/energy provision. As mentioned above, such 
dual behaviour can be modelled by using hybrid games. Examples of hybrid games and 
their variety of applications can be found in several studies. For example, Grossman & 
Hart [174] apply a two-stage hybrid game, with non-cooperative and cooperative stages, 
and show that one firm purchases another one when the former’s control increases the 
productivity of its management more than the loss of control decreases the latter’s 
management productivity. Similarly, Hart & Moore [175], also using two-stage hybrid 
games, address the dilemma of when transactions should be fulfilled within the firm or 
through the market. Taking a more technical view, Zhao [176] establishes an intermediate 
non-cooperative and cooperative solution concept for n-person games, considering one 
stage and deriving cooperative games from non-cooperative games. Ray & Vohra [177] 
study binding agreements in which each player’s payoff depends upon all other players’ 
actions. As can be seen, these studies are highly theoretical, developing game-theoretic 
methods rather than applying them to specific industries or incumbents.  
 
Within the hybrid games theory literature, biform games form a specific category. A 
biform game [157] consists of a hybrid game (cooperative and non-cooperative) that 
employs the core (second game stage) and Nash equilibrium (first game stage) as solution 
mechanisms, which are developed under a common methodology. The link between both 
stages is represented by a confidence index, which is derived from the Hurwicz criterion 
and subsequent modifications [157,178,179]. Accordingly, a biform game can be formally 
defined as follows [157]: 
 




𝑍𝑖 is a finite strategy set for each 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛 player. 
𝑧𝑖 is the player 𝑖’s selected strategy. 
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𝑉 is a map from 𝑍𝑖 × … × 𝑍𝑛 to the set of maps 𝛲(𝐼) → ℝ, with 𝑉(𝑧𝑖, … , 𝑧𝑛)(∅) = 0 for 
every 𝑧𝑖, … , 𝑧𝑛 ∈ 𝑍𝑖 × … × 𝑍𝑛.  
𝛼𝑖 is the player 𝑖’s confidence index, which is between 0 and 1. 
 
The resulting set of strategies 𝑧𝑖 , … , 𝑧𝑛 ∈ 𝑍𝑖 × … × 𝑍𝑛 defines a transferable utility game 
with characteristic function 𝑉(𝑧𝑖, … , 𝑧𝑛):  𝛲(𝐼) → ℝ, where 𝛲(𝐼) is the set of all subsets 
of the players set 𝐼. This means that, for each coalition 𝑆 ⊆ 𝐼, 𝑉(𝑧𝑖, … , 𝑧𝑛)(𝑆) is the value 
created by coalition 𝑆, given that the players choose the strategies 𝑧𝑖, … , 𝑧𝑛. Thus, to solve 
a biform game, it is necessary to follow five steps [157]: 
 
1. Determine the core for the cooperative part or second stage of the (biform) game. 
2. Calculate the range of payoffs for each player. 
3. Use 𝛼𝑖 and (1 − 𝛼𝑖) to compute the weighted average in order to evaluate the 
cooperative part of the game, applying that index to the largest and smallest payoffs 
that every player could receive. 
4. Assign to player 𝑖 a payoff equal to the 𝑖’s weighted average, in order to reduce the 
cooperative stage to a non-cooperative game. 
5. Compute the Nash equilibrium of the non-cooperative part or first stage of the game. 
 
There are several applications of biform games to economic and strategic problems. For 
instance, Stuart [180] analyses the newsvendor problem and determines the equivalence 
of the inventory decision to a capacity decision under Cournot competition, considering 
scenarios with uncertainty and no uncertainty. The same author, in [181], by using biform 
games, notices that in a monopoly, competition only partially determines the outcomes 
affecting the monopolist’s capacity decision. Ryall & Sorenson [182] study whether a 
broker, who intermediates between two or more parties, has a competitive advantage and 
whether this could persist. Hennet & Mahjoub [183,184] go over the supply network 
formation considering it as a biform game instead of cooperative linear production games. 
From a more technological perspective, Kim [185] develops adaptive cognitive radio 
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spectrum sensing/sharing algorithms for smart grids, based on biform games. Jia [186] 
models endogenous investments in assets, which have made to support a specific 
relationship, and examines how those investment decisions may change due to 
competition and governance arrangements. Feess & Thun [187] analyse the surplus 
division in supply chains on investment incentives, taking into account the Shapley value 
instead of the core in the second stage. Li & Chen [188] describe the relations of 
competition and cooperation on innovation networks by using biform games. Considering 
biform games, Menon [189] highlights the fundamental role of cognitive elements on 
strategic interactions and develops the core components of strategic mental models. To 
our knowledge, there are no existing applications of biform games to the community 
energy emergence, despite this being a useful tool to model the dual cooperative and 
competitive nature of community energy projects. 
 
Based on the studies mentioned above, it is worth highlighting the flexibility that biform 
games can provide in terms of (potential) applications, which might help to deal with 
different situations where is possible to find cooperation and competition at the same time. 
This is not only related to the economic and strategic fields, but also to other disciplines 
such as engineering, as developed in [185]. Given this flexibility, biform games allow 
obtaining deeper knowledge about stability, or how a community-led project can 
incentivise and retain the membership, by giving information about the players’ 
negotiation power that comes from the cooperative stage of each game without 
considering procedural assumptions of bargaining. In addition, through the non-
cooperative stage it is possible to get information about whether a strategy is good and 
creates a favourable cooperative stage for players, where they have the chance to negotiate 
and then obtain the best possible payoff or outcome [157]. All of this might help to better 
understand the emergence of community energy projects, as well as the related 
cooperation mechanisms and the competitiveness of such projects, which can be translated 
into economic-strategic viability. As noted above, the focus of the existing literature on 
community energy has been on a more social and institutional view, leaving the financial 
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and economic perspective aside from the main stream of analysis, so our approach 
enriches the current knowledge on community energy development and biform games 
applications. 
 
Biform games take into account the Nash equilibrium as the solution mechanism for the 
first (non-cooperative) stage, which is defined as follows: the strategies (𝑧𝑖
∗, … , 𝑧𝑛
∗ ) are 
Nash Equilibria if, for each player 𝑖, 𝑧𝑖
∗ is player 𝑖’s best response to the strategies 
(𝑧1
∗, … , 𝑧𝑖−1
∗ , 𝑧𝑖+1
∗  , … , 𝑧𝑛
∗) chosen by the other players that solves the following 
optimisation problem [190]: 
 
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑧𝑖∈𝑍𝑖𝑓𝑖(𝑧1
∗, … , 𝑧𝑖−1
∗ , 𝑧𝑖
∗, 𝑧𝑖+1
∗  , … , 𝑧𝑛
∗)   (III.2) 
 
The function payoff, 𝑓𝑖, is given by the cooperative part or second stage of the game. To 
solve it, biform games take into account the core as the solution mechanism. The core is 
defined as follows [191,192]: 
 
𝐶(𝑣) = {𝑥 ∈ ℝ𝑛| ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑖∈𝐼 = 𝑣(𝐼) , ∑ 𝑥𝑖 ≥ 𝑣(𝑆)𝑖∈𝑆 ∀ 𝑆 ∈ 𝑃(𝐼)} (III.3) 
 
In words, the core can be defined as a mathematical methodology to distribute payoffs or 
outcomes among the players, in which the sum of all payoffs of each player 𝑖 (∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑖∈𝐼 ), 
who belong to the players set 𝐼 (also referred as grand coalition), has to be equal to the 
coalitional value of 𝐼, 𝑣(𝐼), represented by a characteristic function 𝑣 . This is sometimes 
called the efficiency principle. Additionally, the sum of all payoffs of each player 𝑖 who 
belong to coalition 𝑆 (∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑖∈𝑆 ), has to be greater than or equal to the coalitional value of 
𝑆, 𝑣(𝑆). This is called coalitional rationality. This applies to all coalitions that belong to 
the coalition set 𝑃(𝐼), including single coalitions. Consequently, any payoff allocation or 
distribution agreement under the core is stable, in the sense that no player can achieve a 
higher payoff outside a coalition within the core [192]. Mathematically, the core can be 
non-empty (feasible solution) or empty (infeasible solution), as shown in Fig. III.1. 
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Fig. III.1. Non-empty and empty core 
Source: adapted from [74] 
 
Fig. III.1. represents a way to plot the core by drawing a triangle in barycentric 
coordinates47, in which the plane of the plot is ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑖∈𝐼 = 𝑣(𝐼) and drawing each point on 
the plane at which the three coordinates sum to 𝑣(𝐼). Then, the coalitional incentives 
constraints are drawn on the plane, in order to find which points are stable or unstable. 
Moreover, to find games with an appropriate and feasible solution, the core has to meet 
three mathematical conditions at the same time, according to the Bondareva-Shapley 
theorem: superadditivity, convexity, and balancedness [192-195]. 
 
The link between the first and second stages of the biform game is the parameter 𝛼𝑖, which 
is the player 𝑖’s confidence index. This index can be seen as a representation of the players’ 
beliefs about the fraction of the coalitional value they could capture in the cooperative part 
of the game. We can therefore obtain information about the degree of competition and 
potential bargaining opportunities. This is why the confidence index is applied to the 
largest and smallest payoffs that every player could receive once the core is determined. 
A confidence index near one means an optimistic player who expects to capture most of 
                                                 
47 See http://mathworld.wolfram.com/BarycentricCoordinates.html 
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the value to be distributed in the second stage, whereas a confidence index close to zero 
means the opposite [157].  
 
Recalling that the core can be non-empty or empty, we also have to deal with games that 
have an empty core. Summerfield & Dror [158] develop a methodology that treats a 
biform game as a two-stage stochastic programming problem with recourse, which deals 





∗) = 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑧𝑖∈{0,1} − 𝑐
1(𝑧𝑖) + 𝑄𝑖(𝑧𝑖, 𝑧𝑗 , 𝑧𝑘)  (III.4) 
 
where: 
𝑄𝑖(𝑧𝑖, 𝑧𝑗 , 𝑧𝑘) = 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑇⊆{𝑖,𝑗,𝑘} 𝛼𝑖𝑥?̅?
𝑇,(𝑧𝑖,𝑧𝑗,𝑧𝑘) + (1 − 𝛼𝑖)𝑥𝑖
𝑇,(𝑧𝑖,𝑧𝑗,𝑧𝑘)  (III.5) 
𝑠. 𝑡.  
𝐶(𝑇, 𝑣) ≠ ∅      (III.6) 
 
Here, players 𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑘 ∈ 𝐼 and 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗 ≠ 𝑘. Furthermore, 𝑇 ⊆ 𝛲(𝐼) represents a stable 
subcoalition with a non-empty core (in the second stage or cooperative part of the game) 
that maximises player 𝑖’s expected payoff. That is, a coalitional game Γ = (𝐼, 𝑣) will be a 
subgame Γ = (𝑇, 𝑣) with ∅ ≠ 𝑇 ⊆ 𝛲(𝐼), so 𝑇 can be now also be treated as a coalition. It 
is important to notice that all coalitional values based on 𝑇 are equal to those based on 𝐼. 
The players’ decisions in the non-cooperative part or first stage of the game are 
represented by 𝑧𝑖 ∈ {0, 1}. The term −𝑐
1(𝑧𝑖) denotes a decision cost during the first stage, 
derived from the second stage symbolised by 𝑄𝑖(𝑧𝑖, 𝑧𝑗 , 𝑧𝑘). 𝑥?̅? and 𝑥𝑖 represent the upper 
and lower payments, respectively, that a particular player could receive. We consider this 





     




In this section, a specific application of biform games to the community energy sector is 
formulated to better understand this phenomenon from an economic-strategic perspective. 
Bearing in mind the concepts defined above, the assumptions for this applied model are 
as follows. 
 
We consider two residential electricity customers, who have the option to participate in 
energy production using solar photovoltaic (PV) technology in one of two ways. The first 
way to do so is through a net billing distributed generation scheme, jointly carried out with 
a distributor or supplier as is usual in several countries, including Chile and the UK, in 
which customers can individually buy (rooftop) solar PV panels. A net billing scheme can 
be technically defined as a scheme where the energy injection is valued at an injection rate 
that is different from the consumption rate. The resulting value is then subtracted from the 
energy consumption expenses [133]. The other way is having an agreement only between 
both residential electricity customers to build and set up a small-scale solar PV power 
plant, which is conceived to satisfy their electricity consumption. If the residential 
electricity customers decide not to participate in energy production, they can maintain a 
regular electricity provision scheme from a distributor or supplier. We assume that, all 
players perfectly know the costs, tariffs, rights, and obligations derived from their 
relations with other players in all three cases.  
 
We model the aforementioned situation as three-player (coalitional) games with 
transferable utility. The cooperation agreements are negotiated by the players and can be 
enforced by some outside party, if necessary. The games can then be defined as follows: 
 
Γ = (𝐼, 𝑣)     (III.7) 
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Γ = a three-player (coalitional) cooperative game. 
𝐼 = {1,2,3} = the players set or grand coalition. 
𝑣 = a function 𝛲(𝐼) → ℝ, with 𝑣(∅) = 0, which indicates the maximal aggregate payoff 
of a coalition 𝑆 ∈ 𝛲(𝐼). 
𝛲(𝐼) = set of coalitions (i.e., the set of all subsets of 𝐼). 
 
Additionally, 𝐼, ∅, and the single player sets {𝑖} (with 𝑖 ∈ 𝐼), are treated as coalitions. Any 
payoff vector for 𝑛 players is denoted as 𝑥 = (𝑥1, 𝑥2 … 𝑥𝑛) ∈ ℝ
𝑛. 
 
We examine the three scenarios, each considering three players, for each country, as noted 
below in Table III.1. 
 
Table III.1. Details of scenarios developed in each country 
Relation / Scenario Base scenario Distributed generation scenario Community energy scenario 
Players involved 
Player 1 & Player 3 
Player 2 & Player 3   
Player 1 & Player 3 
Player 2 & Player 3   
Player 1 & Player 2 
Type of relation or 
agreement 
Utility contract Net billing scheme 
Project through a legal 
organisation for self-
consumption 
Coalitions {1, 3}, {2, 3} {1, 2, 3} {1, 2} 
 
III.3.2 Key definitions and assumptions for payments and coalitional values 
 
To determine the payments for each player and the corresponding coalitional values48, we 
formulate the following equations: 
 
a) Annual customers’ electricity consumption payments at present value, 𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑉𝐶. 
 
𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑉𝐶 =  [(𝐷𝑡𝐶 × 𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶) 𝑟⁄ ][1 − 1 (1 + 𝑟)
𝑡⁄ ]  (USD/year)  (III.8) 
                                                 
48 The exchange rates considered for all calculations are USD/CLP 619.6 and USD/GBP 0.758 according to OANDA.com. 
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b) Annual distributor’s/supplier’s requirements payments at present value, 𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑉𝐷. 
 
𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑉𝐷 =  𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑉𝐶  (1 − 𝜔) (USD/year)   (III.9) 
 
c) Annual generation payment obtained by customers at present value, 𝐴𝐺𝑃𝑉𝐶. 
 
𝐴𝐺𝑃𝑉𝐶 =  [(𝐺𝑇𝐶 × 𝐴𝐴𝐺𝐶) 𝑟⁄ ][1 − 1 (1 + 𝑟)




𝐷𝑡𝐶= Distribution or supply tariff paid by customers. 
𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶= Customers’ annual average consumption. 
𝐺𝑇𝐶 = Generation tariff received by customers. 
𝐴𝐴𝐺𝐶  = Customers’ annual average generation. 
𝜔  = Added value generated and captured by the distributor/supplier, between 0 and 1. 
𝑟 = Discount rate. 
𝑡 = Period of time, in years. 
 
Regarding the parameter 𝐷𝑡𝐶, we take into consideration representative tariffs from one 
of the main distributors/suppliers in each country, as shown in Table III.2. 
 
Table III.2. Representative electricity tariffs assigned to customers in 
Chile49 and Scotland50 
Data / Country Chile Scotland Unit 
Chilean Tariff 90.71  CLP/kWh 
British Tariff  14.03 p/kWh 
Tariffs in USD 0.15 0.19 USD/kWh 
Sources: [196,197] 
 
                                                 
49 Valid at September 2017, considering the BT1 tariff including energy, capacity buying, distribution capacity, pool coordination and 
transmission use. 
50 Valid at September 2017, considering a simple average of all locations of British Gas Standard domestic single rate electricity for 
Direct Debit payment, with effect from 15-09-2017. 
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The term 𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶  is defined according to the following criteria: 
 
a) For player 1, we assume this player consumes 1,800 kWh/year in Chile [115] and 
3,505 kWh/year in the UK [198], as we recognise this player as a residential low-
middle income consumer of electricity. 
b) For player 2, we assume this player consumes 7,865 kWh/year in Chile [115] and 
4,972 kWh/year in the UK [198], as we recognise this player as a residential high 
income consumer of electricity. 
c) It is important to notice that player 3 is a distributor (in Chile) or supplier (in Scotland) 
of electricity. 
 
Concerning the term 𝐺𝑇𝐶, we consider that players 1 and 2 have access to a sale 
(generation) rate of 0.10 USD/kWh [197] and 0.05 USD/kWh [199] in Chile and Scotland, 
respectively. 
 
We parameterise 𝐴𝐴𝐺𝐶  considering information about the potential generation of solar 
PV panels in Chile and Scotland. For the Scottish case, we take data from the Energy 
Saving Trust’s Solar Energy Calculator considering as the consumer’s location the city of 
Edinburgh, a roof slope of 45°, a shading less than 20% of the sky, with a southeast 
direction of the roof, and a medium installation size. The potential generation derived from 
the use of solar PV panels and corresponding costs are shown in Table III.3. 
 
Table III.3. Potential generation derived from solar PV panels use and the related costs in Chile and Scotland 
Criteria / Country Chile Scotland 
Main location Santiago Edinburgh 
Installed capacity 2 kWp 2 kWp 
Potential annual generation 3,000 kWh 1,520 kWh 
Cost (Local currency) CLP 3,390,000 GBP 4,000 
Solar PV Cost (USD) 5,471.27 5,277.05 
Sources: [122,200] 
 
In order to determine the overnight capital cost 𝑂𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑒𝑟 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑, and then estimate the 
cost per household of a solar PV power plant in a community energy project which meets 
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the capital requirements, we consider an 𝑂𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑒𝑟 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 of 2,020 USD/kW and a 
capacity factor of 0.2 [201]. Moreover, we take the number of residential electricity 
customers of one municipality/council in each country, where we can find similar features 
for both residential customers. The selected places are Lo Barnechea for Chile, and The 
City of Edinburgh Council for Scotland, which have 364,868 customers [202] and 241,433 
customers [203], respectively. In the Scottish case, it is important to note that we assume 
that each separate dwelling is a separate residential electricity customer. Furthermore, for 
practical purposes, and because it would be unrealistic to think that everyone could 
participate in this kind of initiative at the same time in a certain place, we just take a small 
proportion of those customers (0.1%) as potential participants. We assume that a half of 
them are low-middle income customers (player 1) and the rest are high income customers 
(player 2). The calculation details related to 𝑂𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑒𝑟 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 for each country, are 
summarized in Table III.4. 
 
Table III.4. Overnight Capital Cost (OCC) per household 
Item / Specific Location 
Lo Barnechea 
Municipality 
City of Edinburgh 
Council 
Unit 
Selected customers 365 241  
Customers as player 1 182 121  
Customers as player 2 182 121  
Consumption player 1 328,381 423,111 kWh/yr 
Consumption player 2 1,434,843 600,202 kWh/yr 
Required capacity player 1 187 242 kW 
Required capacity player 2 819 343 kW 
Total required capacity 1,006 584 kW 
OCC player 1 378,613 487,834 USD 
OCC player 2 1,654,329 692,014 USD 
𝑂𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑒𝑟 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 player 1 2,075 4,041 USD 
𝑂𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑒𝑟 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 player 2 9,068 5,733 USD 
 
The term 𝜔 is quantified by considering information from distributor’s financial 
statements from 2012 to 2016, in order to have a representative measure of the value 
generated and captured by player 3, after receiving payments from players 1 and 2, and 
paying player 3’s suppliers. We set 𝜔 to the average operating margin, defined as 
operating profit divided by revenues due to the core activities; 13% [204] and 5% [205] 
for the Chilean and Scottish case, respectively.  
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We use a discount rate 𝑟 =10% and consider a 25-year horizon, which is the approximate 
useful life of solar PV panels [121]. Using these parameters, we bring all financial 
payments to their present value assuming a uniform time horizon. 
 
Considering equations (III.8) to (III.10) and all the information shown above, the 
payments for each player are based given by the following equations: 
 
Table III.5. Formulas to compute the payments for each player in every scenario 
 Base scenario Distributed generation scenario Community energy scenario 
Player 1 (III. 8) (III. 10) − [(III. 8) + Solar PV Cost] (III. 8) − 𝑂𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑒𝑟 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 
Player 2 (III. 8) (III. 10) − [(III. 8) + Solar PV Cost] (III. 8) − 𝑂𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑒𝑟 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 
Player 3 (III. 8) − (III. 9) 
Chilean case: [(III. 8) − (III. 10) +
Solar PV Cost] − {[((III. 8) − (III. 10)) ×
(1 − 𝜔)] + [(Solar PV Cost) × (1-30%)]} 
 
Scottish case: [(III. 8) − (III. 10)] −
{[((III. 8) − (III. 10)) × (1 − 𝜔)]}  
0 
 
Table III.5. lists the nature of all payments for each player, under the three scenarios 
described above. Accordingly, the payments under the base scenario represent how much 
players 1 and 2 pay for their electricity consumption to the distributor or supplier, which 
is simultaneously the amount that the latter receives, minus the corresponding costs based 
on the specified profit. The payments under the distributed generation scenario represent 
how much players 1 and 2 receive for the energy production from their solar PV panels, 
minus their electricity consumption and solar PV panel investment costs. At the same 
time, player 3 receives payments for the residential customers’ consumption, minus their 
solar PV generation, and the corresponding costs based on a specific margin. It is worth 
nothing that, in Chile, players 1 and 2 can buy solar PV panels from distribution companies 
(we assume that the distributor’s profit margin on solar panel sales is 30%) and specialised 
vendors, unlike in Scotland, where customers can only buy them from specialized 
vendors51. These differences are reflected in the corresponding formulas. The payments 
for the community energy scenario imply that players 1 and 2 receive the savings derived 
from their reduction in electricity consumption payments to the supplier or, alternatively, 
                                                 
51 The cost of solar PV panels is taken as an average of the values listed in http://www.theecoexperts.co.uk/how-much-do-solar-panels-
cost-uk#/3 for devices of 2 kWp of installed capacity. 
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that the community-led project receives electricity payments, minus a lump-sum cost per 
player or household which represents their share in the project. 
 
Assuming that the costs of solar PV panels and OCC are covered in just one instalment, 
we calculate the payments for each player, scenario, and country, taking into account all 
equations from Table III.5., as shown in Tables III.6. and III.7. 
 
Table III.6. Payments received by every player and scenario in the Chilean 


























1 - 2,723.11 2,450.80 
2 - 2,723.11 10,708.64 

















1 -2,450.80 -7,922.07 -2,075.34 
2 -10,708.64 -16,179.91 -9,068.09 















s 1 - - 375.46 
2 - - 1,640.54 
3 1,710.73 4,285.48 - 
 
Table III.7. Payments received by every player and scenario in the Scottish 


























1 - 689.86 6,044.85 
2 - 689.86 8,574.90 

















1 -6,044.85 -11,321.90 -4,041.15 
2 -8,574.90 -13,851.94 -5,732.56 















s 1 - - 2,003.70 
2 - - 2,842.34 
3 730.99 662.00 - 
 
Because the core is considered within the concept of biform games, we clip all negative 
payments to zero. We therefore define all coalitions and their values, considering the data 
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shown in Tables III.6. and III.7., in order to compute and solve the games presented in 
Tables III.8. and III.9., as shown below. 
 
Table III.8. Game 1 - Coalitions and their values for each scenario in the Chilean case (amounts in thousands of USD, which come 
from Table III.6.) 
Coalitions / scenarios 







{∅} 0    
{1} 0    
{2} 0    
{3} 0    
{1, 2}    2.02 
{1, 3}  0.32   
{2, 3}  1.39   
{1, 2, 3}   4.29  
 
Table III.9. Game 2 - Coalitions and their values for each scenario in the Scottish case (amounts in thousands of USD, which come 
from Table III.7.) 
Coalitions / scenarios 







{∅} 0    
{1} 0    
{2} 0    
{3} 0    
{1, 2}    4.85 
{1, 3}  0.30   
{2, 3}  0.43   
{1, 2, 3}   0.66  
 
In these two tables, the sum of the values associated to coalitions {1, 3} and {2, 3} are 
equal to the final payment for player 3 in the base scenario in Tables 6 and 7. There are 
two terms in that sum, which correspond to player 1’s and player 2’s value under coalition 
with player 3 separately, according to the nature of the base scenario. 
 
As a sensitivity analysis, we now modify the values in Tables III.8. and III.9. to clearly 
see the effects of cost subsidisation on the confidence indexes and Nash equilibria. For 
simplicity, we consider a support scheme in which solar PV panel costs and OCC are 
covered by annualised payments, mostly made by a subsidising entity, such as a 
government. Specifically, we consider a case in which consumers make only one payment 
in the first year of the project, after which the government pays the rest52. This implies 
                                                 
52 Alternatively, once could find an equivalent investment cost subsidy that would give the same solution; for simplicity, we do not 
consider this. 
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that the payments series occur during the solar PV panels useful life mentioned before. In 
relation to the distributed generation scenario, we also now consider that solar PV panels 
are bought from specialised vendors in both countries. This means that, for the Chilean 
case, consumers can buy solar PV panels at a 50% lower cost.  
 
The games and their corresponding coalitional values for this sensitivity analysis are 
shown in Tables III.10. and III.11. 
 
Table III.10. Game 3 - Coalitions and their values for each scenario in the Chilean case (amounts in thousands of USD) 
Coalitions / scenarios 







{∅} 0    
{1} 0    
{2} 0    
{3} 0    
{1, 2}    11.93 
{1, 3}  0.32   
{2, 3}  1.39   
{1, 2, 3}   1.00  
 
Table III.11. Game 4 - Coalitions and their values for each scenario in the Scottish case (amounts in thousands of USD) 
Coalitions / scenarios 







{∅} 0    
{1} 0    
{2} 0    
{3} 0    
{1, 2}    13.54 
{1, 3}  0.30   
{2, 3}  0.43   
{1, 2, 3}   0.66  
 
In Tables III.10. and III.11., as before, the sum of the values associated to coalitions {1, 3} 
and {2, 3} are equal to the final payment for player 3 in the base scenario. 
 
III.3.3 Procedural considerations 
 
In all these three-player games there are two components of decisions: a non-cooperative 
and a cooperative one. The non-cooperative component represents an individual decision 
to get involved in an electricity generation project or simply buy electricity through a 
standard supply agreement. The cooperative component represents the possible payoffs 
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and their distribution among the players who have decided to become involved in energy 
production. This involves negotiation power implications, as mentioned before. 
Consequently, given that we need to calculate the core to solve the cooperative part of 
each game, we consider a triangle with barycentric coordinates, following the next 
inequality: 
 
𝑣({𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑘}) − 𝑥𝑘 ≥  𝑣({𝑖, 𝑗})    (III.11) 
𝑥𝑘 ≤ 𝑣({𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑘}) − 𝑣({𝑖, 𝑗})    (III.12) 
 




𝐶(𝑣) = {𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝑗 , 𝑥𝑘 ∈ ℝ
3: 𝑥𝑖 + 𝑥𝑗 + 𝑥𝑘 = 𝑣({𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑘}), 𝑣({𝑖}) ≤ 𝑥𝑖
≤  𝑣({𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑘}) − 𝑣({𝑗, 𝑘}), 𝑣({𝑗}) ≤ 𝑥𝑗 ≤  𝑣({𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑘}) − 𝑣({𝑖, 𝑘}), 
𝑣({𝑘}) ≤ 𝑥𝑘 ≤  𝑣({𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑘}) − 𝑣({𝑖, 𝑗})}   (III.13) 
 
Apart from the considerations related to the calculation of the core, it is important to verify 
whether the core is non-empty or empty. To do so, we take into account the following 





𝑣({1}) + 𝑣({2}) ≤ 𝑣({1,2})     (III.14) 
𝑣({1}) + 𝑣({3}) ≤ 𝑣({1,3})     (III.15) 
𝑣({2}) + 𝑣({3}) ≤ 𝑣({2,3})      (III.16) 
𝑣({1}) + 𝑣({2,3}) ≤ 𝑣({1,2,3})    (III.17) 
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𝑣({2}) + 𝑣({1,3}) ≤ 𝑣({1,2,3})    (III.18) 
𝑣({3}) + 𝑣({1,2}) ≤ 𝑣({1,2,3})    (III.19) 
For convexity: 
 
𝑣({1,2}) + 𝑣({1,3}) ≤ 𝑣({1,2,3}) + 𝑣({1})   (III.20) 
𝑣({1,2}) + 𝑣({2,3}) ≤ 𝑣({1,2,3}) + 𝑣({2})   (III.21) 




𝑣({1,2}) + 𝑣({1,3}) + 𝑣({2,3}) ≤ 2𝑣({1,2,3})  (III.23) 
 
In games with an empty core, Summerfield & Dror’s [158] approach is considered as 
described above. Recalling that the players’ decisions in the first stage of the game are 
represented by 𝑧𝑖 ∈ {0, 1}, we assume for simplicity that the decision cost during the first 
stage is −𝑐1(𝑧𝑖) = 0; this could easily be generalised to include first-stage decision costs. 
In terms of the upper and lower payments 𝑥?̅? and 𝑥𝑖, since 𝑥?̅? and 𝑥𝑖 ∈ ℝ
𝑛 and we assume 
transferable utility games, then 𝛼𝑖𝑥?̅? + (1 − 𝛼𝑖)𝑥𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖. This implies that 𝑥?̅? and 𝑥𝑖 
represent player 𝑖’s income and costs, respectively, which form the coalitional values 
listed above. Accordingly, player 𝑖 is confident about the influence that incomes or 
expenses might have on the final payoff. This will allow determining the upper and lower 
bounds that are necessary to use the confidence indexes, even when there is an empty core 
and the grand coalition may form. Considering this, we solve (III.4), (III.5), and (III.6). 
 
Another aspect is that, in reality, players might not have perfect information about each 
other’s confidence indexes; hence, they might not know which coalitions the other players 
prefer. We therefore propose an alternative approach that combines the benefit of using 
probability distributions and the idea behind the confidence index. In this approach, we 
assume that each confidence index (𝛼𝑖) follows a uniform distribution. This implies that 
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each degree of confidence about the final payoff has the same probability, because none 
of the players knows anything about other players’ confidence. We determine the Nash 
equilibrium (best strategy, coalition, and final payoff) for each player, randomly sampling 
10,000 points from each distribution by solving (III.4), (III.5) and (III.6). This will help 
to better understand which project (coalition) prevails when players do not know the other 
players’ confidence indexes. Furthermore, this will give an idea about the likelihood of 
coalition formation. To track the final results, we model a matrix that is shown in Fig. 
III.2. In this matrix, player 1 chooses the rows, player 2 chooses the columns, and player 
3 chooses the matrices. 
 
 {∅} {2}  {3} {2, 3} 
 𝑧2 = 0 𝑧2 = 1  𝑧2 = 0 𝑧2 = 1 
𝑧1 = 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 𝑥𝑖 𝑥𝑖 
𝑧1 = 1 0 0 0 𝑥𝑖 𝑥𝑖 0  𝑥𝑖 0 𝑥𝑖 𝑥𝑖 𝑥𝑖 𝑥𝑖 
 𝑧3 = 0  𝑧3 = 1 
 {1} {1, 2}  {1, 3} {1, 2, 3} 




We first verify whether our games have a non-empty core, by computing inequalities 
(III.14) to (III.23). The findings of this procedure are shown in Table III.12. 
 
Table III.12. Test results for Superadditivity, Convexity, and Balancedness for every game 
Games / Criterion Superadditivity Convexity Balancedness Type of Core 
Game 1 – Chilean case Yes Yes Yes Non-empty 
Game 2 – Scottish case Yes No No Empty 
Game 3 – Chilean case with cost subsidisation Yes No No Empty 
Game 4 – Scottish case with cost subsidisation Yes No No Empty 
 
As can be seen above, only game 1 has a non-empty core. We follow Branderburger & 
Stuart’s [157] method to solve this game. For the rest of the games, we follow 
Summerfield & Dror’s [158] approach as explained above. 
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III.4.1 Numerical results for game 1 
 
Taking into account (III.3) and solving (III.11) to (III.13), we determine the core for this 
game considering constraints (III.24) to (III.28), which are based on the coalitional values 
listed in Table III.8., in order to comply with the coalitional rationality criterion and 
efficiency principle: 
 
𝑥1, 𝑥2, 𝑥3 ≥ 0     (III.24) 
𝑥1 + 𝑥2 ≥ 2.02    (III.25) 
𝑥1 + 𝑥3 ≥ 0.32    (III.26) 
𝑥2 + 𝑥3 ≥ 1.39    (III.27) 
𝑥1 + 𝑥2 + 𝑥3 = 4.29    (III.28) 
 
We therefore plot a triangle with barycentric coordinates as can be seen in Fig. III.3., 
which shows the possible imputations that can be freely assigned to the players, which are 
inside the core and comply with the two aforementioned criteria. 
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Fig. III.3. Non-empty Core for Game 1 (amounts in thousands of USD) 
 
These results are not straightforward. If players 1 and 2 block any participation for player 
3 and decide to form coalition {1,2}, the worst acceptable payoff for them will be 0.32 
and 1.39, respectively. Clearly, player 3 will have the incentive to participate in another 
coalition, as he receives zero. In the case of being involved in another coalition, the worst 
acceptable payoff for players 1 and 2 will be zero. Similarly, the best acceptable payoff 
for players 1 and 2 will be same in either coalition {1,2} or a different one. Hence, 
assigning a conservative confidence index for each player, which means that each player 
has a neutral payoff expectation, we determine the Nash equilibrium taking the payoffs 
shown in Fig. III.3. and solving (III.2), as noted in Table III.13. 
 
Table III.13. Final results for Game 1 (rounded amounts in thousands of USD taken from Fig. III.3.) 
Strategies / Players 
Player's possible payoffs Player's confidence - 𝛼𝑖 Best strategy 
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 
Best payoff forming {1,2} 2.9 4.0 0.0 
0.5 0.5 0.5 {1,2} {1,2} ≠ {1,2} 
Worst Payoff forming 
{1,2} 
0.3 1.4 0.0 
Best payoff forming 
another coalition 
2.9 4.0 2.3 
Worst Payoff forming 
another coalition 
0.0 0.0 0.3 
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Forming coalition {1,2} implies that the strategy of being a consumer and/or producer of 
electricity by implementing a community energy project (CEP) is optimal, so we can say 
that the rest of the possible coalitions follow other options (No CEP). Accordingly, as can 
also be seen in Fig. III.4., the Nash equilibrium is (CEP), (CEP), and (No CEP) for players 
1, 2, and 3, respectively. 
 
 
Fig. III.4. Nash equilibrium for Game 1 (amounts in thousands of USD) 
 
In Fig. III.4., player 1 chooses the rows, player 2 chooses the columns, and player 3 
chooses the matrices. It is important to notice that even when the confidence index changes 
for all players, the resulting Nash equilibrium will be the same in this case. 
 
III.4.2 Numerical results for games 2, 3, 4, and simulation 
 
III.4.2.1 Games 2, 3, and 4 
 
We solve (III.4), (III.5), and (III.6), and modify each confidence index, one at a time, in 
order to determine the possible Nash equilibria given the specific confidence indexes. The 
findings are shown in Tables III.14., III.15., and III.16. 
 
CEP 1.6 2.7 0.0 1.6 2.0 0.0 CEP 1.6 2.7 1.3 1.6 2.0 1.3




Player 2 Player 2
CEP No CEP CEP No CEP
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Table III.14. Game 2 - Intervals for players’ confidence and 
corresponding Nash Equilibrium 
Players’ confidence Nash Equilibrium 
0.401 ≤ 𝛼1 ≤ 1 
0.401 ≤ 𝛼2 ≤ 1 
0.000 ≤ 𝛼3 ≤ 0.487 
Community energy scenario 
0.943 ≤ 𝛼1 ≤ 1.000 
0.953 ≤ 𝛼2 ≤ 1.000 
0.488 ≤ 𝛼3 ≤ 1.000 
Distributed generation scenario 
𝛼1 = 1.000 
0.000 ≤ 𝛼2 ≤ 0.952 
0.488 ≤ 𝛼3 ≤ 1.000 
Base scenario {1,3} 
0.000 ≤ 𝛼1 ≤ 0.942 
𝛼2 = 1.000 
0.488 ≤ 𝛼3 ≤ 1.000 
Base scenario {2,3} 
 
Table III.15. Game 3 - Intervals for players’ confidence and 
corresponding Nash Equilibrium 
Players’ confidence Nash Equilibrium 
0.086 ≤ 𝛼1 ≤ 1 
0.086 ≤ 𝛼2 ≤ 1 
0.000 ≤ 𝛼3 ≤ 0.465 
Community energy scenario 
0.503 ≤ 𝛼1 ≤ 1.000 
0.802 ≤ 𝛼2 ≤ 1.000 
0.466 ≤ 𝛼3 ≤ 1.000 
Distributed generation scenario 
𝛼1 = 1.000 
0.000 ≤ 𝛼2 ≤ 0.801 
0.466 ≤ 𝛼3 ≤ 1.000 
Base scenario {1,3} 
0.000 ≤ 𝛼1 ≤ 0.502 
𝛼2 = 1.000 
0.466 ≤ 𝛼3 ≤ 1.000 
Base scenario {2,3} 
 
Table III.16. Game 4 - Intervals for players’ confidence and 
corresponding Nash Equilibrium 
Players’ confidence Nash Equilibrium 
0.069 ≤ 𝛼1 ≤ 1 
0.069 ≤ 𝛼2 ≤ 1 
0.000 ≤ 𝛼3 ≤ 0.487 
Community energy scenario 
0.906 ≤ 𝛼1 ≤ 1.000 
0.930 ≤ 𝛼2 ≤ 1.000 
0.488 ≤ 𝛼3 ≤ 1.000 
Distributed generation scenario 
𝛼1 = 1.000 
0.000 ≤ 𝛼2 ≤ 0.929 
0.488 ≤ 𝛼3 ≤ 1.000 
Base scenario {1,3} 
0.000 ≤ 𝛼1 ≤ 0.905 
𝛼2 = 1.000 
0.488 ≤ 𝛼3 ≤ 1.000 
Base scenario {2,3} 
 
Given that coalitions {1}, {2}, {3}, and the empty coalition {∅} have the same coalitional 
values (equal to zero), we assume an empty solution for the first stage, namely the 
decisions  𝑧1 = 𝑧2 = 𝑧3 = 0 or {∅}, if the Nash equilibrium is one of these coalitions. It 
is also clear that if the players’ confidence indexes do not meet one of the intervals, the 
solution will be 𝑧1 = 𝑧2 = 𝑧3 = 0 or {∅}. 
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III.4.2.2 Simulation 
 
As explained above, we also simulate uncertainty about confidence indexes by 
considering 10,000 solutions to (III.4), (III.5), and (III.6), randomly and independently 
drawing confidence indexes from uniform distributions with support [0,1]. We then obtain 
the percentage of specific Nash equilibria (strategies/coalitions) out of the total number of 
cases/iterations, which are shown in Table III.17. 
 
Table III.17. Nash Equilibria as a percentage out of the total number of iterations. 
Strategies or coalitions / Games Game 2 Game 3 Game 4 
No relation among the players - {∅}  82.74% 56.27% 56.89% 
Community energy scenario 17.08% 38.63% 42.69% 
Distributed generation scenario 0.18% 5.10% 0.42% 
 
According to Table III.17., even when there is no knowledge among the players about 
people’s confidence, there is an opportunity for implementing community energy projects 
in both countries, considering games 2, 3, and 4.  
 
We also determine the minimum thresholds necessary for obtaining a particular coalition 
as solution, in terms of payments (𝑥𝑖) and confidence indexes for each player and game. 
These are presented in Table III.18., and although they are naturally sensitive to the sample 
size, they do show that even relatively low confidence levels can be enough for a 










     
Table III.18. Minimum threshold observed in 10,000 iterations, in terms 









𝑥𝑖 = 2.55 
𝛼𝑖 = 0.401 
1 − 𝛼𝑖 = 
0.599 
 
𝑥𝑖 = 0.08 
𝛼𝑖 = 0.086 




𝑥𝑖 = 4.6 
𝛼𝑖 = 0.069 





𝑥𝑖 = 7.10 
𝛼𝑖 = 0.401 
1 − 𝛼𝑖 = 
0.599 
 
𝑥𝑖 = 8.57 
𝛼𝑖 = 0.086 
1 − 𝛼𝑖 = 
0.914 
𝑥𝑖 = 1.19 
𝛼𝑖 = 0.069 







𝑥𝑖 = 28.18 
𝛼𝑖 =  0.945 




𝑥𝑖 = 1.59 
𝛼𝑖 = 0.503 




𝑥𝑖 = 6.41 
𝛼𝑖 = 0.907 





𝑥𝑖 = 3.75 
𝛼𝑖 =  0.953 




𝑥𝑖 = 3.9 
𝛼𝑖 = 0.802 




𝑥𝑖 = 7.45 
𝛼𝑖 = 0.931 





𝑥𝑖 = 2045.93 
𝛼𝑖 =  0.566 
1 − 𝛼𝑖 = 
0.434 
 
𝑥𝑖 = 16.93 
𝛼𝑖 = 0.466 
1 − 𝛼𝑖 = 
0.534 
𝑥𝑖 = 58.77 
𝛼𝑖 = 0.489 
1 − 𝛼𝑖 = 
0.511 
 
III.5 Discussion and recommendations 
 
III.5.1 Discussion of the games and their results 
 
In relation to game 1 (Chilean case shown in Fig. III.3., Table III.13., and Fig. III.4.), it is 
important to note that this game has a non-empty core and no cost subsidisation is 
considered. Based on the results above, player 1 (the low-medium income residential 
customer) and player 2 (the high income residential customer) will form a coalition in 
order to carry out a community energy project, which is represented by coalition {1,2}. 
This strategy is the most profitable for them, under our assumptions. Player 3 (the 
electricity distributor) would not be interested in participating in such coalition {1,2}, as 
it might be offered a payment equal to zero (and then blocked to do so). If the distributor 
were offered a better payoff/payment, e.g.,  𝑥3 = 1.43 (with a core 𝐶(𝑣) =
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{𝑥1, 𝑥2, 𝑥3 ∈ ℝ
3: 𝑥1 + 𝑥2 + 𝑥3 = 4.29, 𝑥1 =  1.43, 𝑥2 = 1.43, 𝑥3 = 1.43}), such 
payoff distribution would not be preferred by both residential electricity customers, as 
there is another (better) option for them. Consequently, this would motivate blocking 
measures and then the community energy coalition formation, leaving the distributor 
aside.  
 
In game 2 (Scottish case shown in Tables III.14., III.17., and III.18.), no costs 
subsidisation is considered and it has an empty core, so we adopt Summerfield & Dror’s 
[158] solution approach. Here, the community energy coalition requires a lower income 
to cover the costs, as the minimum required confidence indexes to form coalition {1,2} is 
relatively low (𝛼𝑖 ≥ 0.401). Hence, as long as both residential electricity customers have 
that level of confidence and the supplier is slightly pessimistic about the results of the 
game or negotiation process (0 ≤ 𝛼3 ≤ 0.487), the best strategy (represented by the Nash 
equilibrium) for all players will be the implementation of a community energy project. On 
the other hand, if the supplier is more confident about the results of the negotiation process 
(0.487 ≤ 𝛼3 ≤ 1.000) and both residential electricity customers are also more confident 
about the results, leaving the uncertainty aside, the best strategy will be the 
implementation of a net billing project. This might be also interpreted as follows: the less 
uncertainty (alternatively, the more confidence) you have, the more attractive the 
traditional electricity provision scheme is. This can be seen in all games, especially when 
a regular utility contract is the best strategy for all players (coalitions {1,3} and {2,3} in 
Table III.14.). Here, there is no uncertainty for both residential customers because they 
have to pay their bill every month, which is received by the supplier. At the same time, 
due to both residential electricity consumers’ confidence, the supplier can participate in 
the coalition even when it is moderately, very, or completely confident that it can extract 
this revenue. The results of our probabilistic analysis also show that there are opportunities 
for community energy initiatives, as shown in Table III.17. The successful cases in which 
the best strategy for all players is the implementation of community energy projects 
reached 17.08%, a percentage that is higher that of distributed generation projects 
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(0.18%). As it happens, community energy initiatives are relatively popular in Scotland, 
compared to other types of citizen participation, so although our model is simple, it does 
go some way in explaining reality.  
 
Considering games 3 and 4 (Chilean and Scottish case, respectively), both games present 
an empty core but in these cases, a cost subsidy is considered. As can be seen in Table 
III.15. (Chilean case), the required confidence for implementing community energy 
projects (represented by coalition {1,2}) reaches a very low level for both residential 
customers (𝛼𝑖 ≥ 0.086). At the same time, the distribution company may be pessimistic 
about the results of the game or negotiation process (0 ≤ 𝛼3 ≤ 0.465) but there would be 
a favourable environment for conceiving community-led projects, as the best strategy for 
all players is forming coalition {1,2}. The same feature can be seen in Table III.16. 
(Scottish case), where the required confidence for forming coalition {1,2} is also very low 
for both residential consumers (𝛼𝑖 ≥ 0.069) and, again, the supplier may be pessimistic 
about how well he can perform within the bargaining process (0 ≤ 𝛼3 ≤ 0.487) but the 
best strategy for all incumbents will be carrying out a community energy project. In this 
sense, according to all possible solutions of these 2 games, including those solutions where 
having a regular utility contract (represented by coalitions {1,3} and {2,3} in Tables III.15. 
and III.16.) is the best strategy, we notice that the less uncertainty (alternatively, the more 
confidence) one has, the more traditional the electricity provision scheme is preferred. 
From our probabilistic results shown in Table III.17., we can see a remarkable percentage 
of community energy equilibria (38.63% and 42.69% for the Chilean and Scottish case, 
respectively), in comparison with distributed generation strategies (5.10% and 0.42% for 
the Chilean and Scottish case, respectively). This is not entirely surprising, as the costs of 
community energy have been decreased significantly.   
 
Comparatively speaking, the confidence index for each scenario and player in games 2 
and 4, which are presented in Tables III.14. and III.16. for the Scottish case, is influenced 
by a cost subsidisation under the community energy scenario. This effect implies a 
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significant reduction on the required confidence index for both residential customers, in 
order to have a community energy initiative as solution (from 0.401 ≤ 𝛼𝑖 ≤ 1 to 0.069 ≤
𝛼𝑖 ≤ 1 for both players). In relation to the distributed generation scenario, there is also a 
reduction in the required confidence index for the same incumbents, but by a lower amount 
(from 0.943 ≤ 𝛼1 ≤ 1 and 0.953 ≤ 𝛼2 ≤ 1 to 0.503 ≤ 𝛼1 ≤ 1 and 0.802 ≤ 𝛼2 ≤ 1, 
respectively). Although those significant reductions in the confidence indexes came from 
one scenario (community energy), the possible equilibria in the game were altered. This 
is interesting because a modification of costs structures affects the possible equilibria, and 
therefore the probability of a specific coalition forming. This can be noted in our 
simulation (shown in Table III.17.) where a cost subsidisation is considered. For example, 
in the Scottish case, the successful cases in which implementing community energy 
projects was the best strategy for all players increased from 17.08% in game 2 to 42.69% 
in game 4. We also notice that the likelihood of having a net billing schemes as a solution 
is almost zero (0.42%), which is consistent with the current market context.  
 
III.5.2 General remarks and recommendations 
 
Taking into account all of the above, we note some important elements. First, an 
appropriate payoff distribution between both residential customers can assure stability 
and, therefore, long-lasting coalition formation, as no attractive option would influence 
any change in the coalition or project. Second, the negotiation between both residential 
consumers will be especially crucial, given that without a successful bargaining process 
the emergence of the community energy project (coalition formation) might not occur. 
Third, the interaction between the residential customers’ negotiation power and that of the 
distributor/supplier is critical because both residential consumers should be able to operate 
and run the business without any involvement from the distributor/supplier. This seems 
contradictory in the current context where distributors and/or suppliers play a major role 
in the electricity markets, especially at an end-user level. We do not want to imply that 
our results suggest a total exclusion of distributors, but rather suggest that they may be 
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better placed in other supporting roles for community energy projects, such as ancillary 
services for small-scale projects. Thus, the regulatory environment should favour market 
freedom and free access to other (potential) incumbents, namely community energy 
projects, promoting equality in terms of negotiation and avoiding any market power 
exercise. Nevertheless, it is also true that promoting more flexibility and adaptability for 
distributors/suppliers will be necessary in case of a wider deployment of community 
energy projects, as this would potentially reduce their market share. Fourth, one of the 
most crucial assumptions we make is that residential customers can afford any level of 
costs, which is particularly important for games 1 and 2. This might not be true unless 
customers have access to a saving scheme or direct subsidies before entering the business, 
or simply have the money to do so. More work is needed to explore the impacts of credit 
constraints and policies to alleviate these. Finally, there are other factors that are not 
considered in this chapter; for example, the specific terms and conditions for public or 
private funding, how establishing PPAs or other contracts would affect the economic-
strategic viability, and other expenses that might be relevant (legal, first buyer, 
operational, marketing, and so on). We also do not consider carbon reduction incentives. 
Our approach based on biform games could take these into account. For instance, PPAs, 
which represent a higher income for community energy initiatives, would move the 
conclusions towards more stability and higher economic-strategic viability for community 
energy initiatives. Carbon incentives would work in the same way.  
 
Summarising, following our mild assumptions, the findings presented above support the 
idea that community energy projects can provide stability to their members and be 
economically-strategically feasible or competitive in comparison with other schemes, 
such as net billing distributed generation schemes. In this sense, our findings are aligned 
with the empirical literature studies. For instance, Walker [163] states that “local income 
and regeneration” is one of the key incentives for community ownership. Based on a 
survey, Seyfang et al. [49] notice that the economic objectives are one of the most 
important aspects for UK community energy groups. For a group of case studies, Hicks & 
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Ison [140] note that “financial benefits for shareholders and/or community” is a leading 
motivation. Ebers Broughel & Hampl [141] based on two large-scale representative 
surveys performed in Austria and Switzerland, show the existence of potential investors 
who are willing to invest between 1,000 and 10,000 CHF/EUR in community energy 
projects. Brummer [162] highlights that “economic benefits” is one of the most cited 
categories for a set of UK-based investigations. On the other hand, for the same set of 
studies notices that the most cited barrier is “lack of resources” (funding, time, and 
expertise). Nolden [54] shows the challenges for gathering financial resources. As noted 
above, the specific terms and conditions of private and/or public funding are not accounted 
in our approach. Berka et al. [56] notice that community energy projects face higher costs, 
longer project development times, and higher risks, which is influenced by six facets of 
an organisation or project. In our approach, none of these six facets are accounted in our 
approach. Abada et al. [166] establish that even when it is possible a value creation by 
community-led coalitions, there is no guarantee that they are viable as some members 
would exit the project or coalition. Again, there several factors that play a role in this case: 
firstly, as mentioned beforehand, this study considers a project that would be more related 
to our definition of distributed generation schemes. Secondly, there are also other game 
theory tools that are taken into account in this study. Finally, the methodology and 
modelling are different. As a result, we think of our approach as a complement that 
contributes to the existing literature and can help to get a better understanding about this 
phenomenon.  
 
Based on all the aforementioned elements, some recommendations can be given: 
 
1. Focus on community energy schemes instead of others, if a higher citizen participation 
in energy production is desired. 
2. Evaluate the provision of long-term financial arrangements, considering the 
corresponding compensation or recovering mechanisms, in order to improve access to 
community energy projects. This may include promoting PPAs and other contracts 
103 
     
that can improve a project’s income generation and the recoverability of private/public 
funding. 
3. Promote stronger collaboration among people in order to facilitate the formation of 
stable coalitions. In this sense, sharing/distribution rules based on biform games might 
be useful. 
4. Define explicit public policies and goals related to the above-mentioned points, in 




This chapter proposes a simple but novel approach for demonstrating the economic-
strategic viability of community energy projects, which adapts biform game theory to 
energy markets. Given the increasing importance of the community energy sector, we see 
many opportunities to use biform games, which are still relatively unknown in comparison 
with other game theoretical tools. Using these tools will help to better understand the 
underlying economics of the sector. 
 
Using publicly available real-word data, we model simple biform games for Chile and 
Scotland. Under mild assumptions, it is possible to see the economic-strategic viability of 
a wider implementation of community energy projects in both countries, as it appears to 
be the best strategy for residential customers. Consumer confidence is crucial, unless a 
significant gap between incomes and costs exists (e.g., because of subsidies), in which 
case the importance of that confidence is reduced. Our examples also uniformly show that 
the less uncertainty (alternatively, the more confidence) consumers have, the more 
traditional their electricity provision is likely to be. 
 
The results shown in this work are in agreement with the current Scottish situation in 
community energy development, and they are useful for other countries, like Chile, that 
are trying to increase citizen participation in energy production. Fostering a community 
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energy sector could be especially critical in developing countries like Chile, where this 
sector is still incipient while political attention is predominantly focused on other 
mechanisms, such as net billing. Community energy projects could contribute to the 
efforts to halt climate change, increasing the renewable energy participation in electricity 
markets, strengthening local economies, and improving the quality life of communities. 
Of course, there are challenges, especially in terms of affordability. However, as long as 
communities can be enabled to enter the business, their economic-strategic viability seems 
promising. 
 
More research about the economics of the community energy emergence and more 
knowledge about other aspects that might be crucial to this sector are necessary, especially 
those matters that are not accounted in this analysis. With this chapter, we attempt to 
encourage further work to do so. 
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IV. COMMUNITY ENERGY PROJECTS IN THE CONTEXT OF 
GENERATION AND TRANSMISSION EXPANSION PLANNING: AN 
ECONOMIC APPROACH BASED ON BIFORM GAMES AND 




The role of community energy projects in liberalised electricity markets is becoming more 
relevant. It is possible to see a variety of community-led projects that are currently 
generating energy or are being implemented in many countries around the world, with 
emphasis on Europe [49,55,73-75,79-81,133,160-162]. These projects which are 
encouraging citizen participation in (renewable) energy production and therefore helping 
tackle climate change and making capitalism more democratic. Such projects promise not 
only the provision of (clean) energy to communities, but also economic and/or social 
benefits, such as reduced prices of energy/electricity, employment, local income, 
ownership and decision-making process involvement, a more profound social cohesion, 
among other social initiatives [52,71,143,146,164,165]. 
 
Given their increasing significance, community energy projects can be expected to 
significantly influence electricity markets in the future, especially, if a genuine high 
citizen participation in energy production is desired. These impacts may be varied, but 
include changes to wholesale market prices, transmission lines investment, line 
congestion, investment in generation capacity, as well as cooperation and payoff 
distribution mechanisms among people. It is therefore crucial for incumbents in the 
electricity market, such as large generators, distributors or suppliers, transmission system 
operators, and system planners, understanding the potential effects of community energy 
projects, as they need to plan, manage, and deal with current and future investments or 
assets, current and potential customers, relations with other stakeholders, etc. Regulators 
and policy makers need to understand the whole-system effects derived from community 
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energy projects to correctly quantify their benefits. Moreover, community energy project 
managers need to understand the interactions between their decisions and wide energy 
system developments. 
 
This is challenging, as community energy initiatives are different from other investments 
in generation capacity. A community energy project firstly needs to assure to its members 
stability, in the sense of offering suitable incentives to belong to and remain in the project 
or coalition, and also needs to be competitive, in the sense of offering a long-term viability 
and attractive benefits in comparison with other projects. This illustrates the dual nature 
of such initiatives. On the one side, these projects need cooperation mechanisms and on 
the other side, need to compete against other projects. All of this needs to be addressed 
somehow, in order to properly evaluate the merits of community energy projects and their 
impact on the wider system. This might be done at the very moment of planning the 
expansion of the energy system, considering all the potential generation and transmission 
expansion investments, or when it is necessary to have an initial idea of the economic-
strategic viability of such projects, before their explicit inclusion in the energy market. 
 
Biform games [157] provide an attractive option to model projects or initiatives with the 
dual behaviour exhibited by community energy projects. Biform games belong to the 
category of hybrid games, which can tackle the cooperative and non-cooperative worlds 
of game theory at the same time. This methodology therefore allows a more 
comprehensive analysis of community energy projects as well as their economic-strategic 
viability. Biform games take into account the Nash equilibrium [190] and the core [206] 
as solution mechanisms for solving both cooperative and non-cooperatives stages within 
a particular game. To our best knowledge, this concept has not been widely included in 
generation and transmission expansion planning models, so there is a gap that deserves to 
be explored. We will do so in this work. Moreover, we also consider a core-based model, 
called linear production games [207], which will help us to address not only the economic-
strategic feasibility perspective of community energy projects and their impacts on the 
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wider energy system, but also how much new community energy capacity might be 
invested in, given a certain amount of resources. 
 
Hence, in this chapter, we include biform games’ and linear production games’ 
fundamentals in a simple and intuitive bi-level generation and transmission expansion 
planning model. We determine the impacts of community energy projects on social 
welfare, nodal wholesale prices, optimal generation and transmission expansion, CO2 
emissions, as well as other forms of citizen participation in energy production. We apply 
this model to a simple three-node network, with two large generators, each one located at 
a different node. There are three groups of residential electricity customers (with different 
disposable incomes) located at the remaining node. These customers have the option to 
participate in energy production, by carrying out a community energy project or, 
alternatively, another energy/electricity production scheme (in this case, a distributed 
generation project). By solving the model, we obtain prices and investment decisions, 
which help better understand the economic-strategic viability and competitiveness of 
community energy projects in the context of a generation and transmission expansion 
planning process, as well as the impacts derived from their interaction with other market 
incumbents and/or projects, namely large generators, a transmission operator, and a 
system planner. The interactions among the different groups of residential electricity 
customers are addressed as well. 
 
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. In section IV.2, we present the theoretical 
background necessary to build up the proposed model. In section IV.3, we outline the 
main features and assumptions of our model. In section IV.4, the results are presented. In 
section IV.5, a discussion regarding those results and some recommendations is presented. 





     
IV.2 Theoretical background 
 
IV.2.1 Optimisation and equilibrium problems: an overview 
 
Energy and electricity markets have significantly evolved during the recent decades due 
to several factors, such as a technological progress, better knowledge of the economic 
drivers behind markets, more experience and knowledge in managing electrical 
equipment, empowered electricity customers and their needs, permanent changes in 
regulation and legislation, an increase in market participants, etc. As a consequence, 
modelling the full complexity of energy and electricity markets has become crucial to 
strengthen them and better understand the interactions among the incumbents, such as 
large generators and retailers, retailers and residential customers, regulators and suppliers 
or retailers, system operators and the whole market, as well as the derived consequences 
and/or impacts. 
 
Most of these models have their origins in the power systems optimisation. Optimisation 
models provide an intuitive, flexible, and relatively complete way to deal with many issues 
or situations that deserve attention. Long-term power systems optimisation models can be 
roughly categorised in three groups: generation expansion models, transmission 
expansion models, and integrated generation and transmission expansion models [208]. 
In these models, the objective is chiefly to minimise (maximise) costs (benefit or welfare) 
subject to a variety of constraints related to demand satisfaction, generation limits, budget 
constraints, power balance at each node, power flow constraints, security constraints, 
among others [208]. These models require a significant amount of data about current and 
future prices, interest rates, demand structures or loads, emissions, taxes, technical 
capacity of power units and lines, etc. These parameters are often fundamentally 
uncertain, which is why many models consider uncertainty and risk. [209].  
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In general, optimisation models can be categorised in different ways. For instance, 
Dagoumas et al. [210] classify models in optimisation models (with simple and multiple 
objective function), computable general or partial equilibrium models, and alternative 
models. In the same vein, Lumbreras & Ramos [211] classify the optimisation models 
used in generation expansion problems as classical (linear and non-linear programming 
problems) and non-classical (meta-heuristic algorithms that iteratively improve a 
solution). Of course, simple optimisation models within the above-mentioned 
classifications cannot easily account for strategic interactions between market 
participants. Gabriel et al. [212], based on the mathematical characterisation of energy 
markets, notice that mathematical problems with equilibrium constraints (MPEC), 
equilibrium problems with equilibrium constraints (EPEC), mixed complementarity 
problems (MCP), and variational inequality (VI), which draw on game theory to account 
for these interactions, are particularly useful to work on modern energy markets. These 
models are now increasingly being used. For instance, Hobbs & Nelson [213] present and 
analyse a Stackelberg-based bi-level optimisation problem which is used to quantify how 
customers react to subsidies and some distortions based on decisions and prices. Chao & 
Peck [214] present a mechanism for establishing a competitive market for transmission 
services, mainly based on Coasian and Pigouvian principles and the Kirchhoff’s law, and 
therefore deploying tradable transmission capacity rights. Using a variational inequality 
approach, Jing-Yuan & Smeers [215] find the Nash equilibrium for an oligopolistic 
market with scattered generators and customers considering regulated transmission prices. 
Hobbs [216] develops two models "a la" Cournot, formulated as mixed linear 
complementarity problems, highlighting the effects on prices, welfare, profit, among 
others, considering arbitrage and perfect competition as well. Pineau & Murto [217] 
address the uncertainty on investments decisions by modelling an optimisation problem 
for players who might devote money in new thermal capacity, using variational inequality 
and mixed complementarity problem approaches. Sauma & Oren [218] formulate MPEC 
and EPEC problems in order to evaluate the impacts on social welfare and location of 
transmission investments, taking into account the generators’ expansion response to 
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transmission expansion and congestion protocols. Later, the same authors [219] extend 
the concept of proactive transmission planning stated in [218] to show the impacts of 
different planning objectives on network optimal expansions. Ruiz & Conejo [220] reveals 
a procedure to obtain an optimal offering strategy for a strategic power producer based on 
the development and solution of an MPEC. Pozo et al. [221] propose a mixed integer 
linear programming optimisation problem which integrates transmission and generation 
investment planning, as well as market operation decisions, and characterises the pure 
Nash equilibria related to generation expansion (EPEC) as a set of linear inequalities. Lo 
Prete & Hobbs [167] develop a cooperative game theoretic approach, considering 
optimisation models for market agents coalitions, and note the impacts on prices, costs, 
and benefits derived from the introduction of a microgrid in a regulated network. Munoz 
et al. [222] examine the impacts derived from risk aversion on generation and transmission 
investments by modelling a proactive risk-averse transmission planner problem 
(Stackelberg equilibrium problem). More recently, Acuña et al. [223] establish a 
Stackelberg game considering generators and intermediaries (marketers), which is 
implemented throughout a bi-level optimisation problem, in order to evaluate two 
cooperation schemes between them.  
 
However, none of these models is appropriate for the analysis of community energy 
projects, as they are all based on non-cooperative game theory and therefore cannot 
properly consider the dual cooperative and non-cooperative nature of community energy 
initiatives. Biform games theory offers an alternative which, to our best knowledge, has 
not been applied to generation and transmission expansion planning models that focus on 
community energy promotion and deployment.  
 
IV.2.2 State-of-art community energy planning optimisation models 
 
Optimisation problems applied to community energy matters have recently attracted some 
attention. For example, Huang et al. [224] survey some of the available tools, identifying 
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a variety that would be useful for community energy promotion and deployment. Ashok, 
based on an optimisation model, finds that micro-hydro-wind systems are the optimal 
solution to electrify rural villages in India [225]. Cai et al. [226,227] develop a method 
based on different optimisation techniques and show different community-scale 
renewable energy alternatives for a study system comprised of three typical communities. 
Mendes et al. [228] highlight and recommend appropriate optimisation planning 
models/tools for integrated community energy systems (ICES), noting that a Distributed 
Energy Resources Customer Adoption Mode (DERCAM) might be a good tool for 
designing ICES given its three-level optimisation algorithm. Moret & Pinson [229], based 
on optimisation models and communication-based fairness indicators, study the 
interaction between an energy collective (formed by a community manager, a prosumer, 
and energy production assets) and the market and system operator and/or other energy 
collectives. Roy & Ni [230] develop a game theoretic approach for a distributed power 
system (distributed operators and residential customers) and highlight that residential 
consumption is relevant to control prices as well as consumers. They not only find the 
market clearing price at the Nash equilibrium point, but also show that residential 
customers individually reduce costs. Olivella-Rosell et al. [231] propose a novel 
optimisation problem for managing flexible energy resources throughout a Smart Energy 
Service Provider (SESP), considering (residential) prosumers and energy cooperatives. 
Yazdanie et al. [232] study decentralised generation and storage benefits for rural places 
in Switzerland by developing and solving a least-cost optimisation model and scenarios, 
and note that small hydro and solar PV improve self-sufficiency, storage improves results, 
and carbon pricing mitigates pollutant emissions. 
 
The aforementioned investigations show the contributions that mathematical 
programming can provide to community energy matters. However, they are often unclear 
about what community energy really means and what the differences are with other 
concepts such as microgrids or distributed generation projects. They also do not consider 
the hybrid nature (cooperative and non-cooperative) of community energy initiatives. For 
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this reason, in the next section we provide our definition of community energy and 
distributed generation projects, which we will use to define our own modelling approach. 
 
IV.2.3 Key definitions 
 
In order to develop our approach, based on biform games, to generation and transmission 
expansion planning modelling, it is important to first define the concepts of community 
energy and distributed generation. Regarding the former concept, its fundamentals can be 
found in [35,36]. There are also other studies that take these fundamentals and add more 
elements that contribute to an updated definition, which can be seen for example in 
[49,71,133,161]. We consider the updated definition of community energy based on the 
Scottish experience proposed in [133]. Hence, a community energy project, in our context, 
is "a project conceived, carried out, and implemented by people who are interested in 
generating energy, located in or close to the project, well-organised under a legal and 
organisational structure, the owner or have control of the project ownership, the main 
beneficiary, and interested in welfare maximisation as well as income generation". On the 
other side, in relation to the distributed generation concept, we take into consideration the 
definition stated by Ackermann et al. [31], in which a distributed generation project is 
defined as “an electric power source connected directly to the distribution network or on 
the customer site of the meter”. Within this concept, it is possible to find specific citizen-
oriented electricity provision schemes, such as net billing or net metering schemes. In this 
work, the former is considered. Therefore a net billing scheme (or distributed generation 
scheme for the purposes of this work) can be simply defined as a scheme where the energy 
injection is valued at a rate that is different from the consumption rate, and the resulting 
value is therefore subtracted from the energy consumption expenses. We reflect this 
situation in this work by establishing a case where residential customers have an 
opportunity to install mainly residential rooftop solar photovoltaics (PV) panels for self-
consumption and selling/injecting any disposable surplus to the grid. This case is 
equivalent to the current Chilean net-billing scheme [133]. 
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Having defined these concepts, we will develop a generation and transmission expansion 
planning process model that can include both community energy and distributed 
generation projects. Since an understanding of biform games is fundamental to the rest of 
this chapter, we first set out their main characteristics in the next section. 
 
IV.2.4 Biform games main aspects 
 
Game theory considers a set of rational decision-makers (or players) who determine the 
best possible result, as well as the corresponding strategy for obtaining it. Consequently, 
games can be cooperative (where players cooperate), non-cooperative (where players do 
not cooperative), and hybrid. Biform games theory is part of the wider game theory field, 
and specifically deals with hybrid games that include cooperative and non-cooperative 
stages.  
 
Following Brandenburger & Stuart [157], a biform game can formally be defined as 
follows: 
 




𝑍𝑖 is a finite strategy set for each 𝑖 = 1, . . . , 𝑛 player. 
𝑧𝑖 is the player 𝑖’s selected strategy. 
𝑉 is a map from 𝑍𝑖 ×. . .× 𝑍𝑛 to the set of maps 𝑃(𝐼) → I𝑅, with 𝑉(𝑧𝑖, . . . , 𝑧𝑛)(⌀) = 0 for 
every 𝑧𝑖, . . . , 𝑧𝑛 ∈ 𝑍𝑖 ×. . .× 𝑍𝑛. 
𝛼𝑖 is the player 𝑖’s confidence index, which is between 0 and 1. 
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The set of strategies 𝑧𝑖 , . . . , 𝑧𝑛 ∈ 𝑍𝑖 ×. . .× 𝑍𝑛 defines a transferable utility game with 
characteristic function 𝑉(𝑧𝑖, . . . , 𝑧𝑛): 𝑃(𝐼) → I𝑅, where 𝑃(𝐼) is the set of all subsets of the 
players set 𝐼. As a result, for each coalition 𝑆 ⊆ 𝐼, 𝑉(𝑧𝑖 , . . . , 𝑧𝑛), (𝑆) is the value created 
by coalition 𝑆, given that the players choose the strategies 𝑧𝑖 , . . . , 𝑧𝑛. Consequently, the 
steps shown below need to be followed to solve a biform game [157]:  
 
1. Determine the core for the cooperative part or second stage of the (biform) game.  
2. Calculate the range of payoffs for each player.  
3. Use 𝛼𝑖 and (1-𝛼𝑖) to compute the weighted average in order to evaluate the cooperative 
part of the game, applying that index to the largest and smallest payoffs that every 
player could receive.  
4. Assign to player 𝑖 a payoff equal to the 𝑖’s weighted average, in order to reduce the 
cooperative stage to a non-cooperative game.  
5. Compute the Nash equilibrium of the non-cooperative part or first stage of the game. 
 
Here, we notice that there are two solution mechanisms considered when solving biform 
games, one for the cooperative (second) stage and another for the non-cooperative (first) 
stage, namely the core and Nash equilibrium, respectively.  
 
Regarding the core [192,193,206], this solution mechanism can be defined as follows: 
 
𝐶(𝑣) = {𝑥 ∈ I𝑅𝑛| ∑𝑖∈𝐼 𝑥𝑖 = 𝑣(𝐼), ∑𝑖∈𝑆 𝑥𝑖 ≥ 𝑣(𝑆)  ∀  𝑆 ∈ 𝑃(𝐼)}  (IV.2) 
 
The core is then a mathematical way to distribute payoffs among the players within a 
cooperative game, where ∑𝑖∈𝐼 𝑥𝑖, which represents the sum of all players’ payoffs that 
belong to the players set 𝐼 (or grand coalition), has to be equal to 𝑣(𝐼), which represents 
the coalitional value of 𝐼, in order to comply with a condition called the efficiency 
principle. At the same time, ∑𝑖∈𝑆 𝑥𝑖, which represents all players’ payoffs that belong to 
a certain coalition 𝑆, has to be greater than or equal to 𝑣(𝑆), which represents the 
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coalitional value of 𝑆, in order to comply with another condition called coalitional 
rationality. Thus, as long as a payoff distribution complies with these two conditions, i.e. 
the payoff distribution is within the core, no player will have an incentive to unilaterally 
leave (change) the coalition. However, it is important to note that the core might be either 
non-empty (implying a feasible solution) or empty (implying an unfeasible solution). To 
assure that a game has a non-empty core, it has to be balanced according to the Bondareva-
Shapley theorem [194,195]. The Bondareva-Shapley theorem can be explained as follows: 
a family 𝑆1, 𝑆2, . . . , 𝑆𝑚 of subsets of 𝐼 is balanced over 𝐼 if positive numbers or weights 
𝑤1, 𝑤2, . . . , 𝑤𝑚 exist, such that ∀  𝑖 = 1,2, . . . , 𝑛 the following equality holds: 
 
∑𝑗:𝑖∈𝑆𝑗 𝑤𝑗 = 1      (IV.3) 
 
Similarly, a cooperative game Γ = (𝐼, 𝑣) is balanced if for any balanced family 
𝑆1, 𝑆2, . . . , 𝑆𝑚 over 𝐼, with weights 𝑤1, 𝑤2, . . . , 𝑤𝑚, the following inequality holds: 
 
∑𝑚𝑗=1 𝑤𝑗𝑣(𝑆1) ≤ 𝑣(𝐼)     (IV.4) 
 
Therefore a game Γ = (𝐼, 𝑣) has a non-empty core if and only if Γ = (𝐼, 𝑣) is a balanced 
game.  
 
Regarding the Nash equilibrium [190], this solution mechanism can be defined as follows: 
 
The strategies 𝑧𝑖
∗, . . . , 𝑧𝑛
∗  are a Nash equilibrium if 𝑧𝑖
∗ is the player 𝑖’s best response to the 
other players’ strategies 𝑧1
∗, . . . , 𝑧𝑖−1
∗ , 𝑧𝑖+1
∗ , . . . , 𝑧𝑛




∗, . . . , 𝑧𝑖−1
∗ , 𝑧𝑖
∗, 𝑧𝑖+1
∗ , . . . , 𝑧𝑛
∗ )   (IV.5) 
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The payoff function 𝑓𝑖 is based on the cooperative part of the biform game, which can be 
solved by the core.  
 
Another relevant feature of biform games is that they take into account a confidence index, 
which is the link between the cooperative stage and the non-cooperative part of the game. 
This index can be interpreted as the players’ expectation about the outcome of the game, 
in terms of how well they could do within the game and therefore how much of the total 
coalitional value they could capture. This index is related to perceived competition and 
negotiation opportunities among the players [157]. 
 
In terms of specific applications of biform games, it is possible to find several studies with 
applications to microeconomics, particularly, the newsvendor problem [180], monopoly 
and market power [181], competitive advantages of intermediaries [182]; to management 
matters, namely manufacturing and supply chain [183,184,187], investment in 
relationship support assets [186], innovation networks [188], strategic mental models 
[189]; and even to telecommunications [185]. There is no specific application of biform 
games to generation and transmission expansion planning optimisation problems, even 
without considering community energy projects. Thus, in our opinion, given the 
expanding role of community-led energy projects in electricity markets, there is a need to 
develop biform transmission and generation expansion models, as we do here. 
 
IV.2.5 Linear production games main aspects 
 
Before formulating the proposed model and its main features, it is important to mention 
another type of game that is considered in this work: the linear production game. These 
games can be useful in situations where there are producers that want to produce goods 
maximising their profit, considering market prices, subject to limited available resources 
(bundles). Owen [192,207,233] demonstrates that these games are balanced and therefore 
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have a non-empty core, according to the Bondareva-Shapley theorem [194,195] shown 
above. These games can be mathematically formulated as follows: 
 
𝑣(𝑆) = 𝑀𝑎𝑥    𝑝1 𝑔𝑜𝑜𝑑1 + 𝑝2 𝑔𝑜𝑜𝑑2+. . . +𝑝𝑟 𝑔𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑟  (IV.6) 
  
Subject to  
𝑅11 𝑔𝑜𝑜𝑑1 + 𝑅12 𝑔𝑜𝑜𝑑2+. . . +𝑅1𝑟 𝑔𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑟 ≤ ∑𝑖∈𝑆 𝑅𝑖1(𝑆)  (IV.7) 
  





𝑅𝑞1 𝑔𝑜𝑜𝑑1 + 𝑅𝑞2 𝑔𝑜𝑜𝑑2+. . . +𝑅𝑞𝑟 𝑔𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑟 ≤




𝑣(𝑆) is the coalitional value of coalition 𝑆 ∈ 𝐼.  
𝑝𝑟 is the market price for good 𝑟.  
𝑅𝑞𝑟 is the amount of resource 𝑞 necessary to linearly produce the good 𝑟. 
∑𝑖∈𝑆 𝑅𝑖𝑞(𝑆) is the sum of the amounts of resource 𝑞 contributed by player 𝑖 to coalition 
𝑆, which player 𝑖 belongs to.  
 
As a consequence of this mathematical formulation, this type of game considers how 
coalition 𝑆 should produce/launch any good 𝑟 and maximise the corresponding profit 
taking into account the market price 𝑝𝑟 for that good, subject to the amount/quantity of 
resource 𝑞 that any player 𝑖, who belong to 𝑆, contribute to the coalition ∑𝑖∈𝑆 𝑅𝑖𝑞(𝑆). This 
can be used to model a cooperative energy project which is financed by its members. One 
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of the most useful properties here is that the solution of this problem is within the core, so 
there is no incentive for any player to unilaterally change its production level. 
 
The use of all these elements in the proposed model is shown in the next sections, where 
the main features, assumptions, and mathematical representations can be found. 
 
IV.3 Main features and assumptions of the model 
 
IV.3.1 Framework and main data 
 
In this section, we present the main features and assumptions of our model. First of all, 
our simple test network is shown in Fig. IV.1. 
 
 
Fig. IV.1. Market representation to be examined 
 
As it is represented in Fig. IV.1., in this market there are three nodes, which have the 
relatively inelastic demand function features and peak loads shown in Table IV.1.: 
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Table IV.1. Demand function features and peak loads 
at each node 
Node Intercept Slope 
Peak load 
(MW) 
1 110 -0.05 200 
2 50 -0.1 35 
3 70 -0.04 150 
 
Moreover, there are two large generators located at nodes 1 and 2, which represent a 
municipal solid waste/landfill gas power plant (MSWLG) and a natural gas combined 
cycle power plant (NGCC), respectively. Their technical and economical features are 
shown in Table IV.2. 
 










1 15.00 8,895,000 14 465.92744 
2 47.11 999,000 330 405.93243 
 
As far as possible, these values have been derived from real-world data. Generation costs 
consist of the average full load variable costs registered for two power plants in Chile 
(Santa Marta and Nueva Renca) in January 2019 [234], which correspond to MSWLG and 
NGCC technologies, respectively. Investment costs are taken from [235], and represent 
the overnight cost for each technology. Concerning the CO2 emissions per power plant at 
nodes 1 and 2, these values are calculated considering a typical heat rate for a gas turbine 
and a combined cycle gas turbine, respectively, multiplied by the corresponding emissions 
factor taken from [236]. Finally, each outcome is expressed in units per MWh. 
 
At node 3, there are three groups of electricity residential customers (or communities) 
with different annual disposable income and willingness to devote money in energy 
production. This information is detailed in Table IV.3. 
 








Willingness to devote 
money factor 
3 1 Low Income 500 324,900 0.1 
3 2 Medium Income 300 340,200 0.1 
3 3 High Income 100 352,080 0.1 
 
120 
     
To build up Table IV.3., we have gathered representative socio-economic information 
related to income characterisation of inhabitants in Chile, which can be found in [237]. 
Particularly, the customers annual disposable income values in Table IV.3. consist of the 
upper bound for categories YPCE7, YPCE4, and YPCE3 of the equivalent autonomous 
per capita income intervals (in Spanish, Tramos de ingreso autónomo per cápita 
equivalente) multiplied by the number of customers (randomly selected), the model time 
horizon (12 months), the willingness to devote money factor, and the corresponding 
CLP/USD exchange rate53.  
 
There are three groups of residential electricity customers who interact within the market: 
low income customers (LIC), medium income customers (MIC), and high income 
customers (HIC). These groups of customers, or communities, may choose participating 
in energy production by carrying out either a community energy project or a distributed 
generation/net billing project. The details about these projects are shown in Table IV.4. 
 
Table IV.4. Citizen participation in energy production projects details 
 Community energy project Net billing project 












3 1 0.01 2,020,000 0.01 3,285,000 
3 2 0.01 2,020,000 0.01 1,795,000 
3 3 0.01 2,020,000 0.01 1,887,000 
 
As shown above, all communities may participate in energy production by using solar PV 
technologies. The generation cost for the community energy project is very low, as only 
some minor operations and maintenance costs are required. The investment cost for the 
projects is obtained from [201], and is the same for all communities. On the other hand, 
the generation cost considered for the net billing scheme is very low, but investment costs 
are different for each community, given that each group of residential customers only has 
access to a particular type of solar PV equipment with a specific cost, which depends upon 
the specific capacity and vendor. Lower-income communities have a lower energy 
                                                 
53 The exchange rate used in this work is CLP/USD 0.00150, which corresponds to the value stated on the 22nd March 2019, 
according to OANDA.com 
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consumption level and lower access to capital. The investment costs therefore correspond 
to solar PV panels with an installed capacity of 1kWp, 3kWp, and 5kWp [238], for low-
income, medium-income and high-income communities, respectively. The final values are 
converted into USD through the corresponding exchange rate and expressed in per-MW. 
 
The details about the existing transmission lines in the network are shown in Table IV.5. 
 
Table IV.5. Existing transmission lines portfolio 







1 1 2 1 34.85 220 0.08 211.53 12,591,500 
2 1 3 1 23.24 220 0.11 105.76 6,295,750 
3 2 3 1 17.43 220 0.15 52.88 3,147,880 
 
Data for line 1 is based on real-world data about a line in the Chilean national transmission 
system (Chena 220 – Alto Jahuel 220) [239,240]. Data for lines 2 and 3 is scaled from line 
1 to represent lines with a lower capacity.  
 
Additionally, the details about the candidate new lines portfolio, based on arbitrary 
modifications of the above table, are shown in Table IV.6. 
 
 Table IV.6. Candidate new lines portfolio 







1 1 2 1 34.85 220 0.08 200 16,368,950 
2 1 3 1 23.24 220 0.11 100 5,036,600 
3 2 3 1 17.43 220 0.15 50 3,620,062 
 
IV.3.2 Characterisation of the incumbents’ problems 
 
Considering all the aforementioned elements and data, the relationships among the 
incumbent’s problems are characterised as shown in Fig. IV.2. 
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Fig. IV.2. Each incumbent’s problem related to the market representation treated in this work 
 
As shown in Figures IV.1. and IV.2., there is a network planner who wants to plan the 
transmission expansion of the system, taking into consideration a rational expectation of 
the expansion of the current two large generators’ capacity and the inclusion of new 
citizen-led energy generation initiatives. Such citizen-led initiatives can be either a 
community energy project or a net billing scheme, which are in agreement with the 
definitions shown above in subsection IV.2.3. The market clearing (operation) occurs in 
a further (lower) stage, where the decisions about the expansion are taken, as can be seen 
on the top of Fig. IV.2. However, as shown in our collapsed model on the bottom of Fig. 
IV.2, for mathematical convenience, we assume that this network planner pursues social 
welfare maximisation while anticipating not only the generation capacity expansion, but 
also the market operation (clearing). 
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As mentioned beforehand, there are two large generators that maximise their profits. We 
assume they have perfect information about the demand at each node of the system and 
they strategically act and exercise market power in a Nash-Cournot fashion. Moreover, 
these generators can expand their current capacities, making rational expectations of the 
market operation for profit calculation purposes. 
 
On the other side, there are three communities that consist of three groups of residential 
electricity customers with different disposable incomes. They can choose to participate in 
energy production by forming a coalition S={1,2,3}=I and using solar PV technologies 
within a community energy project or net billing scheme. They seek to maximising the 
profit of this project if they enter the business. These decisions can be seen on the top of 
Fig. IV.2., where communities face the non-cooperative part of their problem (game) 
related to the potential competition they might have with other initiatives or projects. 
However, they also need to invest in new installed capacity and allocate it among the 
customers that are participating in energy production. This implies deciding which 
initiative (community energy and/or net billing) is profit-maximising as well as stable 
(attractive), in the sense that no one would leave (change) the project or initiative. It is 
worth recalling that there is no initially installed capacity of such initiatives (in agreement 
with Fig IV.1.). These decisions can also be seen on the top of Fig. IV.2., where the 
cooperative part of the problem (game) related to the decisions about capacity/scheme 
(payoff) distribution is presented. These two stages, the non-cooperative and the 
cooperative one, are therefore collapsed and included within a same level (by modelling 
a biform game), as can be seen on the bottom of Fig. IV.2. 
 
In parallel, another problem arises: how much money residential customers could 
potentially invest in energy generation? They have limited resources and do not have 
perfect access to financial markets, so this question is very relevant. To know so, a 
community planner sets a rule (by modelling a linear production game) that communities 
have to follow (solve) at the same time they evaluate the opportunity to participate in 
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energy production. This rule establishes that communities need to take into account the 
costs, market prices, as well as their disposable income, in order to decide the optimal way 
to use their resources in energy generation (via a community energy project and/or net 
billing scheme). This rule also allows them to find an optimal maximum capacity to be 
invested, which ensure, at the same time, stability in the sense that no one would deviate 
or change that investment decision. From a more game-theoretical view, this way of 
modelling will allow to determine the maximum coalitional value to be distributed within 
the coalition and therefore facilitate the calculation of a solution under the core within one 
level. 
 
Thus, conceptually speaking, the collapsed model (with just two levels) shown on the 
bottom of Fig. IV.2. is our proposed bi-level three-node optimisation problem. From a 
more mathematical viewpoint, it is important to note that the upper-level (network 
planner) problem is therefore modelled as a mixed-integer quadratic optimisation 
problem, which is solved considering the optimality conditions of the lower-level 
optimisation problems as constraints, together forming an MPEC. Since the upper-level 
problem is convex (i.e., a continuously differentiable concave objective function over a 
convex set) and the lower-level problems are also convex, it is possible to replace the 
lower level problems by their Karush–Kuhn–Tucker (KKT) conditions and include these 
conditions as constraints in the upper level. The KKT conditions are necessary and 
sufficient for lower-level optimality. We linearise the complementarity conditions using 
the Fortuny-Amat linearization method [241], for which the corresponding equations are 
shown in the Appendix. 
 






     
IV.3.3 Incumbents’ problems formulation: a bi-level three-node optimisation 
model 
 
Following what was shown in Fig IV.2. in a bottom-up view, the incumbents’ equations 
that belong to our bi-level three-node optimisation model proposal are detailed as follows: 
 





𝑛 = electricity produced by the large generator g located at node n (in MWh). 
𝑔𝑔  𝑒𝑥𝑝





𝑛 = demand curve at node n intercept.  
𝛽𝑑
𝑛 = demand curve at node n slope.  
𝐺𝐶𝑔
𝑛 = variable generation cost for large generator g located at node n (in USD/MWh).  
𝐺𝐼𝐶𝑔
𝑛 = generation investment cost for large generator g located at node n (in USD/MW).  
𝑟 = interest rate.  
𝑡 = time.  
𝑞𝑔























)−1  }  (IV.10) 
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𝑛 ≥ 0 ⇒ −𝑔𝑔  𝑒𝑥𝑝
𝑛 ≤ 0      (𝜇1𝑔
𝑛)    (IV.11) 
 
𝑞𝑔
𝑛 ≥ 0 ⇒ −𝑞𝑔
𝑛 ≤ 0      (𝜇2𝑔




𝑛𝑀𝐴𝑋 + 𝑔𝑔  𝑒𝑥𝑝
𝑛 ⇒ 𝑞𝑔
𝑛 − 𝑞𝑔
𝑛𝑀𝐴𝑋 − 𝑔𝑔  𝑒𝑥𝑝
𝑛 ≤ 0      (𝜇3𝑔
𝑛)  (IV.13) 
 























𝑛 = 0   (IV.15) 
 
0 ≤ 𝜇1𝑔
𝑛 ⊥ 𝑔𝑔  𝑒𝑥𝑝









𝑛𝑀𝐴𝑋 + 𝑔𝑔  𝑒𝑥𝑝
𝑛 ≤ 0   (IV.18) 
 





𝑛 = electricity produced by a community energy project owned by community i located 
at node n (in MWh).  
127 
     
𝑞𝑖
𝑛𝑁𝐵 = electricity produced by a net billing scheme project owned by community 
(households) i located at node n (in MWh).  
𝐶𝐸𝑃𝑖
𝑛 = community i’s installed capacity allocation based on a community energy project 
(in MW).  
𝑁𝐵𝑖




𝛼𝑖 = community i’s confidence index (continuous parameter [0,1]).  
𝑝𝑛 = nodal price at node n (in USD/MWh).  
𝐺𝐶𝐶𝑖
𝑛 = community energy project generation costs for community i located at node n (in 
USD/MWh).  
𝐺𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑖
𝑛 = community energy project generation investment costs for community i located 
at node n (in USD/MW).  
𝑝𝑁𝐵 = net billing injection price (in USD/MWh).  
𝐺𝐶𝐶𝑖
𝑛𝑁𝐵 = net billing project generation costs for community i located at node n (in 
USD/MWh).  
𝐺𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑖
𝑛𝑁𝐵  = net billing project generation investment costs for community i located at node 
n (in USD/MW).  
𝑔𝑖  𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑
𝑛𝑁𝐵  = community i’s expected individual installed capacity based on a net billing 
scheme (if they acted by themselves) (in MW).  
𝑁𝐵𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑥𝑝
𝑛  = maximum installed capacity allocation based on a net billing project for 
communities located at node n (in MW). 
𝐶𝐸𝑃𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑥𝑝
𝑛  = maximum installed capacity allocation based on a community energy 
project for communities located at node n (in MW). 
𝑟 = interest rate.  
𝑡 = time. 
128 
     
𝑞𝑖
𝑛𝑀𝐴𝑋 = maximum installed capacity based on a community energy project for 




 = maximum installed capacity based on net billing projects for community 













































𝑛 ≥ 0 ⇒ −𝑞𝑖




)     (IV.20) 
 
𝑞𝑖
𝑛𝑁𝐵 ≥ 0 ⇒ −𝑞𝑖




































𝑛 ⇒ ∑𝑛 ∑𝑖 𝐶𝐸𝑃𝑖
𝑛 − 𝐶𝐸𝑃𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑥𝑝








𝑛 ⇒ ∑𝑛 ∑𝑖 𝑁𝐵𝑖
𝑛 − 𝑁𝐵𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑥𝑝




)         (IV.25) 
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𝐶𝐸𝑃𝑖
𝑛 + 𝐶𝐸𝑃𝑗
𝑛 ≥ 0 ⇒ −𝐶𝐸𝑃𝑖
𝑛 − 𝐶𝐸𝑃𝑗








𝑛 ≥ 𝑔𝑖  𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑




𝑛 + 𝑔𝑖  𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑
𝑛𝑁𝐵 + 𝑔𝑗  𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑




)  (IV.27) 
 
𝐶𝐸𝑃𝑖
𝑛 ≥ 0 ⇒ −𝐶𝐸𝑃𝑖




)    (IV.28) 
 
𝑁𝐵𝑖
𝑛 ≥ 𝑔𝑖  𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑
𝑛𝑁𝐵 ⇒ −𝑁𝐵𝑖
𝑛 + 𝑔𝑖  𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑




)  (IV.29) 
 



















⇒ (1 − 𝛼𝑖)𝑝











































































𝑛 ⇒ − ∑𝑛 ∑𝑖 𝐶𝐸𝑃𝑖
𝑛 + 𝐶𝐸𝑃𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑥𝑝






𝑛 ⇒ − ∑𝑛 ∑𝑖 𝑁𝐵𝑖
𝑛 + 𝑁𝐵𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑥𝑝
𝑛 = 0    (IV.35) 
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𝑛 − 𝑔𝑖  𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑
𝑛𝑁𝐵 − 𝑔𝑗  𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑














𝑛 − 𝑔𝑖  𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑
𝑛𝑁𝐵 ≥ 0     (IV.43) 
 






𝑛  = maximum installed capacity allocation based on a community energy 
project for communities located at node n (in MW). 
𝑁𝐵𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑥𝑝
𝑛  = maximum installed capacity allocation based on a net billing project for 
communities located at node n (in MW). 
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𝛼𝑐𝑜𝑚 = communities average confidence index (continuous parameter [0,1]).  
𝑝𝑛 = nodal price at node n (in USD/MWh).  
𝑝𝑁𝐵 = net billing injection price (in USD/MWh).  
∑𝑖∈𝑆 𝑅𝑖𝑛𝑣(𝑆) = coalition S’s resources available (disposable income) for covering 
installed capacity investment costs (in USD).  
𝑅𝑖𝑛𝑣  𝑁𝐵 = net billing project investment costs or necessary resources to conceive 1 MW 
of a net billing project (in USD/MW).  
𝑅𝑖𝑛𝑣  𝑛 = community energy project investment costs necessary resources to conceive 1 
MW of a community energy project (in USD/MW).  
𝑟 = interest rate.  




𝑀𝐴𝑋{𝑁𝐵𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑛 ,𝐶𝐸𝑃𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑛 }  𝛼𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝
𝑛𝐶𝐸𝑃𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑥𝑝
𝑛 + (1 − 𝛼𝑐𝑜𝑚)𝑝
𝑁𝐵𝑁𝐵𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑥𝑝
𝑛  (IV.44) 
 










(1 − 𝛼𝑐𝑜𝑚)𝑅𝑖𝑛𝑣  𝑁𝐵𝑁𝐵𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑥𝑝
𝑛 )] − ∑𝑖∈𝑆 𝑅𝑖𝑛𝑣(𝑆) ≤ 0      (𝜇1
𝑐𝑐𝑛)  (IV.45) 
 
 𝑁𝐵𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑥𝑝
𝑛 ≥ 0 ⇒ −𝑁𝐵𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑥𝑝
𝑛 ≤ 0      (𝜇3
𝑐𝑐𝑛)   (IV.46) 
 
 𝐶𝐸𝑃𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑥𝑝
𝑛 ≥ 0 ⇒ −𝐶𝐸𝑃𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑥𝑝
𝑛 ≤ 0      (𝜇4
𝑐𝑐𝑛)   (IV.47) 
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𝑛 ⇒ (1 − 𝛼𝑐𝑜𝑚)𝑝
𝑁𝐵 − 
(1 − 𝛼𝑐𝑜𝑚)𝜇1




















𝑐𝑐𝑛 = 0 (IV.49) 
 
0 ≤ 𝜇1








(1 − 𝛼𝑐𝑜𝑚)𝑅𝑖𝑛𝑣  𝑁𝐵𝑁𝐵𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑥𝑝








𝑛 ≥ 0    (IV.52) 
 





𝑛 = power load at node n (in MW).  
𝑓𝑙𝑛 = power flow from/to node n (in MW).  




𝑇𝐼𝐶𝑙 = investment costs of new transmission line l (in USD/line).  
𝑃𝑇𝐷𝐹𝑙,𝑛 = swing factors on line l related to power injection/withdrawal at node n.  
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𝑡ℎ𝑙 = thermal capacity of existing line l (in MW).  
𝑡ℎ𝑙
𝑛𝑒𝑤 = thermal capacity of new line l (in MW). 
𝑞𝑑
𝑛𝑀𝐴𝑋 = maximum demand or peak load at node n.  
𝑟 = interest rate.  





















































𝑛    (IV.55) 
 
∑𝑛 𝑞𝑑
𝑛 − ∑𝑛 ∑𝑔 𝑞𝑔
𝑛 − ∑𝑛 ∑𝑖 𝑞𝑖
𝑛 − ∑𝑛 ∑𝑖 𝑞𝑖
𝑛𝑁𝐵 = 0  (IV.56) 
 
𝑞𝑑
𝑛 − ∑𝑔 𝑞𝑔
𝑛 − ∑𝑖 𝑞𝑖
𝑛 − ∑𝑖 𝑞𝑖
𝑛𝑁𝐵 − 𝑓𝑙𝑛 = 0   (IV.57) 
 
∑𝑛 𝑓𝑙
𝑛 = 0     (IV.58) 
 
− ∑𝑛 𝑃𝑇𝐷𝐹𝑙,𝑛𝑓𝑙
𝑛 ≤ 𝑡ℎ𝑙 + 𝑡ℎ𝑙
𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑝   (IV.59) 
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∑𝑛 𝑃𝑇𝐷𝐹𝑙,𝑛𝑓𝑙
𝑛 ≤ 𝑡ℎ𝑙 + 𝑡ℎ𝑙
𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑝    (IV.60) 
 
Optimality conditions (IV. 14)  𝑡𝑜  (IV. 18)   (IV.61) 
 
Optimality conditions (IV. 30)  𝑡𝑜  (IV. 43)   (IV.62) 
 
Optimality conditions (IV. 48)  𝑡𝑜  (IV. 52)   (IV.63) 
 
IV.3.4 Specific assumptions and procedural considerations 
 
Some assumptions and procedural considerations need to be taken into account in order 
to solve the optimisation problems outlined above.  
 
First of all, as there are some differences in terms of units for some terms in all equations, 
all variables and parameters are converted to an hourly basis. Particularly, in terms of the 
investment costs for large generators and communities, including those for the community 
energy projects and net billing scheme projects, and new transmission lines, we assume 
that the corresponding incumbent would pay them back via an ordinary annuity 
considering an interest rate compounded hourly during the life cycle of a typical solar PV 
panel, which is 25 years in this case [121]. Thus, the hourly-basis interest rate 𝑟 =
0.1/8760 and the number of payments or capitalisation periods 𝑡 = 25 ⋅ 8760 are 

















     
Regarding the customers annual disposable income, denoted by ∑𝑖∈𝑆 𝑅𝑖𝑛𝑣(𝑆) in the 
model, this value corresponds to the sum of all customers’ annual disposable incomes 
divided by 8760. 
Secondly, the investment costs considered for installing 1 MW of a community energy 
project or a net billing scheme project, denoted by 𝑅𝑖𝑛𝑣  𝑛 and 𝑅𝑖𝑛𝑣  𝑁𝐵 respectively, are 
the same as those presented in Table IV.4. 
 
Thirdly, for simplicity, we assume that the best payoff that a community may get if it acts 
under another coalition 𝑆 ≠ 𝐼 ≠ {1,2,3} is 0.  
 
Fourthly, in order to consider and include, to some extent, the concept of fairness at the 
moment of allocating the capacity among communities, we consider a payoff allocation 
that is set out by the community planner based on how much each community might spend 
in new installed capacity for energy production, according to their available resources and 
the total resources that the coalition might have in total. Consequently, the community 














𝑛    (IV.65) 
 
Fifthly, from equations (IV.19) to (IV.52), which represent the communities and 
maximum capacity to be invested problems, it can be noticed that the parameter 𝛼𝑖 is 
applied to both energy projects options, namely community energy projects and net billing 
scheme projects. This means that, under the formulation shown above, we assume that the 
best payoff comes from a community energy project and the worst one comes from a net 
billing scheme project. The rationale of this is that a community energy project would 
imply a higher installed capacity and, thus, the payoff would be higher as well. 
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Nevertheless, we carry out an alternative approach, by applying the parameter 𝛼𝑖 to 
incomes and expenses, in order to reflect how confident the players are about the influence 
that incomes and/or expenses have on the final payoff and then on a specific strategy. This 
alternative approach therefore implies changes in some objective functions, constraints, 
and then KKT conditions as well. These alternative versions are shown as follows:  
 

























































































= 0   (IV.69) 
  














𝑐𝑐𝑛 = 0   (IV.70) 
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𝑐𝑐𝑛 = 0   (IV.71) 
 
0 ≤ 𝜇1






)−1( −(1 − 𝛼𝑐𝑜𝑚)𝑅𝑖𝑛𝑣  𝑛𝐶𝐸𝑃𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑥𝑝
𝑛 − 
(1 − 𝛼𝑐𝑜𝑚)𝑅𝑖𝑛𝑣  𝑁𝐵𝑁𝐵𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑥𝑝
𝑛 )] + ∑𝑖∈𝑆 𝑅𝑖𝑛𝑣(𝑆) ≥ 0  (IV.72) 
 
As noted above, we also include the term 𝛼𝑐𝑜𝑚, which is the communities’ average 
confidence index. This parameter consists of the average of all confidence indexes 
considered in our model. This is a basic way to merge each community’s confidence index 
into just one global confidence index, which facilitates the computation and solution of 
the community energy planner model. We encourage further research in terms of finding 
the most appropriate way to merge different confidence indexes, which is beyond the 
scope of this work. 
 
We first solve our bi-level three-node optimisation problem considering a base case for 
both approaches, taking into account all the parameter values listed above, and with  𝛼1 =
𝛼2 = 𝛼3 = 0.5, 𝑝
𝑁𝐵 = 100 USD/MWh, and 𝑅𝑖𝑛𝑣  𝑁𝐵 equal to the highest net billing 
investment cost listed in Table IV.4. We then further increase the competition between 
community energy projects and net billing schemes by considering the parameter 𝑅𝑖𝑛𝑣  𝑁𝐵 
as the average of the net billing investment costs declared in Table IV.4; we therefore 
carry out simulations for both approaches modifying the following terms: players’ 
confidence index (𝛼𝑖), customers’ (grand coalition) total disposable income 
(∑𝑖∈𝑆 𝑅𝑖𝑛𝑣(𝑆)), net billing injection price (𝑝
𝑁𝐵), and investment costs for net billing 
projects (𝑅𝑖𝑛𝑣  𝑁𝐵).  
 
We solve the bi-level three-node optimisation problem using Julia© 1.0.3 with Gurobi© 
8.1.  
138 




IV.4.1 Visual representation of results 
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Fig. IV.3. Results for the base case considering both approaches (confidence index applied to schemes and income/expenses). 
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Fig. IV.4. Simulation results for parameter alpha (confidence index) considering 𝛼1 = 𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛, 𝛼2 = 𝛼3 = 0.5, and 𝑝
𝑁𝐵 = 100 USD/MWh on the top, and 𝛼1 = 𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛, 𝛼2 = 𝛼3 = 0.5, and 
𝑝𝑁𝐵 = 50 USD/MWh on the bottom. Alpha is applied to schemes (left-hand side) and income/expenses (right-hand side). 
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Fig. IV.5. Simulation results for customers total disposable income considering 𝛼1 = 𝛼2 = 𝛼3 = 0.5 and 𝑝
𝑁𝐵 = 100 USD/MWh on the top, and 𝛼1 = 𝛼2 = 𝛼3 = 0.5 and 𝑝
𝑁𝐵 = 50 USD/MWh on the 
bottom. Alpha applied to schemes and income/expenses shown on each chart (same results for both ways of applying alpha). 
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Fig. IV.6. Simulation results for alpha (confidence index) considering 𝛼1 = 𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛, 𝛼2 = 𝛼3 = 0.1, and 𝑝
𝑁𝐵 = 100 USD/MWh on the top, and 𝛼1 = 𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛, 𝛼2 = 𝛼3 = 1 and 𝑝
𝑁𝐵 = 100 
USD/MWh on the bottom. Alpha is applied to schemes (left-hand side) and income/expenses (right-hand side). 
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Fig. IV.7. Simulation results for alpha (confidence index) considering 𝛼1 = 𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛, 𝛼2 = 𝛼3 = 0.1, and 𝑝
𝑁𝐵 = 100 USD/MWh on the top, and 𝛼1 = 𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛, 𝛼2 = 𝛼3 = 1 and 𝑝
𝑁𝐵 = 100 
USD/MWh on the bottom. Alpha is applied to schemes (left-hand side) and income/expenses (right-hand side). 
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Fig. IV.8. Simulation results for net billing installed capacity costs considering 𝛼1 = 𝛼2 = 𝛼3 = 0.5 and 𝑝
𝑁𝐵 = 100 USD/MWh on the top, and 𝛼1 = 𝛼2 = 𝛼3 = 0.5, 𝑝
𝑁𝐵 = 50 USD/MWh, and a limit 
on net billing installed capacity of 4.5 MW for communities on the bottom. Alpha applied to schemes and income/expenses shown on each chart (same results for both ways of applying alpha). 
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Fig. IV.9. Simulation results for net billing injection price considering 𝛼1 = 𝛼2 = 𝛼3 = 0.5. Alpha applied to schemes and income/expenses shown on each chart (same results for 
both ways of applying alpha).
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IV.4.2 Discussion 
 
Fig. IV.3. shows the numerical results in the base case, which considers residential 
customers who are neither confident nor pessimistic about the potential result they can 
obtain within this game (i.e., 𝛼1 = 𝛼2 = 𝛼3 = 0.5). From these results, it can be seen that 
there is an opportunity for community energy projects, even though a high net billing 
injection price of 𝑝𝑁𝐵 = USD 100/MWh is available in the market. This happens because 
the investment costs for net billing projects is relatively higher. Moreover, it is not a 
surprise that the capacity allocation among all groups of residential customers is almost 
the same, given that we set out a specific (fairness) rule that enforces it. This should be 
understood as a way to prevent unfairness among the communities in the real world, which 
might lead to an exit from the grand coalition. In this sense, it is important to mention, 
again, that the core assures stability rather than fairness. This can be seen by the fact that 
the coalitional and individual rationality principles are met, as we assume that if customers 
act alone (out of the grand coalition) their payoff will be zero. This situation might not be 
true in some circumstances, and this requires further research into replacing the core 
constraints within the biform games and/or examine the potential payoffs that customers 
might get out the grand coalition. We left this extension as future work.  
 
Another interesting result from Fig. IV.3. is that communities get a profit per hour when 
they enter the business, which is allocated according to the same capacity allocation rule 
shown above. This is very important for community energy projects as their nature is 
getting benefits that can be given to communities in order to benefit people. However, the 
role of the community energy project in this market is not enough to significantly 
deteriorate generator 2’s importance and market power. As can be seen in the results 
above, the generator located at node 2 influences the market and electricity prices at each 
node, which can be seen, for example, in the new line that is built for delivering energy 
from node 2 to node 3, as well as the flows across the network and the corresponding 
prices. In addition, the highest profit goes to generator 2 and CO2 emissions are not 
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significantly reduced. In any case, we highlight the fact that, as long as people enter the 
business, this is profitable under a community energy project.  
 
Fig. IV.4. shows the changes in social welfare and consumer surplus derived from changes 
in the low income residential customers’ confidence index (𝛼1), keeping the remaining 
confidence indexes for medium and high income customers at a level of 𝛼2 = 𝛼3 = 0.5, 
respectively, and considering different net billing injection prices (particularly, 𝑝𝑁𝐵 =
USD 100/MWh and 𝑝𝑁𝐵 = USD 50/MWh). We note that there are some differences in 
the trajectory of the social welfare curve, if we use both approaches (confidence indexes 
applied to schemes and income and expenses, respectively). This can be seen where the 
curves change their slope and start increasing again, when 𝛼1 = 1. In parallel, it can be 
noted from Chart 4 of Fig. IV.4 that the social welfare does not have a similar kinked 
shape, but instead increases for all values of 𝛼1 during the simulation. This can be 
explained because, in this case, there is no switch from community energy installed 
capacity to net billing installed capacity; on the contrary, the investment in a community 
energy project steadily increases as long as 𝛼1 rises. The main factor here is that the net 
billing injection price is lower (𝑝𝑁𝐵 = USD 50/MWh) so there is no incentive for 
communities to invest in a project that offers lower profits. However, in Chart 3 of Fig. 
IV.4, such a switch from one project to another happens because the confidence index is 
applied to schemes rather than income and expenses. Although the net billing injection 
price is also lower, a change in the confidence index more than compensates the gap, and 
therefore a switch happens. Nevertheless, we highlight that when the confidence index is 
applied to income and expenses considering a lower net billing injection price or, 
alternatively, when there is no switch from community energy projects to net billing 
projects, the social welfare is slightly higher than in the rest of the cases at the extreme 
(USD 14,781.55/h versus USD 14,666.71/h), when 𝛼1 = 1 and 𝛼2 = 𝛼3 = 0.5. At this 
point, the low income residential customers are totally confident whereas the rest of the 
customers within the grand coalition are neither pessimistic nor optimistic. Another 
interesting point is that when 𝛼1 = 0 and the confidence indexes are applied to schemes, 
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the social welfare reaches its maximum. Oppositely, if the confidence indexes are applied 
to income and expenses then the social welfare reaches its minimum. In any case, the 
difference at this point in terms of magnitude is not highly significant (approximately USD 
400/h). In both approaches, customers are generating energy through a community-led 
energy project at this point. 
 
Fig. IV.5. shows the results for both approaches at the same time, as their results are very 
similar, noting the impacts on the demand at each node, price at node 3 (where the 
communities are located), generation at each node, and CO2 emissions from generators 1 
and 2. In this case, all residential customers are neither pessimistic nor optimistic (𝛼𝑖 =
0.5) and two net billing injection prices are considered, as before, 𝑝𝑁𝐵 = USD 100/MWh 
and 𝑝𝑁𝐵 = USD 50/MWh. Charts 1 and 3 show how a change in the customers’ total 
disposable income affects the demand at each node and price at node 3. We clarify that 
the prices at nodes 1 and 2 remain the same during the simulation (USD 100/MWh and 
USD 47.11/MWh, respectively). As can be seen here, when the net billing injection price 
gets more competitive (i.e., when it drops) and there is a rise in the customers’ disposable 
income, it is more attractive for the customers’ coalition or grand coalition 𝑆 = {1,2,3} =
𝐼 to invest in more installed capacity based on community energy projects, given the 
investment costs and the potential revenues they can obtain in the spot market. In the same 
vein, the minimum price at node 3 that electricity consumers who are outside the grand 
coalition (outsiders, from now on) might get is lower (USD 64/MWh versus USD 
64.16/MWh). This implies that, in this case, community energy initiatives, in contrast to 
net billing, initiatives can also have positive effects on those that do not take part. This 
effect can also be seen in charts 2 and 4 where, as long as the income is high enough and 
prices are competitive, residential customers invest in community energy rather than net 
billing projects. This is more beneficial for the outsiders, as they save money when they 
consume electricity. In addition, Chart 4 reveals that when customers invest in community 
energy projects they can counter the market power exerted by generator 2 and decrease 
the CO2 emissions in the market to some extent, as long as they have sufficient capital to 
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do so. This is a relevant fact in comparison with the net billing alternative, as shown in 
Chart 2. This chart also notes that even with a low disposable income, the grand coalition 
would prefer to invest in community energy projects. 
 
Fig. IV.6 and Fig. IV.7. show the effects on social welfare, consumer surplus, power 
generation, and CO2 emissions derived from different extremes of confidence. 
Considering a net billing injection price of 𝑝𝑁𝐵 = USD 100/MWh, under a case that 
implies having medium and high income customers with confidence indexes 𝛼2 = 𝛼3 =
0.1, respectively, and another one with same customers but with 𝛼2 = 𝛼3 = 1, a 
simulation for the low income customers’ confidence index (𝛼1) is performed. It can be 
noted in both figures that the aforementioned approaches (confidence indexes applied to 
schemes and income and expenses) give different results. If we take into account Fig. 
IV.6. applying the confidence index to schemes, we can highlight that the higher the low 
income customers’ confidence, the more stable the social welfare gets (around USD 
15,000/h) and the lower the consumer surplus at node 3 is (about USD 200/h), if 𝛼2 =
𝛼3 = 0.1. When the confidence index is applied to income and expenses, the consumer 
surplus at node 3 remains stable at the same level (about USD 200/h), again, if 𝛼2 = 𝛼3 =
0.1. On the other side, the more confident all customers are, the higher the social welfare 
and customer surplus at node 3 are. In fact, the grand coalition could potentially increase 
social welfare by almost 30% (when the confidence index is applied to income and 
expenses) and more than double the consumer surplus at node 3. This can be explained as 
follows. As can be seen in Fig. IV.7., there is no such level of confidence needed to carry 
out a community energy project, if we apply the confidence index either to schemes or 
income and expenses. The difference lies on the magnitudes. If the confidence index is 
applied to each scheme when we have 𝛼2 = 𝛼3 = 0.1, the communities’ average 
confidence 𝛼𝑐𝑜𝑚 tends to a low value and so the investment costs for community energy 
projects and the final capacity to be invested and distributed inside the coalition. This 
implies having a higher capacity of community energy generation in the market, however, 
this stabilises as long as 𝛼1 converges to 1. When the confidence index is applied to 
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income and expenses, the results reveal that it is profitable to conceive a community 
energy project even though the confidence and therefore the final installed capacity are 
very low. Nevertheless, this implies that there are limited options to counter the power 
exerted by the large generators, especially generator 2, and therefore no significant effects 
on prices and emissions, as can be noted in Chart 2. On the other hand, when the 
confidence is much higher and the net billing injection price is more attractive for potential 
generators, the grand coalition will invest in net billing projects, as shown in Charts 3 and 
4. Of course, because there will be more local generation at node 3, there will be lower 
demand for more expensive electricity from other nodes so the price at node 3 decreases, 
demand and production at the same node (and within the system) increase, and CO2 
emissions from generator 2 exponentially decrease. However, according to the definition 
of net billing previously declared, we should have a huge installed capacity based on this 
type of projects, which consist of rooftop residential solar PV panels. This might be 
impractical in reality. 
 
To clearly see the effects derived from the above-mentioned limitation in terms of the 
effective installed capacity that net billing projects, according to our definition, might have 
in reality, we perform an experiment leading to the results presented in Fig. IV.8. In Fig. 
IV.8, we assumed that all customers are neither optimistic nor pessimistic (𝛼1 = 𝛼2 =
𝛼3 = 0.5). We firstly consider that there is a billing injection price of 𝑝
𝑁𝐵 =
USD 100/MWh. We carry out a simulation to see the effects on demand at each node, the 
price at node 3, generation at each node, and CO2 emissions derived from a decrease on 
the net billing installed capacity costs. The corresponding results can be seen in charts 1 
and 2. Then, we assume that there is a limit imposed by the community planner, in which 
customers within the grand coalition cannot exceed 4.5 MW of installed net billing 
capacity in total, which means that each customer (or household) cannot have more than 
5kWp of installed capacity derived from rooftop solar PV panels. Given this limitation, 
the net billing injection price becomes more competitive to wholesale prices and reaches 
𝑝𝑁𝐵 = USD 50/MWh. The corresponding results are shown in charts 3 and 4. It can be 
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noticed in Fig. IV.8. that the aforementioned limitation obviously affects the net billing 
scheme deployment, a limitation that is arguably closer to the reality, and although such a 
limitation exists, there are still incentives to deploy both schemes at the same time, if the 
customers face lower costs. This helps increase competition and lower prices for the 
coalition members and outsiders; that is, for the entire market. 
 
Finally, Fig. IV.9. takes into account a situation where all customers are neither optimistic 
nor pessimistic (𝛼1 = 𝛼2 = 𝛼3 = 0.5) and the net billing injection price changes. This 
figure corroborates that a higher price reduces social welfare and this particularly happens 
when the residential customers or the grand coalition switches from a community energy 
project to a net billing project, even though the communities’ profit significantly increases 
due to a higher injection price. This implies a very small increase of the spot price at node 
3, as the production and demand slightly decrease, and no effect on CO2 emissions. 
 
IV.5 General remarks and recommendations 
 
Considering the results shown above, we highlight that there are incentives to develop and 
deploy community energy projects, even considering the potential interactions they may 
have with other market participants, such as large generators that exert market power, net 
billing projects, etc. We demonstrate this by considering a novel methodology in 
electricity market modelling and, specifically, in generation and transmission expansion 
optimisation problems.  
 
In determining the effects of community energy projects, the confidence index and the 
way it is applied are crucial in determining the optimal solution and equilibrium. Therefore 
a dilemma arises: how to apply the confidence index? Is the best option to apply it to 
schemes or income and expenses? According to the results obtained, we observe more 
conservative values in those cases where the confidence index is applied to income and 
expenses, putting prices and costs of both citizen participation in energy production 
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options at the same level within a competition. This means, for example, that prices of 
both types of projects can be subject to the same confidence index at the same time to be 
chosen as the best option; if customers have a high confidence, so these prices take more 
relevance and become more important for the decision-making process in comparison 
with the costs. The opposite occurs when the confidence index is low so costs are more 
relevant. Thus, the confidence index can be interpreted as the confidence about how prices 
(income) or costs (expenses) influence the final outcome or payoff rather than a direct 
determinant of a weighted average payoff. Conversely, when the confidence index is 
applied to both schemes, the confidence index itself becomes more relevant and the 
decision-making process is mostly based on its magnitude or specific value rather than 
predefined prices and costs, especially when these two elements do not have a significant 
gap or distance between them. In this case, it is important to define which option may be 
catalogued as the “best” and “worst” one. This might be complex if the decision-making 
process is about choosing between two worthy options. To sum up, both approaches seem 
to be valid and therefore more research work is necessary to clarify this issue. Beyond the 
confidence index, the customers’ disposable income is clearly important, as well as 
investments costs; changes to both can help increase citizen participation in energy 
production.  
 
Accordingly, community energy projects are an attractive option to be considered as they 
offer stability and viability, from an economic-strategic perspective, as well as an 
interesting outcome, namely profits to be allocated. They also do not face, in principle, 
any significant limitation in terms of capacity in the same way net billing projects do, and 
do not need a high confidence and a very high (imposed) price (𝑝𝑁𝐵 = USD 100/MWh) 
to be carried out. In this sense, regulated prices or subsidies for renewable energy projects 
seem to be less popular in many countries so projects with a direct involvement in the spot 
market could contribute to a deeper citizen participation in energy production. Concerning 
this, a key factor needs to be addressed in a more detailed way, namely, how people can 
fund or devote money to a community energy project. We consider mild assumptions in 
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this work, but we encourage more research in order to design more advanced financial 
mechanisms or instruments that motivate people, under fair conditions, to get access to 
funding and then carry out a community energy project. Another important issue is that 
these models need to consider other variables, especially those related to social sciences, 
in order to produce more accurate outcomes in the near future, dealing with people’s 
intentions, feelings, expectations, etc. One path could be how to measure the confidence 
index in reality using, for example, surveys with a Likert scale, interviews, or other social 
sciences tools. 
 
A particularly interesting conclusion from our work is that community energy projects can 
have a positive impact even on those who do not participate in such projects. Again, this 
depends on the exact model parameters, but we find several cases where this happens, and 
where net billing distributed energy projects do not lead to the same result. This is an 
important outcome, which should be taken into account by policy makers, as positive 
externalities provide a justification for more support for community energy projects. 
Moreover, there is currently some concern that local energy developments can have 
negative impacts on lower-income households that do not participate in energy production 
initiatives; as we show, this concern may be valid but this effect can also go the other way, 
especially if community energy projects are considered. 
 
Based on all the aforementioned elements, we provide some recommendations:  
  
1. Design and evaluate more complex benefit allocation mechanisms that assure stability 
as well as fairness, considering models that deal with cooperative and non-cooperative 
behaviours at the same time, such as biform games.  
2. Explore more options to provide better access to funding with proper and fair payback 
mechanisms, interest rates, uncertainty and risks assessments, among other elements.  
3. Include social variables in this type of models in order to explicitly consider human 
behaviour in generation and transmission expansion planning optimisation problems.  
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4. Promote at a governmental level the use of this kind of model in order to better 
encourage, with a stronger financial and economic base, citizen participation in energy 
production.  
5. Define clearer and more explicit goals and milestones related to the aforementioned 
points, in order to improve the community energy emergence discipline, taking into 




This chapter proposes a bi-level generation and transmission expansion planning 
optimisation model, which attempts to evaluate the incentives for deploying community 
energy projects in real-world markets, addressing their interaction with other large 
generators and citizen participation schemes, such as net billing projects. This model 
combines biform games with linear production games in order to find stable and feasible 
solutions for the incumbents, from an economic and strategic perspective. As mentioned 
before, to the best of our knowledge, such inclusion and combination of these game 
theoretical tools has not been implemented yet, so we see many opportunities to further 
develop more research in the field of the community energy emergence as well as wider 
energy markets complexities.  
 
Using real-world data, mainly considering the Chilean context, we model and solve a bi-
level three-node generation and transmission expansion problem under mild assumptions. 
From our results, it is remarkable that community energy projects appear as an attractive 
option for residential customers to be involved in energy production, even when this 
option is economically disadvantaged compared to a net billing project with a higher 
(imposed) injection price. Community energy projects do not need a high confidence to 
be carried out, given their investment costs as well as the spot price they might obtain in 
the market. In any case, they might be jointly deployed with net billing projects as the 
latter would face a limitation in terms of the capacity that a household can bear. Besides, 
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beyond the confidence index itself and its relevance, it is key the way how it is applied 
and used in the proposed model. 
 
The results obtained might help countries around the world which would like to explore 
the idea of promoting citizen participation in energy production. This is especially true in 
those regions where the community energy sector is still unknown or incipient, so future 
research should  further examine explicit public policies in order to tackle climate change, 
promote a sustainable development in countries around the world, foster a more 
democratic access to free markets and capitalism, reduce inequality and transfer more 
power to communities, etc. 
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FINAL REMARKS AND GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this doctoral thesis, the main features of the Scottish and Chilean citizen participation 
in energy production sectors have been shown, with particular focus on the community 
energy sector in both countries. This includes analysis of the current Chilean net billing 
scheme through non-cooperative games, in order to better understand its economic-
strategic convenience for residential electricity customers. Furthermore, an exploratory 
assessment about the preferences for local energy initiatives based on solar PV 
technologies has been presented. This assessment was carried out by launching an online 
survey focused on residential electricity customers who live in Region Metropolitana 
(Santiago and its surroundings), Chile. Through social science tools, the customers’ 
willingness to participate in such projects (by devoting time and/or money) was analysed, 
including a novel independent variable related to the customers’ sense of ownership. 
Moreover, a pioneering, but simple game theoretical development was presented in this 
work, which considers the use of a novel tool in energy/electricity markets matters, biform 
games. Through such game theoretical developments, the economic-strategic viability of 
community energy projects was analysed and contrasted with other electricity provision 
schemes, including net billing. At the same time, this exercise dealt with games with a 
non-empty core and games with an empty core, which is relevant from a mathematical 
and economic perspective, as it would be possible to find an intuitive and reasonable 
solution no matter how the core is. Finally, in order to investigate the effects of 
community energy projects on the wider electricity system, a simple, but novel bi-level 
generation and transmission expansion planning optimisation model, which combines 
biform games and linear production games, has been presented. Given the nature of the 
economic problem behind such model, its formulation was developed as a mathematical 
program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC) problem, which involved determining the 
corresponding Karush–Kuhn–Tucker (KKT) conditions in order to find optimal solutions 
in a more efficient and accurate way. 
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Based on the data, evidence, and models formulated in this work, it is possible to highlight 
the following general conclusions: 
 
1. The Scottish experience in community energy development should be catalogued as a 
remarkable example (to be followed), not only in terms of installed capacity but also 
in terms of the social organisations that are currently participating in such sector, 
which are benefitting people in a sustainable way. 
2. The Chilean net billing scheme may not be the best support mechanism for citizen-led 
energy developments so other citizen participation in energy production schemes 
should be considered. Community energy projects can be the best strategy to follow 
for residential electricity customers in Scotland and Chile. Moreover, there are more 
opportunities for community energy projects to be implemented in comparison with 
net billing schemes in both countries, even when incumbents have uncertainty about 
their share of the project’s benefits. Unsurprisingly, cost subsidisation can further 
improve community energy incentives. 
3. Under more complex interactions within electricity markets, community energy 
projects might be competitive even when they are economically disadvantaged against 
net billing projects, bringing positive effects on social welfare, consumer surplus, 
nodal prices, and CO2 emissions under specific circumstances. 
4. The residential electricity customers considered in this work appear to be willing to 
participate in or devote money and/or time in local energy initiatives (based on solar 
PV technologies). However, at the same time, consumers are worried about the lack 
of financial resources necessary to fund those local energy initiatives. 
5. Consumers’ sense of ownership influences both willingness to devote time and 
willingness to devote money, which implies that who owns the project (a particular 
energy production scheme) matters. 
 
The above-mentioned points and the specific content revealed in each chapter of this work 
lead to the following more general recommendations from a policy perspective: 
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1. If a higher citizen participation in energy production is desired, then the Chilean 
government should refocus the current strategy and policy to foster other types of 
initiatives such as community energy projects. 
2. This would imply revising the current narrative around net billing projects and their 
preference, considering, at the same time, a shift towards long-term explicit goals in 
relation to the implementation and deployment of community energy projects across 
the country assuring, among other elements, low-cost access to the network (market). 
3. Such a new narrative on the promotion of community energy projects should include 
specific, achievable, and verifiable tasks or activities and milestones. 
4. It would be useful to investigate and, where necessary, correct any key factor that 
might be influencing the emergence of community energy projects, such as prices and 
costs structures, current laws and regulations, technologies, limitations and 
prohibitions, market power exertion and lobbying, etc. 
5. Communities need to be able to access the necessary funding to carry out energy 
generation projects. At the same time, even when the funding is provided, the project 
has to operate in a sustainable way, which may involve getting a client portfolio 
including long-term contracts like Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs). Thus, 
communities should be supported at the time of entering and running the business. 
This implies delivering content related to finance, management, economics, energy 
generation technologies, law and regulation, at least at a basic level. 
6. Community energy projects involve a variety of elements related to several fields of 
study, including history, psychology, sociology, economics, management, 
engineering, etc., so governments should promote multidisciplinary support to 
communities and electricity consumers in general, which should lead to fostering more 





     
Regarding a more technical and future-research perspective, some recommendations can 
be given as follows: 
 
1. All models presented in this work, with the exception of those ones shown in chapter 
two, should be extended to explicitly include social and environmental variables that 
take into account elements like willingness to participate in, sense of ownership, 
environmental externalities, carbon taxes, and so on, in order to refine the results and 
potentially get more relevant information for policy-making processes. In the same 
vein, other sharing/distribution rules based on biform games, for instance, should be 
included in order to design more innovative mechanisms that assure not only stability 
but also fairness. Of course, this might imply more challenges, and possibly a very 
high computational cost. 
2. Especially relevant is the specific calculation of the confidence index and the way it 
is applied. In this sense, social science tools like Likert-scale-based surveys might help 
to improve the estimation of this parameter, which would enable a more accurate view 
of people’s confidence over a particular economic-strategic interaction with other 
incumbents. This would lead towards a more accurate measure of the uncertainty and 
more evidence about which way is the best one to use the confidence index (over 
schemes or incomes and expenses). 
3. Another significant research topic in the near future should be the way citizens can get 
the funding to participate in initiatives such as community energy projects. 
Accordingly, more sophisticated financial models should be developed to take into 
account more complex variables that help to determine a fair measure of risks and then 
a proper interest rate calculation with the corresponding payback conditions. This 
would be very important, as communities might not all face the same terms and 
conditions to access the capital, especially in comparison with larger companies that 
they compete with.  
4. Further research addressing sociological, psychological, and other social variables, 
gathering more representative data to accurately describe the population, should be 
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carried out in Chile in the near term, in order to obtain a better idea about who would 
like to be involved in community energy initiatives and the implications of that. This 
would lead the development of novel tools, based on social and/or economic variables, 
to determine which scheme should be the proper one for a specific community. 
 
This research has been a first attempt to describe Chilean citizen participation in energy 
production sector, with focus on community energy projects, taking into account 
international examples such as the Scottish community energy sector. Furthermore, using 
game theoretical tools, this work attempted to demonstrate that the current Chilean net 
billing scheme would not be convenient for residential electricity consumers who want to 
be involved in energy production. At the same time, this work has been a first attempt at 
investigating whether Chilean citizens would be willing participate in energy production 
initiatives or not, by devoting time and/or money, and how this depends on their sense of 
ownership of these initiatives. Moreover, this work has been a first attempt at applying 
biform games to energy/electricity markets matters, including their inclusion in more 
complex generation and transmission expansion optimisation problems, with the objective 
of characterising the Scottish and Chilean community energy sectors, as well as providing 
evidence about their economic-strategic viability and competitiveness.  
 
The evidence presented in this work, should encourage further research and deeper 
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APPENDIX – LINEARISATION OF COMPLEMENTARITY PROBLEMS 
UNDER THE FORTUNY-AMAT & MCCARL APPROACH 
 












The complementarity inequalities (IV.50) to (IV.52) are linearised as follows: 
 
 
